Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS1946
2008-10-23 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

MAURITANIA/FRANCE: "ISOLATE AZIZ, MAKE HIM LEAVE"

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM PINS ETTC MR FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2349
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #1946/01 2971340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231340Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4614
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1624
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 2412
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001946 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINS ETTC MR FR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/FRANCE: "ISOLATE AZIZ, MAKE HIM LEAVE"

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001946

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINS ETTC MR FR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/FRANCE: "ISOLATE AZIZ, MAKE HIM LEAVE"

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The French are attempting to isolate
Mauritania coup leader General Aziz, in order to force his
resignation, which would lead to the return of constitutional
government, Presidential AF Counselor Romain Serman said on
October 22. Serman said that the GOF had had some success in
promoting anti-coup sentiments among Mauritanian
parliamentarians. He said that the October 20 EU-Mauritania
consultations were designed to fail, so as to bring the
specter of sanctions to the fore. The French want the EU,
AU, U.S., and France to announce soon (e.g., October 25) that
they would send a joint delegation to Nouakchott roughly a
week later to present Aziz with "an offer he can't refuse --
to resign." Serman indicated that France would be
coordinating closely with the U.S. and other partners in the
days ahead. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Romain Serman, an AF Counselor at the French
presidency, on October 22 explained France's strategy for
putting an end to the junta's rule in Mauritania. He said
that when the coup first took place, President Sarkozy
ordered GOF elements to "get them out of there" in no
uncertain terms. Serman had been tasked with this project
and he set forth France's plan.

Squeezing Aziz
--------------

3. (C) First, he hailed the very good cooperation the U.S.
was providing. He noted the announcement of U.S. sanctions
the previous week, just before the October 20 EU-Mauritania
talks within the Article 96 context. He said bluntly that
the EU talks were "designed to fail," so that the EU could
then threaten sanctions. In fact, the Mauritanian delegation
at the talks offered nothing in the way of meeting EU demands
about the return to constitutional rule, the freeing of
President Abdallahi, and so forth. Commissioner Louis
Michel, Serman said, was furious at the Mauritanians for not
demonstrating any willingness to offer reasonable steps to
resolve the crisis.


4. (C) With the talks having failed, the EU was in a

position eventually to cut about 160 million Euros in funding
to Mauritania (about USD 205 million). Serman said that this
amounted to about 1/3 of the GOM's annual budget and would
therefore have a significant effect on Mauritania's economy.
Individual states had already imposed their own sanctions and
this would be an additional layer. Serman repeated that the
U.S. sanctions announced just before were an excellent
foundation for the EU sanctions. "We are also telling them
that UNSC sanctions could be next," Serman said.


5. (C) Serman said that France's strategy was to isolate
Aziz to the extent possible and to strip away his support,
both politically and the support from his clan. Aziz was
showing all the signs of a classic megalomaniac dictator --
paranoia, an obsession with his own power, and a disregard
for his country's fate. "He is not clever enough to pretend
that he has a 'program' for his country," Serman remarked.


6. (C) Serman said that France had had some success in
weakening Aziz's parliamentary support. Ten Mauritanian
deputies came to France a short time ago to discuss the
situation. Meeting with them, Serman said that the group had
originally been 12 but that he (Serman) canceled the visas of
two members because they were unequivocal coup supporters.
Serman said that "we are being extremely blunt with them. I
told the other ten 'all of you risk losing your visas to
France, too, if you continue to support the junta.' This got
their attention. We have to make sure that coup supporters
understand that supporting the coup will cost them
personally. The next thing we will do, even if it's only a
bluff, is to wave the prospect of individual UNSC sanctions
against them, to include travel bans and asset freezes."
Serman said that Aziz's support among Mauritanian deputies
was weakening and that about half of Mauritania's senate now
opposed the junta.


7. (C) Serman thought that Aziz's weakened position could
cause his clan to pressure him to change course or even step
down, if doing so would promote his clan's vested interests.
"What we want to do is to eliminate as much of his support as
we can, so that he ends up isolated and alone."

End-Game Scenario
--------------

8. (C) Serman said that France would work toward the
following end-game: On or about October 25, the U.S., EU,
France (as EU President but also in its own right),and the
AU would announce that they would send a joint delegation to

PARIS 00001946 002 OF 002


Nouakchott approximately one week later. (NOTE: We pointed
out that U.S. elections would take place on November 4, and
Serman said that the delegation would go to Mauritania before
November 4. END NOTE.) This joint delegation would announce
publicly that Aziz had to step down, which would effect a
return to constitutional government. Serman acknowledged
that he would have to give further thought to the issue of
whether Abdallahi would then automatically return to power.
Serman thought that it might be better to have Abdallahi
resign the presidency at the same time Aziz leaves. The
constitution provides that the president of the senate
becomes president of the country in the absence of a
president. The new president would then form a government,
the sole purpose of which would be to organize free and fair
elections within a reasonable period.


9. (C) Serman said that the joint delegation would not go
to Nouakchott to negotiate -- "it would go there to deliver
'an offer he can't refuse' -- to leave power and allow for
the return of constitutional government." The joint
delegation would make its goals publicly known before going
to Nouakchott, thus increasing the pressure on Aziz.


10. (C) Serman said that the GOF would be in close touch
with the USG in the days ahead, via its Washington Embassy,
to coordinate details should the U.S. agree with this as a
way forward. He again expressed appreciation for the
excellent cooperation and similar assessment the U.S. had
already demonstrated.


11. (C) COMMENT: Serman was very firm in expressing the
GOF intention to force Aziz's hand in this way. He had
nothing at all redeeming to say about the junta or about Aziz
personally, which seemed to make it easier to support the
blunt approach he was advocating. Serman was at all times
quite sincere in expressing appreciation for what the U.S.
had already done and in expressing his hope that the U.S.
would join France in taking the steps he had outlined. END
COMMENT.


STAPLETON