FRENCH MFA ON CHAD; SEES LIBYA ANGLING TO DELIVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002225

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO SU CD FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON CHAD; SEES LIBYA ANGLING TO DELIVER
DEBY-BASHIR MEETING

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young. Reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: Chad President Deby's military gains have
outpaced consolidation of his political position, French AF
DAS-Equivalent for Western and Central Africa Christine Fages
commented in a brief December 5 meeting with AF/SPG Director
Timothy Shortley and Africa Watcher. A Deby-Bashir meeting
was in the offing, Fages believed, but Libya wanted to be the
driving force, so as to demonstrate its staying power as a
player on Darfur. Fages suggested the USG could play a
highly constructive role in Chad by maintaining channels to
the rebels, reinforcing the need for Deby to respect the
electoral calendar regardless of spikes in violence, and, if
possible, by helping train Chad's aerial assets. Neither
EUFOR nor MINURCAT was capable of checking JEM recruitment in
IDP camps, she argued. From a Chadian perspective, rebel
leadership drawn from the Goran tribe would be preferable to
that of other ethnic groups whose populations spill over the
border into Sudan. End Summary.


2. (C) Addressing efforts to arrange a meeting between Sudan
President Bashir and Chad President Deby, DAS-Equivalent for
Western and Central Africa Christine Fages noted the two
leaders had missed a chance at Doha, where they were both
present; however, she speculated that Libya wanted credit for
orchestrating such an encounter and would not let it take
place in Qatar. Delivering a Deby-Bashir meeting would
demonstrate, in Tripoli's thinking, that Libya remained a
player in "the game" on Sudan, Fages speculated. She relayed
rumors of a possible summit as early as 15 December. (Note:
AU-UN Envoy Bassole told SE Williamson and AF/SPG Shortley
later (septel) that he judged a Deby-Bashir meeting was
unlikely by end-2008.)


3. (C) Turning to Deby's domestic situation, Fages stated
the Chadian leader's position had strengthened militarily
since February, thanks to acquired augmented air assets,
notably helicopters. Augmented military force, however, did
not equate with enhanced political influence. The 13 August
agreement with Chadian rebels had helped Deby's standing
internationally, but it would be judged by whether the rebels
saw tangible deliverables. The USG could play a constructive
role, she suggested, by maintaining contact with the rebels
and by reinforcing the message to Deby on the need to
maintain the electoral calendar, even if violence spikes anew
in the east. She also drew USG attention to the need for
military training for Deby's air assets, regretting this was
off limits for the GoF due to restrictions on training the
Ukranian pilots employed by Chad as well as a lack of French
technical expertise in dealing with Sukhoi aircraft. (She
emphasized there was no indigenous Chadian air capability.)
Shortley suggested that French AF PDAS-Equivalent Caroline
Dumas could raise this point again during December 16 EU-U.S.
consultations on Africa in Washington.


4. (C) Deby's military advantages had grown, Fages
reiterated, but shifting troop loyalty remained a core
problem and Deby had to be watchful of assassination. The
JEM, moreover, were redoubtable fighters. Asked how the GoF
or EUFOR could check JEM recruitment in IDP camps within
Chad, Fages confessed to being stymied. French gendarmes
with EUFOR were temporarily providing camp security, a
function that MINURCAT would assume, but all international
forces were limited to the camp perimeter, with the
Government of Chad itself responsible for internal camp
security. She described the camp at Beida, in particular, as
a virtual "JEM city."


5. (C) Rebels within Chad still lacked clear leadership,
with tribal rivalry and identity a sticking point, Fages
commented. Mahamat Nouri was an optimal candidate to whom
Chadian opposition could rally. There was an advantage in
Nouri's being from the Goran tribe, since they did not
straddle the border with Sudan, unlike the Arab, Bidayat or
Zaghawa, thus minimizing the risk that a Goran-driven rebel
movement would replicate the pattern of JEM cross-border
activities. From Bashir's perspective, however, an Arab-led
rebellion would cause maximum difficulty for Deby, since it
would find a ready base of support within Sudanese territory.


6. (U) AF/SPG Director Shortley cleared this message.







STAPLETON