BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE: FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UV IV FR
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE: FOREIGN MINISTER
KOUCHNER'S VISIT

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's
January 27 visit to Burkina Faso focused on Cote d'Ivoire and
the need to remain engaged on ensuring free and fair
elections there, according to the MFA desk officer
responsible for both countries. The main priority is to
enable the elections process to go forward so that SRSG Choi
Young-Jin can certify them as acceptable, whenever they take
place. Kouchner's statement to the effect that the elections
could be delayed for "a month or two" was not intended as a
suggestion that the elections be postponed but rather a
statement of fact in view of the still complex work on
identification and registration that must take place before
elections can be held. France's Operation Licorne will draw
down to the 1,800 level, which France intends to maintain
until the end of the Licorne/UNOCI mandate, assuming no
drastic change in circumstances in Cote d'Ivoire. END
SUMMARY.

Burkina Faso
--------------

2. (C) Karim Ben Cheikh, MFA desk officer for Burkina Faso
and Cote d'Ivoire, discussed FM Kouchner's trip to the former
on January 27, following stops in the DRC and Rwanda
(septel). He said that Kouchner's two previously planned
trips to Burkina Faso had been postponed and that the GOF
wanted to meet with Compaore to express the GOF's desire to
maintain close and stronger ties with Burkina Faso.
Specifically, Kouchner wanted to express appreciation for
Compaore's leadership on Togo and especially Cote d'Ivoire.
He also wanted to congratulate Compaore for having been
elected chair of ECOWAS and for Burkina Faso's having
obtained a seat on the UN Security Council. Ben Cheikh said
that Kouchner was well received by Compaore and that the
visit went smoothly.

Cote d'Ivoire
--------------

3. (C) Ben Cheikh said that most of Kouchner's discussion
with Compaore focused on Cote d'Ivoire. Ben Cheikh then
provided an update from the GOF perspective. He said that
the GOF remained firmly committed to the Ouagadougou Accords
and the peace process that they had put in motion. There
was, however, cause for concern. Little work had been done
on the two key tasks that must be accomplished before
elections could be held -- identification and voter
registration. Lack of progress in these areas was what led
Kouchner to state that postponing the elections for "one or
two months" would be acceptable. Ben Cheikh said firmly that
in making that assessment, Kouchner was not trying to suggest
that the elections "should" be postponed but that if
technical problems could not be resolved in time, the June
date could slip with no harm done. Ben Cheikh noted that
critics had seized on Kouchner's comments, speculating that
he was sending a message or somehow trying to manipulate the
process, but that was not the case.


4. (C) Ben Cheikh continued that it was not possible to
determine whether Gbagbo or any of the other political actors
had a hidden agenda or that they wanted to sabotage the
elections process. This remained a possibility. However,
Ben Cheikh suggested that Gbagbo and other leaders understood
that Cote d'Ivoire risked a severe rebuke from the
international community of the elections did not take place
within a reasonable period after the June target date, if
that date could not be met. Ben Cheikh doubted that Gbagbo
would take that risk, especially since it was quite possible
he could win a free and fair election. Ben Cheikh speculated
that Gbagbo might have learned from the Togo experience,
where the Faure regime's standing had risen significantly
after the successful October 2007 legislative elections.


5. (C) Ben Cheikh said that France's top priority, which he
hoped Ivoirians shared, was for elections to take place in
June 2008 or not long thereafter, and that these elections be
sufficiently fair and transparent that UN SRSG Choi could
certify them. That remained the ultimate goal -- elections
worthy of Choi's certification and stamp of approval. Ben
Cheikh noted that the French were quite satisfied with the
job Choi had been doing. He was serious, engaged, and able
to prod sufficiently but inoffensively in a manner that made
him effective. Ben Cheikh had the impression that Ivoirian
parties on all sides respected Choi. For his part, Choi
seemed bent on having the electoral process develop
successfully and yield the certifiable elections everyone
wanted.


PARIS 00000187 002 OF 002



6. (C) Ben Cheikh confirmed that France would begin drawing
down Operation Licorne, to about the 1,800 level. He noted
that the reductions would not be among combat or mobile
troops. Most of the reductions would consist of support and
logistics staff that were no longer necessary since other
parts of Licorne had already departed before the current
round of drawdowns. Ben Cheikh said that, under present
conditions, Operation Licorne would remain at the 1,800 level
for the remainder of its mandate, assuming there were no
drastic changes in the overall situation. He said that
Licorne would be able to support UNOCI as mandated at this
level for the duration of the two missions.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA