Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS202
2008-02-04 16:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH MFA ON WESTERN SAHARA BEFORE VAN WALSUM'S

Tags:  PREL PBTS PTER FR MO AG MR WS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0202/01 0351656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041656Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1876
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000202 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER FR MO AG MR WS
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON WESTERN SAHARA BEFORE VAN WALSUM'S
EXPECTED VISIT TO THE REGION

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000202

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER FR MO AG MR WS
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON WESTERN SAHARA BEFORE VAN WALSUM'S
EXPECTED VISIT TO THE REGION

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa
Nathalie Loiseau indicated January 29 that France is
increasingly impatient with UN-led talks on Western Sahara
and believes the process may even be moving backward. She
blamed part of French frustration on UN Personal Envoy Peter
van Walsum, who will stop in Paris after visiting the region,
but also on a growing concern about regional security.
Loiseau claimed that France has decided it cannot possibly
accept anything other than a solution based on autonomy
within Morocco after the recent death of French tourists in
Mauritania. A potential independent Sahrawi state posed too
grave a risk in terms of AQIM terrorists having more sparsely
inhabited territory in which to circulate. She expressed
concern about recent provocations by Polisario and Morocco
and claimed that France had asked Morocco to prevent a
planned protest march across the berm to the
Polisario-controlled town of Tifariti going ahead. Loiseau
would like to have further discussions after van Walsum's
tour focused on planning for further deadlock at the next
round of talks in Manhasset. End summary


2. (C) French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa Nathalie
Loiseau met with us January 29, at her request, to review
positions on the UN-led Western Sahara negotiations in
advance of UN Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum's upcoming tour
of regional capitals, Madrid, and Paris. Loiseau made clear
at the outset that France had been disappointed by the last
round of talks in Manhasset and hoped against hope that the
round set for mid-March would make some progress. She was
not optimistic, however, given the refusal of the parties to
engage on the core issues and van Walsum's inability or
unwillingness to press the parties to do so. As she would
several times, Loiseau evinced strong skepticism that van
Walsum was willing to or capable of putting sufficient effort

into bringing about a negotiated settlement. She complained
that the momentum was rapidly disappearing from the process
and that it would soon be frozen like the overall dispute or
even show signs of regression.


3. (C) With respect to van Walsum's intention to visit
capitals (including Nouakchott),Loiseau said that the French
had few details on his itinerary or on the level at which he
would be received. The Moroccan leg was confirmed, but there
was nothing about Algeria vis-a-vis the GOA or Polisario
(i.e., including a side trip to Tindouf to meet with
Polisario leaders). Loiseau stated that France had delivered
a demarche to the Algerians urging them to receive van Walsum
at a sufficiently senior level. As regards the Paris leg,
Loiseau reported that van Walsum was currently scheduled to
arrive February 18. That date was proving problematic, as
presidential diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte would be
unavailable. On the MFA side, Loiseau noted that FM Kouchner
(who she claimed did not know van Walsum) was interested in a
meeting if his schedule permitted. Loiseau asked whether van
Walsum planned to brief Washington officials after his tour.


4. (C) Loiseau expressed frustration at not knowing what
van Walsum intended to say during his upcoming mission. She
welcomed suggestions that he might hammer home his view that
an independent Sahrawi state was not a viable outcome but was
not sure he would actually follow through. The French are
studying the draft interim UNSYG report following the third
round of talks. Loiseau took some exception to van Walsum's
evenhanded criticism of all parties for having failed to
enter into real negotiations. She shared our understanding
that the two sides had discussed confidence-building measures
and various other elements (like local administration) that
could figure in a final settlement but was not convinced that
evidence of such limited engagement would lead to much else.


5. (C) As the conversation continued, Loiseau made clear
that the GOF has decided to align itself more clearly than
before with the Moroccan autonomy plan as the only feasible
solution to the conflict. She explained that security was
the major driving force behind this shift. Morocco's fragile
security situation and its connection to the status of the
Western Sahara figured prominently in French thinking.
Loiseau said that Morocco alone among the key players on this
issue had come up with a plan and made a good faith effort to
negotiate on that basis. The others were stalling. Despite
its imperfections and slow pace, Morocco was making progress
on reforms. It deserved our support. Algeria and Polisario,
meanwhile, had done little or nothing in response. Loiseau
rejected the prospect of an independent Sahrawi state as not
only unviable but an unacceptable security risk to the entire
region. The murder of four French tourists in Mauritania had
changed things fundamentally for the French government.
Attacks and threats in Algeria had already underscored how
France is one of the main targets for al-Qa'ida in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The attack in Mauritania was a
horrific reminder of the seriousness of this threat. She
noted that it further exposed how easy it was for AQIM
operatives to operate freely in Mauritania. Parenthetically,
she described Mauritania as a regime on the edge of a
precipice and said the U.S. and France need to discuss how to
increase economic and other support. Loiseau's message on
Western Sahara was clear, however: France could not accept
giving AQIM another large, empty space in which to circulate
with little or no control.


6. (C) Loiseau claimed that Moroccan Foreign Minister
Fassi-Fihri had not gotten the unequivocal pledge of support
for Morocco's position that he wanted when he last visited.
She said, however, that France has privately told Algeria
that it believed the Moroccan plan was the only realistic
basis on which to achieve a settlement and that an
independent Sahrawi state was not feasible. President
Sarkozy has also publicly stated, in his speech in Morocco
and to Arab journalists in Paris, that the Moroccan plan is
the best basis on which to negotiate a solution. She chided
the U.S. for being more circumspect in its public statements.
Although France recognizes the risk to maintaining a
balanced relationship with Morocco and Algeria, Paris also
believed that the Algerians would ultimately be very
pragmatic. Loiseau repeated that the Algerians continued to
be remarkably restrained on this issue, perhaps because of
the growing focus on mobilizing public support behind
reelecting President Bouteflika to a third term.


7. (C) Loiseau lamented the unremitting hostility between
Algeria and Morocco, although she was most critical of
Algeria for openly admitting that it had no intention of
improving ties until the Western Sahara issue was resolved.
She was dismissive of the overly ideological mindset of the
older generation in power in Algiers and was convinced that
nothing would change until it finally passed from the scene.
Loiseau criticized the Polisario for its saber-rattling in
the context of a recent congress, but she also referred to
the irresponsible efforts on the Moroccan side to raise
tensions by organizing a protest march to Tifariti in the
"liberated zone." The connections between the main organizer
and Moroccan intelligence were well known. Fassi-Fihri's
protests over the Polisario congress in Tifariti and its
activities in the areas east of the Moroccan berm were
extensive and had caused French experts to review the area's
legal status (the answer was that there was nothing to
sustain Moroccan claims of a violation of the 1991 cease
fire). France had firmly advised the Moroccan government to
restrain the marchers to avoid a needless provocation.
Loiseau left little doubt, however, that something like it
would happen again.


8. (C) In concluding, we agreed that we would meet after
van Walsum's regional tour and subsequent meeting in Paris.
Loiseau suggested we discuss how to deal with continued
deadlock after the next round of talks in Manhasset.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON