Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS2101
2008-11-14 14:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: FRENCH RESIGNED TO DELAYED

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MARR IV FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1218
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #2101/01 3191429
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141429Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4856
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1634
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2444
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002101 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MARR IV FR
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRENCH RESIGNED TO DELAYED
ELECTIONS

REF: ABIDJAN 803

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002101

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MARR IV FR
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRENCH RESIGNED TO DELAYED
ELECTIONS

REF: ABIDJAN 803

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Cote d'Ivoire desk officer Marie
Audouard on November 14 said that France was resigned to the
fact that elections in Cote d'Ivoire would not be possible by
the November 30 target date, but hoped that they would take
place before the beginning of the 2009 rainy season. She
said France remained engaged and would continue to support
the elections process, including with respect to Operation
Licorne and UNOCI, but that France's patience was wearing
thin and that further delays that pushed the elections beyond
late spring 2009 would test the limits of French tolerance.
She acknowledged, however, that there were few alternatives
to letting the process play out, however long that might
take. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Marie Audouard, MFA desk officer for Cote d'Ivoire,
on November 14 provided an update on French thinking in view
of the delay in holding the elections in Cote d'Ivoire
originally scheduled for November 30. She said that French
doubts about the elections timetable had been accelerating
since the beginning of September, when it became apparent
that the identification and voter registration processes
could not possibly be concluded in time. The logistical
demands were too great and even under the best of
circumstances would have been a challenge. She said that
logistical problems, while long apparent, had for many months
been underestimated, which allowed for the belief that
November 30 was not an unreasonable target. Audouard
believed that under 10 percent of the population had been
identified and registered by mid-November.


3. (C) Audouard said that it was difficult, as noted
reftel, to assign blame for the failure to meet the November
30 deadline. It was a combination of many factors. She
noted the failure to open all of the identification
facilities originally planned. She hoped that within the
coming weeks, the various offices could start operating
simultaneously rather than in sequence, even though putting a
large number of them into operation at the same time would be

a daunting task.


4. (C) Audouard stressed the importance of maintaining
pressure on all parties to continue the preparations for
elections at a rapid pace. She feared that lassitude might
set in, now that everyone knew that the November 30 deadline
could not be met. She said it was probably not a good idea
now to set a new, specific target date. She hoped that
identification could be completed by the beginning of 2009.
Assuming that elections could follow three months after
completion of identification, the elections could be held in
March (or more likely) April 2009. A date could be set once
identification was completed or nearly completed.


5. (C) Audouard said that France very much wanted the
elections to take place before the 2009 rainy season began in
mid/late-spring in Cote d'Ivoire. Once the rainy season
began, there would be a much reduced level of activity,
meaning that if the elections did not take place before the
rainy season, they could take place only in September or
October at the earliest, i.e., almost one year from now. No
one wanted a delay of this sort.


6. (C) The parties seemed to accept the need for postponing
the elections, which Audouard said was a relief. She noted
that at one point Gbagbo wanted to push ahead with elections
on November 30 or shortly thereafter, which would have
allowed him to manipulate the process, but he had apparently
backed down and now accepted elections in the first part of

2009.


7. (C) Audouard confided that the costs to France of its
engagement in Cote d'Ivoire were becoming increasingly
difficult to bear. The past three years had been spent in
preparing for elections that never seemed to happen.
Meanwhile, the cost of Operation Licorne and other French
"nation-building" efforts kept mounting, with a firm date for
drawing down or departing never materializing. A certain
fatigue, both financial and psychological, was setting in for
France, she said, and France did not seem to be the only
outside party experiencing this fatigue.


8. (C) Nonetheless, France remained engaged and committed

PARIS 00002101 002 OF 002


to doing its part to bring stability and democracy to Cote
d'Ivoire. Operation Licorne (now with about 1,800 forces
deployed) was closely linked to UNOCI, and France would never
take unilateral action that might compromise the UN's
presence. However, Audouard repeated that another round of
postponements in the elections process could only exacerbate
France's impatience and frustrations. Still, there were few
alternatives, and she said that France would continue to ride
this out, so long as a reasonably certain end phase, within a
reasonably certain timeframe, seemed achievable.


Allegrone