THE POLITICS OF NYET: RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE COE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001960


EUR ALSO FOR EUR/ERA L KONICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM COE FR GG RU
SUBJECT: THE POLITICS OF NYET: RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE COE

Classified By: CG VIN CARVER FOR REASONS 1.5 (b/d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Russian intransigence, lack of EU unity for
meaningful action, general European desire for dialogue with
Moscow at almost any price, and a cautious Council of Europe
(COE) Secretariat combine to provide little hope that even
minimal COE monitoring of Russia and Georgia will succeed.
Incoming (late November) COE Chair Spain is expected to be
less aggressive in challenging Russia than current Chair
Sweden. End summary.

RUSSIA: HOW DARE YOU EQUATE US WITH GEORGIA?
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2. (C) Russian Ambassador Alekseev continued the "policy of
nyet" in the COE Council of Ministers (ambassadors) October

22. While most delegations supported the Swedish Chair's
draft action plan (supported by a more detailed set of
options from the secretariat) for monitoring both Georgia's
and Russia's commitments to the COE, Alekseev resorted to yet
another boorish intervention. He thanked those delegations
that "were not in a hurry" to analyze the secretariat's draft
(admittedly, the secretariat distributed the 90-page draft
the evening before). Alekseev then posited most of his venom
on Georgia and the Swedish chair: "This is a clear attempt
to put on the same level the country that launched an
aggressive military campaign with the country that had to
react and defend its peacekeepers under Article 51 of the UN
Charter," He continued that "any enhanced monitoring cannot
be accepted by Russia." Alekseev added that "some vested
interests" are attempting to put political pressure on
Moscow. This "should be rejected by everybody who really
cares about the Council of Europe." Alekseev then carefully
noted that the draft contained "some elements that are not
contradictory." He said Russia would try to find a mutually
acceptable solution, but that with "documents like these,"
even CBMs "will be difficult to arrange because this
organization is putting the country that started this whole
mess and the country that was the victim on the same level."

MANY SUPPORT MONITORING FOR BOTH COUNTRIES
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3. (C) Most delegations spoke in favor of the Swedish
approach (monitoring of both countries' commitments to the
COE). France (speaking before Alekseev's intervention)
stressed that the Action Plan was a "realistic and balanced"
proposal; it is important to monitor both countries'
commitments to the COE to promote "constructive cooperation"
with both countries, and to highlight the COE's values.
Finland, Ukraine, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Croatia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania,
Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland, and the European Commission
agreed. The UK said it welcomed an ongoing dialogue between
Russia and the Chair and hoped a way forward could be found.
Germany made its most forceful (comment: which admittedly is
still relatively mild) intervention, noting that the
independence and territorial integrity of a member state were
infringed upon by another member. Portugal, however, said
that strengthened monitoring could actually prevent
cooperation. Several delegations, generally those more
"understanding" of Russia's position, including the Cypriot,
Italian, Bulgarian, and Greek reps, did not intervene.

GEORGIA: DO NOT SUCCUMB TO BLACKMAIL
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4. (C) Georgia stressed that it is ready to cooperate fully
with the COE and supports the Chair's Action Plan. The
Georgian Ambassador said that Georgia has tried to fulfill
all its COE commitments. He acknowledged that some
commitments regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes had
been "unfulfilled" -- "Georgia needs assistance from the COE
in this regard." The Georgian Ambassador decried the
destruction of schools and churches in South Ossetia and said
that the return of all people to their villages is crucial to
a settlement.


5. (C) The Georgian Ambassador then underscored that the
positions of Russia and Georgia were well known and "were
confirmed again today." "We do not condition our cooperation
with the COE," he stressed. Noting that Tblisi is "awaiting
a message from Strasbourg" from the next scheduled debate
November 5, he emphasized that there should be monitoring for
both countries. He cautioned against the "policy of
blackmail that Tblisi sees (Russia engaging) in the COE and
other organizations." The Georgian Ambassador concluded by
asking what the COE and its member states would do if a
country subjected to monitoring does not cooperate.

SECRETARY GENERAL: NO TIME TO WASTE
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6. (C) COE SecGen Terry Davis stressed that the COE must
take action quickly (note: continued COE debates, including
over whether to increase the modest COE Human Rights
Commissioner's office in Tblisi, make EU deliberations look
speedy by comparison). He stressed that enhanced monitoring
of both countries had been supported by the COE informal
ministerial in New York September 24. Davis added that, "It
is clear we are welcome in Georgia," and, taking a cue from
the Georgian Ambassador's intervention, added that if "one is
engaged in ethnic cleansing, one tries not only to expel
people, but also to erase traces, including churches and
schools, of that people's identity."

COMMENT
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7. (C) While a consensus is finally forming at the COE
around monitoring both Russia's and Georgia's COE
commitments, it is a fragile one. The EU is split regarding
how hard to push Moscow to accept monitoring. Sweden as COM
Chair has produced, as the Secretariat's Political Director
told us October 24, the "minimal acceptable" in an effort to
try to keep the EU together and yet maintain some semblance
of COE credibility. Russia blatantly notes that if it is
pushed too hard or too quickly, and particularly if it is put
on an equal footing with "the aggressor," its cooperation
with the COE (spotty at best politically but some in the
secretariat and even in member state delegations are also
looking at Russia's 12 percent contribution to the COE
budget) will suffer. The November 5 discussion will be
critical in getting the COE to support monitoring of both
Russia and Georgia -- a limited action coming almost three
months after the conflict We have no doubt, however, that
the Russians will continue bluster and to stall for more time
-- looking to Spain's taking over the Chair from Sweden in
late November as a positive development -- and one that could
lead the COE to take even less decisive action.
PERKALA