C.A.R.: FRENCH SHARE U.S. WORRIES ON C.A.R.'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001896

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PGOV MARR ECON CT FR
SUBJECT: C.A.R.: FRENCH SHARE U.S. WORRIES ON C.A.R.'S
PLIGHT

REF: PARIS 1698

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials at the Presidency, MOD,
and MFA shared U.S. concerns about the Central African
Republic (C.A.R.) during Ambassador Frederick Cook's October
14 and 15 consultations in Paris. These concerns centered on
the almost complete lack of good governance in C.A.R.,
President Bozize's failure to lead, endemic corruption,
Bozize's suspect associates, and business practices focused
only on short-term profit that tended to alienate potential
investors and that did not feature long-term thinking.
Despite these problems, the French shared the U.S. view that
engagement remained necessary, if only to avoid humanitarian
crises and the creation of a political and social vacuum in a
part of Africa that could ill afford more instability. The
French said they wanted the EUFOR/MINURCAT UN follow-on force
to be deployed in C.A.R. as well as in Chad, and would work
to achieve that. At the same time, the French indicated that
they wanted to reduce their bilateral military presence in
C.A.R., which might finally cause Bozize to realize that
France's security posture with C.A.R. would change under the
new Africa policies Sarkozy wants to implement. The French
expressed support for Ambassador Cook's idea of working with
MICOPAX as a way to provide sorely needed training to FACA.
They also expressed interest in limiting the influence of
Bozize business associate Saifee Durbar, including ways of
enforcing a criminal judgment against him. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to C.A.R. Frederick Cook met,
separately, with Remi Marechaux (AF advisor at the French
Presidency),Colonel Denis Opplert and desk officer Elodie
Riche (MOD Strategic Affairs Delegation, Department for
Regional Questions, Africa Bureau),and MFA DAS-equivalent
Christine Fages, during his October 14-15 consultations in
Paris. Acting AF-watcher attended the three meetings; INR/AA
Bernadette Graves attended the meeting with Marechaux.

Lack of Leadership
--------------

3. (C) At all of the meetings, Ambassador Cook provided his
on-the-ground assessment of C.A.R.'s situation, which was not
promising. The French tended to agree with his evaluation,
both generally and with respect to details. Ambassador Cook
focused on C.A.R.'s plight as a dysfunctional entity hardly
warranting the label of "state." Many, if not most, of its
problems flowed from the top, with President Bozize not
willing or incapable of providing leadership, at times
apparently unaware of what it meant to be "head of state."
The French agreed with this assessment of Bozize, noting that
President Sarkozy had little patience with his counterpart,
as demonstrated by the now-famous 20-minute, no-frills
meeting Sarkozy accorded Bozize in December 2007, during
which he bluntly told Bozize what C.A.R. needed to do to
warrant better treatment, hardly giving Bozize a chance to
respond ("one of the strangest meetings I've ever attended
and had to write up," Fages commented).

Priorities
--------------

4. (C) Ambassador Cook said that U.S. priorities were (1)
to avoid humanitarian catastrophe in C.A.R. and (2) to avoid
the development of a political and social vacuum in a country
surrounded by numerous regional problems. To this end he
noted his calls for political reconciliation, better
governance, and more sensible business policies to attract
investors. Ambassador Cook said that he took care to address
both the government and opposition in the same manner on
these issues so as not to appear favoring one or the other,
which all sides seemed to appreciate. Fages added a third
priority for France -- the withdrawal of French troops from
C.A.R., currently numbering, according to Fages, about 400,
including troops serving in EUFOR and deployed bilaterally.

Post-EUFOR/MINURCAT
--------------

5. (C) Although Fages noted the desire to withdraw or
reduce French forces deployed in C.A.R., all of Ambassador
Cook's interlocutors stressed the need for the planned UN
operation that will succeed EUFOR and MINURCAT to deploy
forces in C.A.R. Fages noted that the UK seemed opposed to
the following-on force's deploying units in C.A.R. and she
said that the U.S. and France would have to work with the UK

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to change its views. The French said that it would be a
mistake not to place forces in C.A.R., especially in view of
the stabilizing effect French forces and forces associated
with EUFOR/MINURCAT have had in C.A.R. Rebels, bandits, and
traffickers of all kinds would quickly exploit parts of
C.A.R. suddenly denuded of international troops, which would
undermine the international community's current strategy of
deploying peacekeepers in Sudan, Chad, and C.A.R. in order to
address the region's problems comprehensively.

C.A.R.-France Security Arrangements
--------------

6. (C) The desire to withdraw troops from C.A.R., the
French said, was in keeping with the broader changes in
France's military relationship with Africa that the GOF was
implementing, particularly with the eight African countries
(including C.A.R.) with which it maintains "defense
agreements" (see reftel for details on France's evolving
military policy in Africa). However, Bozize did not seem to
be getting the message, Marechaux said, despite repeated
French briefings. The previous defense agreement would be
converted into a military cooperation agreement. C.A.R.
would still benefit from the latter in terms of training and
other support, but the new arrangement would not have the
mutual defense provisions of the defense agreement. This
Bozize seemed to refuse to acknowledge. "He thinks that as
long as we have troops deployed in C.A.R., we'll rescue him
in extremis," Fages said, "but he doesn't appreciate that
that is going to end once the defense agreement becomes a
military cooperation agreement." The French had hoped to
renegotiate these agreements by the end of 2008, but Fages
confided that the GOF was behind schedule. MOD official
Colonel Opplert said that he was part of the MOD team working
on the new arrangements and he too commented that it was
difficult to get C.A.R. officials to understand that
France-C.A.R. security arrangement would soon be
fundamentally different.

An Opportunity
--------------

7. (C) The French responded positively to Ambassador Cook's
idea, still in gestation, for the U.S. and perhaps others to
offer, indirectly, training to the FACA under the guise of
training MICOPAX (formerly FOMUC) units deployed in C.A.R.
Ambassador Cook explained that certain MICOPAX units received
U.S. training in their home countries before deployment to
C.A.R. He thought that it could be possible to implement a
second training session for these units once they arrived in
C.A.R., with FACA forces also participating. The FACA units
could then receive training in such areas as human rights,
military-civilian relations, and the like, along with more
traditional technical military training. This would allow
the FACA to be exposed to modern training methods and
principles, without the U.S. and others offering direct
training to the FACA. The French took note of this and
encouraged Ambassador Cook to continue discussing the idea if
it eventually received USG endorsement.

Even the Chinese Are Hesitant to Do Business
--------------

8. (C) Ambassador Cook and the French discussed at some
length the very poor business and investment climate in
C.A.R., much of it the result of bad C.A.R. handling of
economic and business prospects. The country was rich in
resources but inept in managing and using them. Ambassador
Cook described the greed-driven way the C.A.R. handled the
Areva and Axmin mining contracts, demanding more and more
"adjustments" to contracts that appeared to be concluded, all
for the private benefit of Bozize or his associates,
especially his nephew, Minister Sylvain Ndoutingai. Fages
commented that the lack of respect for contracts was a
serious detriment to doing business in C.A.R. and agreed with
Ambassador Cook that such practices were very strong
disincentives for foreign investors to seek opportunities in
C.A.R. Ambassador Cook confided that even the Chinese were
reluctant to do business in C.A.R., with the Chinese
ambassador telling him that Beijing refused to sign-off on
certain proposed projects. Fages added that Bozize seemed to
believe that because C.A.R. had reached agreement with French
firm Areva, this ensured that France would come to his aid if
necessary, similar to the way he believed that the presence
of French troops in C.A.R. guaranteed that France would
"save" him. Fages said that Bozize was off the mark in
thinking that these two factors alone -- French troops in

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C.A.R. and the Areva deal -- somehow would afford him special
French "protection."

Saifee Durbar
--------------

9. (C) The French agreed that Bozize associate Saifee
Durbar, who seemed to have a hand in any number of nefarious
dealings, was an especially pernicious influence. Marechaux
and Fages noted that Durbar had been convicted of fraud in a
French court and was therefore subject to arrest if he came
to France. Fages took a keen interest in discussing with
Ambassador Cook ways of apprehending Durbar or at least in
limiting his freedom of action. She noted that he seemed to
hold a UK passport and was sometimes named to official C.A.R.
UNGA delegations and the like, which allowed him to travel
relatively freely when part of such delegations. She said
that the fact of his conviction in France should perhaps be
forwarded to Interpol, with any subsequent Interpol warrant
requiring EU member states' cooperation.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) Ambassador Cook's meetings with the French took
place in an open and friendly atmosphere, and it soon became
apparent that U.S. and French views of the C.A.R., along with
areas of concern and opportunity, were largely identical.
The French welcomed the chance to compare notes and
Ambassador Cook's visit appears to have set the stage for
broader U.S.-France cooperation in matters relating to C.A.R.


11. (U) Ambassador Cook was not able to clear this message
before leaving Paris.




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