FRENCH REACTION TO NOVEMBER 9 QUARTET MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO NOVEMBER 9 QUARTET MEETING

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The November 9 Quartet meeting reaffirmed the
international consensus on the need to continue the Annapolis
process "exactly as we expected," said French NEA
A/S-equivalent Patrice Paoli on November 12. Paoli said he
was struck by an informal consensus among Arab attendees that
Hamas was responsible for the failure of Palestinian
reconciliation talks, but said he doubted that Syria, Qatar
and Saudi Arabia would publicly blame Hamas for their
failure. FM Kouchner's proposal for a follow-on Quartet
meeting before the end of January 2009 reflected France's
conviction that the international community must maintain a
sense of dynamism and optimism in the coming months. In that
context, Paoli hoped that Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime
Minister Salam Fayyad would use his November 13 meeting with
PM Fillon to specify exactly how the EU could be most helpful
to the parties. Turning to French relations with Syria,
Paoli noted that FM Muallim assured the French on the margins
of the Mediterranean Union ministerial in Marseille that
Syria was still on track to open an embassy in Lebanon by
year's end. Paoli indicated that once relations between
Lebanon and Syria were normalized, France would look to
ensure that Lebanese parliamentary elections take place "as
well as possible" and to induce the Syrians to make a gesture
on controlling the Lebanon-Syria border. On Iran, Paoli said
France did not expect a change in Iranian thinking on the
nuclear program regardless of the outcome of Iran's June 2009
presidential election; he noted that any effort to engage
Iran prior to that date would likely become a political
football in Iranian domestic politics and therefore come to
naught. Paoli said the leak of a French cable on Iran policy
to a French newspaper was odd since there were no policy
divisions on the subject. End summary.

Quartet Meeting
--------------


2. (C) PolMin/C and NEA Watcher met November 12 with Patrice
Paoli, the MFA's A/S-equivalent for the Middle East. Paoli
shared a French perspective on the November 9 Quartet meeting
in Sharm el-Sheikh, saying that the meeting had gone "exactly
as we expected . . . it did not produce much (in terms of new
breakthroughs) but at the same time it produced quite a bit
(in terms of reaffirming the international consensus on the
need to continue the Annapolis process). Paoli noted that
Israeli FM Livni said "little of substance," while PA
President Mahmoud Abbas indicated (to France's relief) that
he would continue in office beyond January 9. Arab League
SYG Amr Musa struck the French as "more realistic" than he
was just two months ago on the margins of the UNGA, although
he still fretted about the logic of discussing "a viable
Palestinian state" when Israeli settlement of the West Bank
went unchecked. Paoli also noted an informal consensus among
Arab attendees that Hamas was responsible for the failure of
Palestinian reconciliation talks, but he doubted whether
Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia would be willing to publicly
blame Hamas for the talks' failure. FM Kouchner's proposal
for a follow-on Quartet meeting before the end of January
2009 reflected France's conviction that the international
community must maintain a sense of dynamism and optimism in
the coming months (Paoli observed that the Quartet agreed to
"look for a date" that might work). In that regard, Paoli
hoped that PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad would use his
November 13 meeting with French PM Fillon to spell out in
some detail the areas -- including specific economic projects
-- where France and the EU could be of most assistance to the
PA, both in addressing the needs of Palestinians and in
supporting the PA's dialogue with Israel. Stressing that
Israel needs to do more to help Fayyad and Abbas to succeed,
Paoli criticized Defense Minister Ehud Barak for failing to
reduce checkpoints or take action against illegal
settlements. Paoli noted that Barak and the Labor Party
"will not win more seats by acting tough," an approach which
he said had backfired against the Labor Party repeatedly in
the past.

Lebanon/Syria
--------------


3. (C) Turning to French policy towards Lebanon and Syria,
Paoli described Lebanon as being in the midst of a political
upheaval similar to that which resulted in the Taif Accord.
Although he did not invoke the formula "Taif II," Paoli noted
that "the situation is just like Taif . . . the question is
whether you want to continue on the brink of civil war, or
whether you can reach at least a minimal consensus (on power
redistribution)." With a chuckle, Paoli declined to
speculate on the outcome of Lebanon's spring 2009
parliamentary election, saying simply that France "favored

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all the days in March" (in reference to the March 14th and
March 8th movements).


4. (C) As for Syria, Paoli noted that on the margins of the
Mediterranean Union foreign ministerial in Marseille, Syrian
FM Muallim assured the French that Syria was on track to open
an embassy in Beirut by the end of 2008, as previously
announced. Paoli noted that normalization of relations with
Lebanon was the most important measure of Syrian behavior as
seen from Paris; he said other French benchmarks for Syria
were merely "context" in comparison. He gave the Syrians
some points for reactivating the Syrian-Lebanese commission
on border demarcation and for cracking down on foreign
fighter flows into Iraq (prior to the October 26 raid),
although he conceded that Syria had done nothing to prevent
the flow of weapons into Lebanon. Paoli indicated that once
Syria finished normalizing relations with Lebanon, France's
priorities would be to prevent the Syrians from mucking about
with Lebanon's parliamentary elections and to induce the
Syrians to make at least a gesture on closing the
Lebanese-Syrian border to weapons shipments.

Iran
--------------


5. (C) Paoli struck a somewhat pessimistic note on Iran,
saying that French policy was clear and that both President
Sarkozy and FM Kouchner were committed to strengthening
sanctions in order to increase pressure on the regime.
However, given the broad consensus in Iran on pushing forward
with the nuclear program, Paoli said the French did not
anticipate a change in Iranian behavior whatever the outcome
of Iran's June 2009 presidential elections. The Iranians, he
continued, were unlikely to budge unless convinced that the
regime's survival is at stake. He added his personal view
that while a "positive gesture" such as talks without
pre-conditions might be the only way to break the deadlock,
any overture to Iran in advance of the June 2009 elections
would quickly become a domestic political football and would
therefore come to naught. On a slightly different subject,
Paoli was unaware of a November 12 article in the French
newspaper Le Canard Enchaine based upon a leaked reporting
cable from the French Embassy in Washington regarding Iran
policy. Paoli did not appear unduly troubled (noting that
efforts in the past to identify leakers had been fruitless)
and confidently said there were no policy divisions on the
issue, making the leak somewhat inexplicable.










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