FRANCE PREPARES TO ENGAGE NEW US ADMINISTRATION ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001927

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2023
TAGS: FR PREL PGOV MEPP
SUBJECT: FRANCE PREPARES TO ENGAGE NEW US ADMINISTRATION ON
THE MIDDLE EAST

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary/comment: France's foreign policy
establishment plans to engage the new U.S. administration as
soon as possible (even, perhaps, before the formal
inauguration) on a range of Middle East issues, including the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Iran, and Syria/Lebanon.
In the hope of presenting the new U.S. team with a concerted
European position, FM Kouchner will use the November 4
meeting of Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in Marseille to
persuade his German, British, Italian and Spanish
counterparts to adopt France's thinking on an expanded
supportive role for the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, including possible assurances that the international
community could offer the parties on permanent status issues;
France will then try to enshrine those ideas in an updated
version of the November 2007 EU Action Plan for the Middle
East, to be blessed at the November 10-11, 2008 GAERC.
Although the French understand U.S. and Israeli reservations
about their proposals, President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner are
determined to press forward with this dialogue. During his
Oct. 3-5 visit to Israel, FM Kouchner found the Israelis
feeling "more threatened" by Iran and even more determined to
do whatever it takes to prevent Tehran from building a
nuclear bomb; Kouchner stressed that for the moment there are
still better options than military strikes. The French will
seek an early signal from the new U.S. team as to their
thinking on additional sanctions, although working level
contacts in the MFA are not optimistic that tougher sanctions
would prove effective. Moreover, they fear the Iranians will
continue enriching uranium while France waits for the new
U.S. administration to "learn the ropes." On Syria, France
will undoubtedly encourage Washington to shift to a strategy
of engagement, and will point to President Bashar al-Asad's
recent announcement of diplomatic relations with Lebanon as
proof that Syrian behavior is malleable and that the French
approach is working. The French will also want to test the
new administration's receptivity to the idea of joint
Franco-American sponsorship of direct Syrian-Israeli talks.
We should begin thinking now about the timing and structure
of a transitional dialogue with France on the Middle East,
with an eye towards: First, channeling France's enthusiasm on
the peace process into Quartet-endorsed projects that will
promote trust between the parties rather than interjecting
third-party ideas into the bilateral negotiations; second,
reassuring the French of continuity in our Iran policy; and
third, pressing the French to apply an objective yardstick in
their year-end review of Syrian progress on President
Sarkozy's benchmarks. See extended comment in para 9. End
summary/comment.

The MEPP: France Sees Opportunity
--------------


3. (C) France's foreign policy establishment plans to engage
the new U.S. administration as soon as possible (even,
perhaps, before the formal inauguration) on a range of Middle
East issues, judging by comments in recent meetings with a
range of French MFA officials (including an Oct. 17 meeting
with Christophe Bigot, FM Kouchner's Middle East advisor) as
well as local UK, Egyptian and Israeli embassy contacts. At
the top of France's agenda is the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, which French officials fear will not be a priority
for any incoming U.S. administration. Paradoxically, the
French also see Washington's potential benign neglect of the
Middle East peace process (MEPP) as an opportunity for
France, via the EU, to play a more prominent role in
supporting the process. "It's the same old story -- they
want to play, not just pay," according to Israeli Political
Counselor Daniel Halevy.


4. (C) Specifically, the French have been working at the NEA
A/S level within the EU Quint to reach agreement on updating
the November 2007 EU Action Plan for the Middle East to
include forward-leaning proposals on assurances that the
international community could offer the parties on a variety
of final status issues, chief of which are the status of
Jerusalem, security (the French have publicly affirmed their
willingness to be part of an international force of observers
or peacekeepers to help enforce any agreement the parties
reach),and the fate of Palestinian refugees. Anxious to
achieve consensus on these issues before France ends its EU
presidency, FM Kouchner will likely raise them during a
discussion of the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship,
now proposed for the margins of the November 4 meeting of
Mediterranean Union FMs in Marseille. (Other issues slated
for that discussion include Afghanistan/Pakistan and Russia.)
If that discussion goes well, the French hope the updated EU

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Action Plan will be approved at the November GAERC and will
form the basis of common talking points that EU member states
will use when engaging the new U.S. administration on the
MEPP. According to UK Pol/C Hamish Cowell, the UK (which,
along with Germany, had some initial doubts about the French
approach) is now more or less on board with France's thinking
-- provided that the Israelis and Palestinians agree. "I
don't believe there is much EU debate on it (the Action Plan)
at the moment," said Cowell, who hinted that the Germans have
also dropped their objections because they, like the British,
regard the exercise as largely academic.


4. (C) The French are well aware of significant U.S.
reservations regarding their approach, in part thanks to
recent visits to Washington by MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Patrice
Paoli and DAS-equivalent Ludovic Pouille. They also
recognize that the Israelis are distinctly unenthusiastic: FM
Livni phoned Kouchner prior to the last Gymnich meeting in
Avignon and asked him not to circulate a paper outlining
France's proposals (Kouchner agreed, no doubt in part because
the agenda had already been overtaken by the crisis in
Georgia); the Israeli MFA sent a delegation to Paris to
express its concern over France's MEPP activism; and Kouchner
found Livni still unconvinced during his October 3-5 visit to
Israel. Bigot noted ruefully that Kouchner had not managed
to develop much personal warmth with Livni, whom he found "a
bit obstinate and confrontational," and suggested that
Kouchner would wait until Livni had finished forming her
government before informing her that France is pressing
forward with its proposals.

Iran: MFA Anxious to See Where Washington Goes
-------------- -


5. (S/NF) Bigot told PolMin/C that Kouchner found the
Israelis feeling "more threatened" by Iran, and hence more
determined than ever to doing whatever it takes to prevent
the Iranian regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon. In
short, said Bigot, the Israelis were "a little bit closer to
bombing." In response, Kouchner stressed that for the time
being, there are still better alternatives to military
strikes. In a recent meeting with DOD U/S Edelman, Strategic
Affairs advisor P. Errera noted that the economic downturn
seems to be haveing an impact on the way Iranian leaders
think and act, possibly giving greater hope that the
sanctions policy will have a positive effect.


6. (S/NF) However, working-level diplomats at the MFA are not
particularly optimistic about the chances for reaching a
diplomatic solution with the Iranians, even if sanctions were
further tightened, the P5 1 were to further sweeten their
offer, and President Ahmadinejad were not re-elected. "No
one here thinks it will change anything," said Franck Gellet
(the MFA's NEA DAS-equivalent for Iran),speaking in an Oct.
17 meeting with NEA Watcher and visiting France Desk Officer
Andrew Lorenz. Gellet (who tends to believe that the issue
will ultimately have to be resolved by force) said his
Israeli interlocutors were concerned that the P5 1 would
"lose a year" waiting for the new U.S. administration to
learn the ropes, during which time the Iranian regime would
"merrily" continue enriching uranium. Gellet said it would
be useful for the new U.S. administration to compare notes
with France and like-minded EU states as early as possible,
not least so that the Europeans can get a sense of where
Washington would like to go with regard to sanctions and
engagement. In the interim, Gellet said the French would
continue to push its EU partners to go further on sanctions,
and would push Moscow not to sell Iran its S-300
anti-aircraft system.

Syria/Lebanon: French Will Advocate Engagement
-------------- -


7. (C) On Syria, the French are certain to encourage the new
U.S. administration to consider a strategy of engagement.
They will argue, on the basis of Syrian performance before
and after President Sarkozy's visit to Damascus, that Syrian
behavior is malleable -- and is moving in a more positive
direction at present. In making their case, they will point
(with a certain amount of self-satisfaction) to what they see
as evidence that engagement works:

-- President Asad's October 14 announcement of diplomatic
relations with Lebanon;
-- Recent meetings of joint Syrian-Lebanese committees on
delineating the border and returning prisoners;
-- Bashar al-Asad's commitment to President Sarkozy to
continue indirect contacts with Israel and his invitation for
France and the U.S. to co-sponsor direct Israeli-Syrian talks;

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-- The delivery (via the good offices of the Emir of Qatar)
of a letter to captured Franco-Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit
from his father;
-- The August 14 visit of President Sleiman to Damascus;
-- Syrian acquiescence to the election of Lebanese President
Sleiman, and to Lebanese PM Siniora retaining his post;
-- Syrian support of the Doha Accords;
-- The token release of some political prisoners.

The French will add that they are under no illusions about
the nature of the Syrian regime, and have therefore been
careful to set out meaningful benchmarks against which to
measure Syrian progress. The French have promised to take a
hard look at year's end at what the Syrians have delivered
before taking any further steps on engagement.


8. (C) Finally, there is a remote possibility that the French
will argue that Hizballah (which has both French and American
blood on its hands) is simply too large and powerful to be
ignored. "My guess is that President Sarkozy despises
Hizballah, but it's a major political force in Lebanon. Yes,
it is a terrorist group -- but it also controls a large
number of seats in the parliament, and Israel has failed to
destroy it in two separate wars," said DAS-equivalent for the
Levant Ludovic Pouille, in reviewing the reasons France has
decided to maintain a political dialogue with Hizballah.

Comment
--------------


9. (C/NF) The French increasingly see the next U.S.
administration as their target audience for a strategic
conversation about the Middle East. One unfortunate
consequence is that they have begun politely discounting USG
messages not to their liking (e.g., cautions that their MEPP
final status ideas are premature). To a certain extent, this
is inevitable -- and should be understood less as evidence of
France's disagreement with current USG policies than as tacit
recognition that Washington will continue to set the
parameters on many of these issues. We should welcome their
interest in having a conversation at the earliest feasible
date, not least so that we can shape French/EU thinking. In
particular, we might seek to channel France's enthusiasm for
playing a larger role on the peace process into exercising
leadership on Quartet-endorsed projects that will promote
trust between the parties rather than interjecting
third-party ideas into the bilateral negotiations. In
addition, we will want to reassure the French of continuity
in our Iran policy and press them to apply an objective
yardstick in their year-end review of Syrian progress on
President Sarkozy's benchmarks. Such a conversation could
help to lay the foundation for continued or improved
cooperation in each of these important domains.


STAPLETON