MAURITANIA/FRANCE: POLITICAL PROCESS AT AN

S E C R E T PARIS 002253

SIPDIS

ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS USMISSION USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KDEM MR FR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/FRANCE: POLITICAL PROCESS AT AN
IMPASSE; AZIZ SHOULD "ACT LIKE VALL"

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 0723

B. NOUAKCHOTT 706

C. NOUAKCHOTT 582

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Romain Serman, AF advisor at the French
Presidency, said on December 10 that the political process in
Mauritania was blocked, with neither Aziz, President
Abdallahi, nor opposition leader Amed Ould Daddah willing to
compromise to reach a solution. Serman said that internal
GOF policy-making was complicated by a dispute between the
military/intelligence communities, which did not want to
weaken Mauritania's anti-terrorism cooperation with France,
and the civilian community, which did not want France to be
seen as "endorsing Aziz's coup." Serman said that this
policy dispute required him to tread carefully during his
November mission to Mauritania, where he met with Aziz,
Abdallahi, and Ould Daddah, each of whom were locked into
fixed positions. Aziz told Serman that he feared a U.S.
military invasion of Mauritania. Serman said that Aziz's
only reasonable course was to declare that he and other coup
leaders would not be candidates for the presidency and to
announce a plan for new elections. Aziz should, in effect,
act as previous coup leader Colonel Vall had acted. Serman
said that if Aziz did not, a coup against him by other junta
members or military figures would be possible. Serman said
that the EU sanctions process was moving slowly, with perhaps
eventual action in mid-January. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Romain Serman, AF advisor at the French Presidency,
reviewed Mauritania issues with us on December 10, focusing
on his visit to Mauritania during the November 22-23 weekend.
He was accompanied on that mission by Philippe Etienne, the
director of FM Kouchner's cabinet at the MFA; Serman made
clear that he, Serman, was the leader of the mission.

"Mission Impossible"
--------------

3. (S) Serman prefaced his remarks by saying that prior to
the visit, the GOF had conducted an intense policy review on
Mauritania, with two competing blocks emerging. One,
representing the intelligence and military communities, did
not want Serman sending strong signals about the return to
the status quo ante or pushing too strongly for the return of
Abdallahi to power. They argued that a strong and negative
message could jeopardize the cooperation that Mauritania was
providing France on anti-terrorism in the region,
particularly concerning al-Qaida in Maghreb and its
affiliates. Serman said that the other camp consisted of
members of the diplomatic community, such as himself. They
argued that France had to maintain a firm position critical
of Aziz, "otherwise, we would in effect be endorsing Aziz's
coup." Serman said that Claude Gueant, Chief of Staff at the
Presidency, ended the debate by deciding that Serman would go
to Nouakchott but would have to walk a careful line that
would neither provoke Aziz into reducing anti-terrorism
cooperation with France nor suggest that France was in any
way ready to accept the legitimacy of the coup. Serman,
shrugging his shoulders, said "they sent me on a 'Mission
Impossible' but I think I succeeded in not leaning too far
one way or the other." Serman said that a DGSE
representative accompanied Serman and Etienne to some of the
meetings; Serman indicated that the DGSE presence proved to
be inhibiting, as he thought it was no doubt intended to be.
(NOTE: The constraints placed on Serman may explain some of
the concerns about French policy noted in, e.g., ref A (para
6) and ref B. END NOTE.)


4. (S) Asked about the anti-terrorism cooperation
Mauritania was providing to France, Serman said that it was
not, in his view, that significant. "Mostly, they seem to
just agree to let our intel and military guys operate in
Mauritania. They don't really do all that much themselves,"
he said.


Political Stalemate
--------------

5. (C) Serman said that the political process seemed
blocked, with none of the actors willing to compromise.
Aziz, he said, no longer viewed Abdallahi as much of a
concern, the result of Aziz's holding power for roughly six
months. "Aziz views Abdallahi as something from yesterday,
and doesn't feel obliged to reach out to him at all."
Instead, Aziz told Serman that he hoped to stage "journees de
consultation" perhaps by the end of 2008, with elections
perhaps by June 2009. Serman explained that these "days of
consultation" were intended to bring together Mauritania's
political actors and allow them, together, to reach consensus
on a way forward, including a possible roadmap for the
elections. Serman indicated skepticism about the prospects
of Aziz's being able to organize such a meeting and to
involve others. Aziz had already said that Abdallahi was no
longer a factor.


6. (C) Abdallahi, for his part, said that he would not
negotiate with the junta. He said that he would accept being
reinstated as President, after which he would be willing to
resign in order to pave the way for elections. Serman said
that he was very fixed in stating this position and did not
offer much room to maneuver ("he has an 'all or nothing'
mindset"). Serman doubted that Abdallahi would agree to
participate in any "journees de consultation" that Aziz might
seek to organize.


7. (C) Opposition leader Ould Daddah told the French that
he wanted Aziz and the other coup leaders to pledge that they
would not run for the Presidency before he would agree to
participate in a political dialogue. Ould Daddah was no fan
of Abdallahi, and would not do much to help him, Serman
observed. Serman said that Aziz never committed on whether
or not he or other coup members would run for high office.
Aziz told Serman that "if I run, I will resign from the
ruling junta committee two months before the elections, with
the number 2 on the committee then taking over." Serman
remarked that even if the number 2 took over, Aziz would
likely retain all or a significant part of his control over
the committee. Aziz also told Serman that he would create an
independent electoral commission and would agree to
international observers for the elections. Serman remarked
dryly that the electoral commission would likely spend its
time buying the support of the 20 leading tribal chiefs
necessary for victory in any election.

Aziz
--------------

8. (C) Serman did not have many positive things to say
about Aziz, whom he met for the first time. He said that he
had few statesman-like qualities, either intellectually or in
terms of leadership. He had no charisma, was unable to look
Serman in the eye, and often spoke while looking at the
floor. Serman said that Aziz had spent his whole career in
the military on some sort of palace duty or another, which
meant he had a very narrow outlook. His one significant time
outside Mauritania consisted of his spending time observing
Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard in Iraq -- "which ought to
tell you something," Serman remarked acidly. Aziz had come
to power as part of a palace coup resulting from officers'
disgruntlement with Abdallahi and Aziz had no vision on how
to move forward. Aziz seemed to understand that he was in
way over his head, Serman indicated.


9. (C) Aziz at one point told Serman that he was worried
about a U.S. military invasion of Mauritania seeking to
effect "regime change." Serman commented that "it was stupid
of Aziz to believe such a thing and even stupider to say it
to us." Serman said that, instead of denying this, the
French delegation tried to exploit Aziz's fear and give him
some food for thought. Serman told Aziz that Barack Obama
would soon become President and that he was known to be a

strong supporter of human rights and democracy, and not
likely to support coups that had ousted a democratically
elected president such as Abdallahi. There was no reason to
believe that USG condemnation of the coup would change with
the new administration, and U.S. policy might well be
tougher. Serman said that Aziz's belief that the U.S. would
invade stemmed from remarks U.S. officials had made, or that
Aziz believed they had made, concerning "all means
necessary," and from a letter Abdallahi had written to
President Bush, which Mauritanian security forces
intercepted, in which he called for U.S. military action.


10. (C) Serman said that France's bottom line message to
Aziz was that he had created a deep and complicated mess that
virtually the entire international community found
unacceptable. Aziz and the junta were the only ones who
could rectify the situation, which involved, quite simply, a
return to constitutional and democratic rule. It was up to
him to deal with Mauritania's plight, and he could not expect
France, the EU, the U.S., or any other body to do it for him.

Scenarios
--------------

11. (C) Serman thought that Aziz might see the light and
decide to do what Colonel Vall had done after Vall's coup --
declare that he and his associates would not seek high office
and devote their time to organizing elections. Serman was
not sure Aziz was strong enough of character to do this,
however. Another scenario involved the possibility that
members of the junta, or other military officers, would
finally tire of Aziz's inept leadership and realize that Aziz
was taking Mauritania nowhere. They could mount a coup
against Aziz and then take Colonel Vall's approach. "There's
no way that anyone overthrowing Aziz in a coup would
subsequently act like Aziz -- who would want to be in his
position?" Serman was not certain which of the two scenarios
was more probable.


12. (S) When asked whether France supported Abdallahi's
return to power, Serman hedged a bit. He acknowledged that
President Sarkozy and others had strongly insisted that
Abdallahi be reinstated, "but that was a while ago. Things
have changed a bit now that time has passed. As I said, the
intelligence and military want us to ease up the rhetoric.
Moreover, we must keep in mind that many Mauritanians, of all
backgrounds, don't like Abdallahi. Public calls for his
reinstatement can actually work in the junta's favor."
Serman indicated that the landscape had changed enough that
making Abdallahi's reinstatement a sine qua non might not be
the best way to proceed.

EU Sanctions
--------------

13. (C) Serman described the EU sanctions process as
muddled. He said that Germany, Spain, Portugal, and the
Netherlands wanted the full 120-day period to run before the
EU's Article 96 process went forward. January 20, or
thereabouts, would mark the 120th day, Serman noted, the same
day that Barack Obama would become U.S. President. Serman
said that the EU would likely move towards sanctions after
the 120-period, per Article 96 guidelines.

Comment
--------------

14. (S) Serman was remarkably candid in describing the GOF
interagency fight over how firmly Serman's delegation should
deal with Aziz and the junta. He clearly indicated that he
would have been tougher had he not been put on such a short
leash. He asked that we not exaggerate France's policy
debate -- "we are still deeply committed to undoing the coup,
but we now have to proceed a bit more carefully because our
intelligence and military believe we have important interests
of theirs to protect. We may not be out in front as much as
we were but we of course still share everyone's ultimate goal
of restoring democracy in Mauritania." END COMMENT.





PEKALA