EU DIPLOMATS PREDICT LITTLE PROGRESS WITH TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002156

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN TU FR
SUBJECT: EU DIPLOMATS PREDICT LITTLE PROGRESS WITH TURKEY
IN 2009

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas
ons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. A quick survey of EU diplomats in Paris in
November 2008 produced consensus that expectations for
Turkey-EU relations in 2009 should be modest. Though the
incoming Czech and then Swedish EU presidencies are more
pro-Turkey than President Sarkozy's France, our contacts
agree with the November EU report that Turkish reforms are
lagging and that the slow opening of accession chapters will
remain, at best, at the current rate of two per presidency.
There have been positive developments in Turkey-EU relations
this year, with Turkey emerging as a more "strategic"
regional partner, as demonstrated by its constructive role in
the Caucasus, facilitating Israel-Syria exchanges, and
initial outreach to Armenia. Ongoing Cyprus negotiations
could also produce progress towards an eventual unblocking of
cooperation between Turkey and the EU, as well as between the
EU and NATO. Despite the controversy provoked by Turkey's
last-minute request for a Deputy Secretary General position
at the Union for the Mediterranean ministerial in early
November, none of our interlocutors raised the issue as
likely to color EU-Turkey relations next year. Nonetheless,
these diplomats conclude that negative dynamics are likely to
prevail in EU-Turkish relations in 2009, especially with
elections in Germany, the European Parliament, and Turkey
itself in which the issue of Turkey-EU relations may be
divisive. We note that President Sarkozy remains opposed to
Turkish EU Accession and the best his EU partners can hope
for is that that his pragmatic approach to allow negotiations
on chapters of the acquis that do not presuppose EU
membership will continue, even if it there is no change in
the overall French position against Turkish membership in the
future. End summary.

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CZECH EU PRESIDENCY
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2. (C) Czech diplomat Marketa Cermakova reiterated on
November 14 support for Turkish accession and desire to
maintain the momentum of accession negotiations. She said
the incoming Czech presidency is optimistic that Turkish
reforms will enable the opening of two or three chapters
during the Czech presidency. The Czech presidency team is
currently focused on chapters no. 16 (taxation) and 19
(social policy and employment),conditioned of course on
Turkish progress towards the criteria and developments in the
final weeks of the French presidency. She noted that the
Czech Republic would also like to open chapter no. 15
(energy),which is blocked for political reasons. The Czech
goals for Turkey-EU relations were affirmed in a November 6
bilateral meeting in Ankara as part of the incoming Czech
presidency's "tour of capitals" of both EU members and
candidate states.

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GERMAN ELECTIONS
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3. (C) FM Kouchner's advisor for Franco-German relations,
German exchange diplomat Irmgard Maria Fellner (please
protect),said on November 17 that she expected Turkey-EU
engagement to slow during a 2009 German federal election
season in which this will likely be a divisive issue. German
FM Steinmeier, who will challenge Chancellor Merkel in the
elections scheduled for September 2009, has come out vocally
in support of Turkish EU accession and has rallied some
prominent German citizens of Turkish origin to his cause.


4. (C) On the other hand, German diplomat Barbara Wolf said
that Merkel's party would seek to keep Turkey from becoming a
major issue in the German federal elections as well as in the
2009 European Parliamentary elections. However, Wolf said
these social issues are so volatile that an incident could
easily occur to bring differences with Turkey into focus in
Germany (such as in 2007, when the public was scandalized by
the eight-month incarceration of a German 17-year-old in
Turkey awaiting trial for the alleged rape of a younger
teenager). However, she dismissed Steinmeier's recent
profession of support for Turkish accession as one of many
"trial balloons," noting that the combined votes of the
German Green Party, citizens of Turkish descent, and any
other pro-Turkey constituencies would alone not have enough
clout to determine the election in Steinmeier's favor. That
said, both diplomats agreed that a surprise Steinmeier
victory in late 2009 could dissolve the Franco-German
understanding that, under Merkel and Sarkozy, has been the
cornerstone of today's EU reticence towards Turkey.


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TURKISH ELECTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION
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5. (C) Wolf also noted that her counterparts at the German
Embassy in Ankara expect Turkey's local elections in March
2009 to have a very negative impact on Turkey-EU relations,
simply because EU accession is not a priority of the
governing AKP party. However, most of our interlocutors
remarked on the deterioration in the "second track" of
Turkey-EU relations: serious public opinion problems on both
sides. Turkish diplomat Ahmet Aydin Dogan noted that the
French EU presidency had offered France an opportunity to
improve its poor image in Turkey, which France will likely
"miss" when only two accession chapters are opened. One
effort to address the lack of mutual understanding is a
planned French-Turkish "cultural season" beginning summer

2009. (Dogan noted that the idea began at a low point of
bilateral relations in 2006, under then-President Chirac).
Dogan reported that municipalities throughout France have
expressed interest in the programs, which he says will focus
on breaking down stereotypes, for example by emphasizing
modern culture and women's rights. Wolf expressed some
doubt, however, about the cultural season's having a sizeable
impact in France, noting that the Turkish government has
often failed to represent Turkish society as modern and
dynamic.


6. (C) General "enlargement fatigue" is another concern that
our contacts acknowledge exists throughout the EU, even in
member-states that are otherwise favorable to the Turkish
cause. At the other end of the spectrum, an Austrian
diplomatic colleague recently offered a lengthy exposition on
Turkey's incompatibility with Europe, starting with religious
differences with a Christian Europe. Regardless, the lack of
movement in the overall accession process tends to reinforce
low public opinion towards Turkish accession, with the number
of those "undecided" about Turkey,s candidacy falling in all
opinion polls.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) While deferring to Ankara and other European posts
for definitive assessments of their government positions and
public opinions, the outlook among EU diplomats in Paris
remains gloomy for EU-Turkey relations in 2009. With the
exception of a breakthrough in the Cyprus negotiations or,
perhaps, a change in the German government position after the
September 2009 German federal elections, the negative
dynamics currently outweigh the positive ones. On the
bilateral front, the Turkish Embassy in Paris is committed to
the cultural season effort, giving us an energetic overview
of the initiative, backed by an analytical framework of how
different public constituencies in France might be
influenced. We note that President Sarkozy's pragmatism has
probably reached its limits with an effective compromise on
continuing to open accession chapters without guaranteeing
that they lead to accession. End comment.

STAPLETON