Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS2079
2008-11-10 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH OFFICIALS: NATO UNITY REQUIRES NO DECISION

Tags:  PREL NATO FR RU 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #2079/01 3151510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101510Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4819
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6231
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002079 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO FR RU
SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS: NATO UNITY REQUIRES NO DECISION
ON MAP UNTIL AFTER 2009 SUMMIT

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas
ons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002079

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO FR RU
SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS: NATO UNITY REQUIRES NO DECISION
ON MAP UNTIL AFTER 2009 SUMMIT

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas
ons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) Summary. During PDAS Marcie Ries' meetings on
Friday, November 7 with French officials Philippe Errera,
Strategic Affairs Advisor to FM Kouchner; Francois Richier,
Strategic Affairs Advisor to President Sarkozy; and Jacques
Audibert, Director of Strategic Affairs at the MFA; all of
her interlocutors made it abundantly clear that France does
not support giving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia
and Ukraine, either at the December ministerial or at next
year's 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg/Kehl. Citing
adamant German opposition led by Chancellor Merkel, the
French see "no hope" of reaching a consensus decision to move
forward on MAP, so they are instead focusing on "creative
solutions" which could reinforce NATO cooperation with the
two countries, and which could be done, if not before the
Ministerial, then early in the new year. Paris wants the
60th anniversary summit to showcase Alliance unity and
transformation and fears that an internal disagreement over
MAP will mar what should be a glorious celebration of NATO
(and at the same time possibly weaken public support for
French reintegration into military structures). End summary.

--------------
FEAR OF INTERNAL DIVISIONS
--------------


2. (C/NF) Audibert made clear that the French consider the
December NATO Ministerial to be a planning meeting directly
linked to the follow-on 2009 April NATO summit. Therefore,
what cannot be achieved in December should also not feature
on the agenda of the NATO summit. Audibert and Richier both
cited the need for increased NATO engagement in Afghanistan
as already presenting a significant challenge for the summit,
which they do not want to be likewise complicated by a thorny
discussion over MAP. Their fear is that the 60th anniversary
summit, which should highlight Alliance unity and concentrate
on the positive results of NATO enlargement and
transformation, will be a repeat of the public division seen
in Bucharest. Such a visible division between European
allies and the new U.S. Administration would undercut themes
of the summit; the French prefer to focus world attention on

the participation of two new members and the possible
announcement of French reintegration into the full NATO
structures after more than 40 years.

--------------
FRANCO-GERMAN OPPOSITION
--------------


3. (C/NF) All of our interlocutors emphasized that the
question of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia is a very sensitive
political issue for Germany, particularly for Chancellor
Angela Merkel who is facing domestic political elections in
September 2009. Richier likewise stressed the Franco-German
unity on this issue, noting that France will not depart from
the German position. Given the staunch German opposition,
therefore, France and the United Kingdom are already in
discussions to find "creative solutions" to manage this
issue. Paris is considering ways to enhance substantive
cooperation (similar to what would take place under MAP)
which would enable the Alliance to send positive signals of
reassurance to Ukraine and Georgia, while also making it
clear to Russia that it cannot control the foreign policy
decisions of its neighbors. In effect, this would grant a
MAP in all but name. Ries noted that any delay in granting
MAP will only make it more of an issue, not less, and it
would be best to reach agreement on MAP at the December
Ministerial. Ries also cautioned French officials about
sending the wrong signal to Russia and thereby reinforcing
intransigent Russian behavior.

--------------
STEPS ON FRENCH REINTEGRATION
--------------


4. (C/NF) French officials laid out the careful planning and
deadlines underpinning the French decision to reintegrate
into the full command structure of NATO. Both Audibert and
Richier cited modest progress on ESDP as likely meeting
French pre-conditions for reintegration by the end of the
year (although the final decision will be made by President
Sarkozy on his own timing). According to French discussions
with the NATO SYG, legally NATO does not have to vote or take
other substantive action on the French reintegration; at the
summit the SYG would merely take note of the French decision
to proceed. Richier said that in February, the French would

also like to gather ideas on European security initiatives
that would be introduced at both the NATO summit in April, as
well as at the possible OSCE summit at the end of the year.
He noted that his German counterparts had pointed out that
the end of 2009 is also the 20th anniversary of the fall of
the Berlin wall, an interesting trigger-event for the OSCE
summit.

--------------
SUMMIT CONCEPT AND FORMAT
--------------


5. (C/NF) In addition to the question of MAP, Richier also
laid out some preliminary French and German thinking about
the summit format and substance. Paris prefers the NATO
summit to be a "family" format with just the alliance members
participating. In addition to the obvious logistical
challenges of supporting an expanded summit in the small
towns of Strasbourg and Baden-Baden, Richier observed that
the Bucharest summit featured all the partner countries and
councils, and that such a large format did not need to take
place annually. However, he added that in early
conversations with NATO in Brussels, the SYG had expressed a
preference for the more expanded-type of summit, as it would
be his last in his position as SYG. France also favors the
launch of a new strategic concept for NATO, as the last one
was completed 10 years ago, prior to the attacks of September
11 and other threats of the 21st century. Richer stated that
Paris was open to merely revising and updating the current
strategy, rather than changing it completely, as again, the
French prefer to avoid protracted arguments that could mar
the summit celebration.


6. (U) This cable was cleared by EUR PDAS Marcie Ries.
STAPLETON