FRANCE-RUSSIA RELATIONS: DIALOGUE IS KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002196

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR RS
SUBJECT: FRANCE-RUSSIA RELATIONS: DIALOGUE IS KEY

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathleen
Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

NOTE: This cable replaces and corrects PARIS 02166.


1. (C) The France-Russia relationship has been rather
turbulent since France assumed the rotating EU presidency in
July. The short August war between Georgian and Russian
troops heightened tensions in the region and presented
President Sarkozy with the perfect opportunity to showcase
both his diplomatic skills and his campaign promise to be
tough on Moscow. Time, pressure from European allies, and
the French President's desire to score diplomatic victories,
however, have conspired to push Paris's policy on Russia away
from the robust, "hold Russia accountable" attitude trumpeted
at the beginning of the Presidency to a more lenient, almost
"business as usual" -- as much as French officials deny it --
approach. This evolution in French policy threatens to allow
continued Russian intransigence on matters such as the
cease-fire in Georgia, missile defense and other European
Security issues. French officials do not tire of asserting
that dialogue is the best -- if not the only -- way to deal
with Moscow's obstinate approach to many foreign policy
issues even as they admit that Europe's growing influence in
Russia's neighboring countries means Russia may convince
Moscow to be more cooperative. End Summary

Sarkozy's Evolving Policy
--------------


2. (C) The Elysee was undoubtedly up in arms after reading
an opinion piece in the latest edition of French newsweekly
"Le Nouvel Observateur" that detailed the ways in which
Sarkozy's Russia policy has changed. The article cites
Sarkozy's declaration at a conference in Evian in October
that Moscow had carried through on all the cease-fire
commitments previously agreed to as a symbol that France and
Europe could return to business as usual with Russia --
including resumption of negotiations on an EU-Russia
Partnership agreement. It quoted a Russian official as
saying: "Sarkozy did exactly what we were hoping by
essentially giving France's blessing for the annexation of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. France, today, is Russia's best
friend in Europe." This, the article concludes, shows just
how accommodating Sarkozy has become since he became the
president of France.


3. (C) French officials have responded to Embassy inquiries
about this article in various ways. Damien Loras, Sarkozy's
key advisor at the Elysee on Russia and the Americas, said
that the Nouvel Observateur journalist had actually called to
apologize for the article, which came across as more critical
than she intended. While it is true that Sarkozy went too
far in his praise for Russia in the press conference
following the EU-Russia summit, Loras continued, we need to
focus on what Sarkozy actually said in the meetings with
Medvedev and during a press conference in Washington on
November 20. MFA A/S equivalent for Continental Europe
Roland Galharague separately observed that in both cases
Sarkozy, who emphasized that Russia has not fulfilled the
promises it made in the August and September cease-fire
agreements, was demonstrating more of the "tough love"
approach he generally takes towards Russia. Galharague
echoed Loras when he said that he thought very little had
actually changed in Sarkozy,s approach to Russia and that
journalists were simply looking for an interesting story and
not necessarily reflecting reality. Galharague said he saw
little in private to fuel the public perception that Paris
was ready to move closer to Moscow.


4. (C) Parenthetically, Galharague confirmed that Sarkozy
was using his own script with Medvedev, noting that with all
due respect to his Elysee colleague, Sarkozy did not follow
the instructions his advisors give him. (Comment: Russia is
far from the only subject area about which we have heard this
critical observation. End Comment.) He also said that
Sarkozy approaches many of these matters "politically" rather
than as a diplomat would, i.e., without considering all the
nuances in a given subject or caring about its historical
evolution.


5. (C) Another MFA official, DAS equivalent for Russia and
the CIS countries Alexandre Vulic, seemed to agree that
Sarkozy has moved from a more skeptical and critical posture
to one that seemed to be more pragmatic. While emphasizing
that this was his personal opinion, Vulic said that Sarkozy's
diplomacy toward Russia is partly motivated by a desire for a
"success story." This was especially evident during the
Georgia conflict. Vulic also noted a rhetorical toning down
of public references to Russia, which had initially been much
more stark and critical. Sarkozy has become more pragmatic
towards the Russians, Vulic concluded: he clearly prefers
working with Russia to confronting it and wants to move the
relationship forward while taking into account events on the
ground in places like Georgia. Vulic opined, however, that
Sarkozy, like the rest of the GOF, is still making up its
mind about Medvedev to determine whether he will be a
hardline leader or one more receptive to change. Vulic
concluded that France's position towards Russia, especially
once it is no longer the EU president, will continue to
develop. He credits German pressure on Sarkozy to tone down
his attitude toward Russia as being a key external influence
driving the current tendency toward pragmatism, and said that
Paris will continue to look to Germany's approach towards
Russia. This does not mean that France will do everything
that Germany does or wants, but Paris, position on Russia
could be more heavily influenced by Berlin than it even is
currently.

Dialogue, not Confrontation, Will Reduce Intransigence
-------------- --------------


6. (C) French officials do not seem concerned that
Sarkozy's morphing attitudes towards Moscow will allow
Moscow's intransigence on issues like Georgia, European
Security and missile defense to continue. Every official at
the Elysee and MFA, regardless of rank or title, emphasized
that dialogue, rather than confrontation, is the best way to
get Moscow to cooperate more. Russia cannot and should not
be pushed "off-stage" at this point, Damien Loras said. The
EU has to continue moving forward on a partnership agreement
with the Russians because it cannot base its relationship
with Russia solely on August's events in Georgia. Besides,
Loras continued, meetings such as the EU-Russia summit give
France and the EU the opportunity to encourage Russia in the
right direction, as France did when it complimented the
Russian delegation in Nice on Moscow's efforts to resolve the
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Such diplomacy, the French emphasized, would be immensely
helpful in resolving the situation with Georgia. Vulic also
emphasized the importance of dialogue with the Russians,
although when we asked how the French planned to make the
Russians follow through on all cease-fire components, Vulic
answered rather uncertainly that "we will simply have to keep
reminding the Russians that they have not completely complied
with the cease-fire agreements" until Moscow acts.


7. (C) Continued dialogue and interaction with Moscow is
especially important on issues like Missile Defense and
Russia's proposal for a European security treaty, and also
help to explain Sarkozy's desire for an OSCE summit sometime
during 2009. Loras said that we should not expect any
spectacular developments from the OSCE summit Sarkozy has
proposed. France's intention for such a summit is really to
take control of Medvedev's plan for a European security
architecture so that Russia cannot try to use such a format
to divide Europe or create an organization of which Moscow is
in charge.


8. (C) Dialogue is also increasingly crucial, Vulic said,
because France and Europe are becoming progressively more
important in the area that Moscow considers its "sphere of
influence." Russia can be a difficult partner, Vulic added,
but it also recognizes that the EU is a major player in its
neighborhood. The Kremlin has realized that it lost a lot of
ground with its neighbors (i.e., CIS members) during the war
with Georgia, which gives France and the EU more
opportunities to compete for influence in Russia's "near
abroad." Constructive dialogue will help Russia understand
that democracy and cooperation with Europe will not pull
countries like Ukraine away from Russia but will make them
stronger and more secure, which will, in turn, increase
Russia's security.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Sarkozy's Russia policy reflects his penchant for
pragmatic relationships that benefit France and highlight his
own skills as a politician and deal-maker. His personal
vision of what security, stability, and other aspects of good
bilateral relationships include is evident not just in his
desire to confront tense situations head on but also in his
determination to forge productive relationships even with
those others may consider beyond the pale. In that respect,
Sarkozy has dealt with Russia in a manner similar to his
approaches that towards Syria, Libya, and China. The year
2008 opened with a high profile -- and risky -- initiative
with Syria over Lebanon and will end with considerable
attention focused on his controversial determination to
resist pressure from other EU countries to restrict or close
off engagement with Russia. In each instance, Sarkozy set
out from a position that could be considered unyielding in
its demands for the other country's behavior, and in each
case, when faced with the opportunity to stick to that hard
position or engage in dialogue with that country (with some
clear benefit to his and France's prestige),Sarkozy chose
the latter. By doing this, Sarkozy has effectively recanted
one of his campaign promises related to foreign policy: he
is making diplomacy personal and taking it upon himself to
get the diplomatic job done. This tendency to prefer to do
it himself at the level of the summit rather than rely on his
diplomatic establishment or even his advisors is becoming a
hallmark and has eroded his follow-through on his other
foreign policy commitment to pursue a more "moral" foreign
policy. Additionally, the change in Sarkozy's position
towards Russia seems to point to his desire to remain at the
forefront of the EU's efforts to figure out the best way to
deal with a resurgent Russia. Sarkozy's endeavors both to
work with Russia as a whole and Medvedev personally may,
therefore, be attempts to maneuver himself into a leadership
role that he hopes to maintain after the EU presidency passes
to the Czech Republic in January. End comment
STAPLETON