Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS1805
2008-09-26 16:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH GOVERNMENT TAKING A HARD LINE ON COUP

Tags:  PREL PINR KDEM PINS MR FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #1805/01 2701657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261657Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4393
INFO RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 1038
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001805 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR KDEM PINS MR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH GOVERNMENT TAKING A HARD LINE ON COUP
LEADERS IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young. Reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001805

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR KDEM PINS MR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH GOVERNMENT TAKING A HARD LINE ON COUP
LEADERS IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young. Reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) SUMMARY: Romain Serman, Counselor on Africa at
the French Presidency, on September 19 provided a frank
assessment of the situation in Mauritania in the aftermath of
the August 6 coup to Ambassador Mark Boulware, stating that
the French are prepared for a "divorce" with Mauritania if
President Abdallahi is not reinstated. President Sarkozy
delivered the short and direct instructions to Serman to "get
the (coup leaders) out," including former chief of staff of
the Mauritanian army, General Aziz. Although Serman stated
that the French were at a "low point" assessing the impact of
their efforts in restoring democratic governance in
Mauritania, he also expressed confidence in ultimately
achieving the right outcome, quoting General Charles de
Gaulle, who said, "we may lose the battle, but we will win
the war." He seemed confident that continued French
pressure, coupled with a withdrawal of French and European
funding, would undercut Aziz's efforts, leave the
Mauritanians disenchanted with Aziz, and ultimately result in
a return to democratic governance. Ambassador Boulware
approved this message. END SUMMARY.

The Presidency on Mauritania
--------------

2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania Mark Boulware met
with Africa Counselor Romain Serman at the French Presidency
on September 19. Serman began by noting that he traveled to
Qatar on September 16 with Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno
Joubert to coordinate pressure on the coup leaders. Coup
leader General Ghazwani had traveled there on September 17.
Referring to additional steps to pressure the coup leaders,
Serman expressed confidence the French could secure
additional support at the UN. (NOTE: In a separate
September 19 conversation, MFA DAS-equivalent Christine Fages
also pointed to a UNSCR as a recourse; however, she noted the
"Russia problem" that the community would face in the council
given "other issues," presumably meaning the Russia-Georgia
crisis. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Serman was frustrated that coup leader General
Aziz was not "budging" from giving up power but stated that

the French are considering imposing visa bans or travel
restrictions on Mauritanians involved in the coup, including
Aziz 's brother-in-law, to increase the pressure on the coup
leaders. Serman echoed Fages' point that the Spanish are the
"problem" on this issue, as Mauritanians can bypass French
restrictions by going to the Spanish -- who have not yet
implemented the biometric passport -- and get a visa from
them; given Schengen law, the visa then allows them full
mobility into the rest of Europe. Serman outlined two
possible outcomes; either the French "lose" or the coup
leaders "crack" under continued international political
pressure.


4. (C) Serman also outlined a series of meetings over
the next month pertaining to the Mauritanian issue that could
have a negative impact on efforts to pressure the coup
leaders. The European Commission Fishing Agreement with
Mauritania -- in which Spanish interests are the strongest --
will be considered in breach by October if a payment of 86
million euros is not made to Mauritania. While it is
possible this could result in European fishing rights being
sold to others, Sermain believes the Europeans will follow
through with this first payment. Other international
opportunities to address the Mauritanian issue include a
Fisheries meeting (Conseil de Peche) at the end of September,
a European Commission meeting, and the African Union Peace
and Security Council (PSC).


5. (C) Serman suggested two possible solutions to deal
with the coup. He termed a "consensus option" would unite
the opposition, Aziz, and important military and civilian
officials around a reinstated President Abdallahi. A second
option would involve the creation of a security council
headed by the president of the Senate (but not the current
Senate leader). The French have used "brutal" language to
try to get General Ghazwani "to crack", but have yet to be
successful in these efforts that stress continued pressure
for appropriate action in keeping with President Sarkozy 's
new Africa policy. Serman stressed that France will maintain
pressure on the coup leaders by blocking French ($150 million
NFI) and EU aid ($600 million NFI) to Mauritania and would
recall French attaches posted in Nouakchott. Serman
emphasized that General Aziz would have trouble building
schools and roads without French and international aid. As a
result of these actions, the remaining French presence in
Mauritania will be focused on the fight against al-Qa'ida in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On counterterrorism, Serman said
Franco-Mauritanian cooperation would continue, albeit at a
discrete level. "We will fly our planes overhead a couple of
times and will share intelligence," but that will be the

extent of French support and efforts to counter AQIM.


6. (C) Serman noted other regional players including
President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Algerian President
Bouteflika have consulted the French on this issue. Serman
suggested the Mauritanian coup leaders are using money from
Saudi Arabia to fund their efforts. (Note: In a separate
meeting MFA Christine Fages said the coup leaders have used
$50 million from Saudi Arabia earmarked for the fight against
terrorism to pay their deputies.) Commenting on the domestic
situation, Ambassador Boulware observed one positive element
is the fact that for the first time we are seeing resistance
to a coup in Mauritania.


The French MFA on Mauritania
--------------

7. (C) On September 19, MFA DAS-equivalent Christine
Fages delivered a similar message on Mauritania, although the
MFA position was notably "softer" than the Presidency
response to Sarkozy,s mandate "get them out of there."
Fages questioned the feasibility of starting talks with coup
leaders involving Abdallahi while the president is still
under house arrest, commenting that there would first have to
be a way to get Abdallahi to solicit international presence.
According to Fages, opposition leader Ould Daddah believes
Aziz wants to stay in power but could consider this current
situation his "last chance."


8. (C) Fages echoed the French Presidency position on
continued involvement in fighting AQIM while commenting she
doubted the Mauritanian army could fight AQIM on its own, as
they "ran away" during a recent AQIM attack that resulted in
the disappearance of 12 Mauritanian soldiers whom the French
judge were taken prisoner by AQIM.


9. (C) Offering a biographic comment on General Aziz,
Fages and her deputy, Laurent Bigot, viewed the General as
the lynchpin for all counterterrorism action. Ambassador
Boulware agreed that Aziz is a "micromanager" and gives the
final go-ahead, but observed he is not the one who plans
everything. According to Bigot, young Mauritanian military
officers do not like Aziz, but the army is unstable, does not
have resources, and probably will fragment into two camps,
divided along those who support the coup d'etat and those who
do not.


10. (C) Fages also stated that the Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU) which planned to meet on the margins of the PSC would
not include Mauritania, something Fages commented the Arabs
would not like. Regarding the Union for the Mediterranean
(UPM),the situation in Mauritania posed a problem for the
French; Fages stated the French do not know whom to invite
and whom to exclude, and there are constant UPM meetings.
Fages did not seem to think we could count on support from
Arab countries or from China. China is waiting to see what
is going to happen, and probably is waiting to acquire access
to fishing zones, according to Fages. China does not want a
second Sudan, but is less interested in Mauritania than in
Sudan.


11. (C) On tactics, Fages outlined two French efforts.
Within the EU, Fages stated there is the possibility of
invoking Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 to
freeze certain funds in a very specific manner that would
increase pressure on the coup leaders. The French are also
asking other Francophone countries to exclude Mauritania,
while waiting to see if the AU will take similar action.
Fages echoed Serman,s view that Senagalese President Wade is
taking inadequate steps to redress this situation. Fages
expressed concern that the AU would wrongly interpret the
passage of a package of laws by the Mauritanian national
assembly as a step towards democracy given the assembly is
democratically elected. Ambassador Boulware pointed out that
if the President has not convoked it, it is not
constitutional. Regarding next steps Fages emphasized the
central question is when to negotiate with the coup leaders,
and opined that time had not yet arrived. The French MFA
believes the international community should stay the course
and wait for the impact of Article 96 of the Cotonou
Agreement of 2000.


12. (U) Ambassador Boulware has cleared this message.







STAPLETON