SUDAN/DARFUR: DECEMBER 5 P-3 CONSULTATIONS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002251

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KJUS PINR SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: DECEMBER 5 P-3 CONSULTATIONS IN
PARIS

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The President's Special Envoy to Sudan,
Ambassador Richard Williamson, met with P-3 counterparts in
Paris on December 5 and, separately, with AU-UN Mediator
Djibril Bassole to discuss Sudan, Darfur, and the Qatar
process. In the P-3 meeting, the UK and France agreed with
Williamson's assessment that recent events may have pushed
Khartoum to a more conciliatory position but that the way
forward was uncertain. The P-3 agreed to support the Qatar
Initiative, with Bassole playing a central role in the
process, and to maintain solidarity on the ICC issue, with no
shift in position unless Khartoum's behavior changed
dramatically. All agreed that Darfur rebel leader Abdulwahid
el-Nur's refusal to engage posed problems and that
consideration might have to be given to identifying another
leader who might better represent the Fur people. In their
separate meeting, Williamson expressed support for Mediator
Bassole's efforts to bring all parties together within the
Qatar process, focusing first on a cessation of hostilities.
END SUMMARY.

P-3 Meeting
--------------

2. (C) Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan Richard
Williamson held consultations with P-3 counterparts in Paris
on December 5 before meeting separately with AU-UN Mediator
Djibril Bassole. The P-3 meeting consisted of a working
lunch hosted at the MFA by Eric Chevallier, MFA spokesperson
and senior advisor to FM Kouchner. Also present were MFA
DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal and MFA Sudan desk officer
Frederic Bouvier; Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and
Technical Counselor Romain Serman (both from President
Sarkozy's office); UK FCO Special Representative Michael
O'Neill and FCO Sudan Unit deputy Bruce Bucknell; AF/SPG
Director Tim Shortley, AF/SE senior advisor Jana
Chapman-Gates, and Embassy assistant AF-watcher.


3. (C) SE Williamson provided an overview to begin the
discussion, noting that the Qatar process was a serious one
offering the best prospects for a political settlement, a
process that the USG had come to support. Williamson said
that Khartoum might be willing to cooperate as a result of
recent developments: the impending change in U.S.
administrations and the possibility that U.S. policy could
become tougher, the JEM assault that nearly reached Khartoum,
growing instability in Abyei and in the south, the ICC's
possible indictment of Sudan President Bashir, and Sudan's
failure to garner support against the ICC at this year's
UNGA. AU-UN Mediator Bassole is playing an active and
positive role. The potential for significant movement in the
right direction is in place, Williamson reiterated. Problems
of course existed, including the willingness of JEM and
Abdulwahid el-Nur to engage. Williamson noted as well
misgivings on the part of Libya, Egypt, and China regarding
Qatar's leadership role and the state of play.


4. (C) UK envoy O'Neill agreed with Williamson's
assessment. JEM had already sent a delegation to Qatar.
Abdulwahid needed to participate as well, although it was not
clear how to bring him in. (NOTE: The P-3 discussed
Abdulwahid several times during the meeting. In sum, all P-3
members expressed frustration at his intransigence and lack
of a willingness to cooperate. Williamson expressed
skepticism that Abdulwahid would ever play a constructive
role and questioned his desire to do so. There was general
agreement that while it was advisable to continue to
encourage Abdulwahid to participate in the Qatar process, the
time might come when it might be appropriate to identify
other Fur leaders -- perhaps from among the SLM/AW's
commanders on the ground -- who could supplant him as Fur
leader. END NOTE.) O'Neill said that the UK had not had
contact with Abdulwahid for several months. Chevallier said
that he would meet with Abdulwahid on December 6 and that
Abdulwahid had indicated that while he would not go to Qatar,
he would send a delegation to test the waters, but not
negotiate. Chevallier said that Abdulwahid was meeting with
some of his commanders in Paris to discuss Qatar. (NOTE:
Assistant AF-watcher met with Abdulwahid on December 4; he
said that he would not go to Qatar as long as the Khartoum
regime continued to persecute the people of Darfur and that
he would not/not send a delegation to Qatar. END NOTE.) In
response to O'Neill's question about the new U.S.
administration, Williamson, who is participating in the

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transition, said that there will likely be an attention and
muscularity that are hard to maintain at the end of an
administration. Williamson added that he has been impressed
with the approach of the transition team, and he will
encourage the new administration to pursue progress through
diplomatic channels during its first months in office while
also developing robust options in the event of non-compliance.


5. (C) Bruno Joubert, Sarkozy's Deputy Diplomatic Advisor,
said that Sarkozy met briefly with Bashir recently in Doha at
the UN Financing for Development meeting and told him that
"he knew what he had to do" in terms of cooperating with the
international community, although Bashir said little in
response. Joubert advised, and the others agreQQ, that
irrespective of how the ICC issued played out, it was
important to keep the pressure on Sudan and to continue
encouraging the Qatar process. Commitment to larger
objectives should not be swayed by ICC action against Bashir,
which Joubert thought could take place in January 2009. On
the ICC and Article 16, O'Neill restated the P-3 position,
with which all agreed, that there would be no change in the
P-3's stance unless there were some dramatic change in
Sudan's behavior. Joubert made the point that mere
cooperation with the ICC on the two Sudanese already under
indictment would not constitute such a change. There had to
be significant progress as well on the ground in Darfur and
with respect to issues such as UNAMID and Sudan's relations
with Chad before there could be any consideration given to an
Article 16 procedure. Given Sudan's track record, such did
not seem likely in the near term. He said that "we shouldn't
water down anything" for mere partial cooperation.


6. (C) Romain Serman, AF-advisor at the Presidency, raised
the idea of using the fear of ICC prosecution to create
fissures within the Khartoum regime that could bring about a
change in policy if not in leadership. He noted intelligence
chief Salah Ghosh's concerns that the ICC would soon indict
him and his desire to "save his skin."8 Serman believed
that Ghosh and others might be willing to cut their own
deals, or get rid of Bashir, if doing so would remove the
threat of ICC prosecution. Although agreeing that Serman's
idea had its merits, the others at the meeting indicated a
preference for continued pressure against the Khartoum regime
as a whole rather than separate approaches towards targeted
individuals. Williamson advised that the message be kept
general -- no concessions on Article 16, and a focus on our
central concern for concrete, verifiable progress on the
ground toward humanitarian relief and sustainable security,
with the possibility of enhanced cooperation with Khartoum if
real progress is demonstrated in these areas.


7. (C) O'Neill advised that formal talks not take place in
Qatar until after the ICC indicted Bashir, presumably in
January. O'Neill said that the Qataris could continue
preliminary work for the talks but should hold off until the
ICC took action. That would allow the talks to begin with
the ICC decision already in place and obviate the need to
make adjustments to any talks that would have begun while an
ICC decision was still pending. O'Neill also believed it
advisable that the UN Security Council respond effectively to
the ICC's indictment, as another means of maintaining
pressure on the regime. MFA DAS-equivalent Le Gal said that
AU-UN Mediator Bassole and the Qataris seemed to be working
on two meetings, the first with JEM or with JEM, Abdulwahid,
and perhaps SLA/Unity, and then a second meeting with all the
parties, including Khartoum. She reported, however, that
organizing the first meeting was plagued with complications
given the difficulty of working with the rebels. O'Neill
said approvingly that this scenario made it unlikely that
talks in Qatar would take place prior to an ICC indictment of
Bashir. O'Neill commented on the preference that the Qatar
process not take shape too quickly, as he had previously
signaled.


8. (C) Chevallier and Joubert left the meeting for other
engagements. Discussion continued, largely on the issue of
Abdulwahid and his intransigence. Williamson pointed out the
need for a more coherent P-3 strategy on Abdulwahid and
Khalil Ibrahim. The French, he said, have the most leverage
with Abdulwahid so perhaps the UK and the U.S. could play a
more useful role by isolating him into cooperation with the
French. The French noted that Abdulwahid had become a media
figure in France and that expelling him would likely cause
problems for the GOF. Williamson hoped the French would

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exert whatever leverage possible to encourage him to act
rather than wait on the margins.


9. (C) The meeting ended with P-3 members expressing
general agreement with the main issues concerning Sudan --
the ICC, Qatar, and the need to pressure engagement by the
rebels. They pledged to continue working together and to
keeping each other informed. The French and UK
representatives also expressed keen interest in the likely
approach the new U.S. administration would take, with
Williamson stating that the new team would take a serious and
active approach to the issue.

Meeting with Bassole
--------------

10. (C) Later on December 5, Williamson, Shortley,
Chapman-Gates and Embassy's two AF-watchers met with AU-UN
Mediator Djibril Yipene Bassole and two members of his staff,
Boubou Niang and Laura Diana Sitea. Williamson noted his
recent visit to Qatar and his favorable impression of the
process. He remarked on Bassole's important role and wished
him success in winning the engagement of the rebels,
particularly Abdulwahid.


11. (C) Bassole's delegation responded by providing an
update on it own activities and its engagement with the Qatar
process, including meeting with Bashir, JEM, and Chad
President Deby. It was important to meet with the Qataris to
understand the status of their efforts. Bassole met with
Khalil Ibrahim but not Abdulwahid, who "refused to meet."
Bassole was happy with the support offered by the U.S. and
France. Williamson noted uncertainties about Bashir, who had
indicated support for the mediator (i.e., Bassole) but whose
"commitment" to a cease fire was riddled with exceptions --
the cease fire would not apply in the case of "bandits" for
example. Bassole said that, despite these concerns, Bashir
seemed "sincere," with Bassole noting the perhaps limited
ability of Bashir to control events on the ground. (NOTE:
Bassole seemed to give Bashir the benefit of the doubt. END
NOTE.)


12. (C) Williamson said that, sincerity aside, Bashir's
support for the militias had been catastrophic and that some
militia members might find a life of violence more attractive
than one of peace. Bassole acknowledged this point and said
that Bashir had claimed that violence arose when his forces
were attacked. His recent cease fire statement had lasted
only two days before violence erupted.


13. (C) Bassole said that his objective was to have all
parties -- the Khartoum government, JEM, Abdulwahid, and
SLA/Unity -- work toward a cessation of hostilities, and not
simply a cease fire. After an agreement on a cessation of
hostilities, Bassole said that he would work towards holding
substantive meetings including all the parties. He said that
he would meet with Abdulwahid on December 7 to seek his
agreement to participate. Bassole was not certain that he
could change Abdulwahid's mind, but he remarked that there
was a need to move on "with or without Abdulwahid." Another
problem was JEM, which, according to Bassole, wanted to
engage with Khartoum alone. Bassole said that he told JEM
that while it might play a "leadership" role in the process,
it was impossible that it act "alone."


14. (C) Bassole's associate Boubou said that a Bashir-Deby
meeting might also be possible. Bashir expressed to Bassole
a willingness to meet with Deby in El Fasher, after the Dakar
Contact Group meeting scheduled for January in Khartoum.
Boubou said the Bashir-Deby meeting could therefore take
place late in January. When Williamson mentioned Libya,
Bassole said there had been plans for Bashir and Deby to meet
in Libya but he did not know why that had not happened.
Williamson commented that the power relationships of Bashir
and Deby were not symmetrical -- Bashir had far more leverage
over the Chad rebels than Deby had over JEM, which could
obtain support elsewhere. Williamson thought that Deby would
be happy to be rid of the Chad rebels but he would have
problems breaking ties with JEM, in part because of Zaghawa
clan issues. Bassole indicated agreement with this view and
reiterated his intention to get all parties involved in what
he hoped would lead to a cessation of hostilities. Bassole
seemed convinced that Deby sought to be engaged, wanted to be
seen as a peacemaker, and wanted input into a solution to the
region's problems.

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15. (C) Bassole understood that Bashir's indictment by the
ICC was likely to happen in January. As mediator, he said he
took no position on the ICC issue -- it was not part of his
mandate and he wanted to remain impartial. If Bashir were
indicted, Bassole said that he did not know how the peace
process would be affected. It was quite possible that
neither the government of Sudan nor the rebels would be
inclined to cooperate further. Williamson explained the
USG's position and the need for Sudan to cooperate fully on
all issues and to effect meaningful change on the ground.


16. (C) Asked about cease fire monitors, Bassole repeated
that he was seeking a cessation of hostilities and not just a
cease fire. That was his first objective. This would
hopefully lead to improved security in Darfur. Bassole
acknowledged the need for a monitoring mechanism. Williamson
raised an SPG proposal for a monitoring mechanism that has
been proposed to UNAMID and the GOS. Whatever mechanism is
best, he said, we stand ready to assist, and AF/SPG Director
Shortley could provide more information as needed.


17. (C) Bassole said that he had talked to Minni Minawi,
who sent unclear signals on the role he might play in the
peace process. Minni Minawi said he would not participate as
a member of the Khartoum government or as a member of the
rebel contingent. Bassole said that Minni Minawi could play
an important role and that this was under consideration.
Bassole said that questions about Minni Minawi's role led to
questions about the viability of the DPA itself and whether
it was "still alive." Bassole said he would continue
studying Minni Minawi's possible role in future events.
Williamson agreed on the possible need to repackage the DPA,
which contained useful elements but carries a great deal of
baggage. Williamson and Bassole then discussed the role of
civil society in the peace process, an issue that also
touched on the leadership roles of the rebel factions.


18. (C) Echoing comments made at the P-3 meeting, Bassole
mentioned the problems posed by Abdulwahid, including the
possible need to tell him that the "train was leaving the
station" and that he needed to join the process or be left
behind. Bassole stressed as well the need to get the JEM and
SLA/Unity involved in his proposal for a cessation of
hostilities. In response to Chapman-Gates's question about
how the P-3 could assist, Bassole repeated his intention to
organize meetings centered around Doha featuring
participation by all the parties. He said that the P-3 could
play a useful role in promoting his efforts and encouraging
the parties to engage, including Abdulwahid and the other
rebel leaders.


19. (C) The meeting concluded with Williamson and the other
USG officials promising to remain in touch with Bassole and
his mediation team and to offer its support where possible.


20. (U) SE Williamson has cleared this message.



PEKALA