Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS1761
2008-09-22 09:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
SUDAN: GATHERING FRENCH SUPPORT
how-toVZCZCXRO8028 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO DE RUEHFR #1761/01 2660906 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 220906Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4348 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001761
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KAWC SU FR UN
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GATHERING FRENCH SUPPORT
REF: PARIS 01671
Classified By: PolMC Kathleen H. Allegrone for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001761
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KAWC SU FR UN
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GATHERING FRENCH SUPPORT
REF: PARIS 01671
Classified By: PolMC Kathleen H. Allegrone for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with
French presidential advisor Bruno Joubert in Paris on
September 12 to discuss the results of Joubert's September 2
visit to Khartoum and gather support against Sudanese efforts
to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir in the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Seeking to allay USG
concerns, Joubert said the GOF has offered Sudan "no deal" on
the ICC. Rather, the French have told the Sudanese they must
reform or face increased pressure from the international
community. Joubert cautioned that if China or Sudan and its
friends try to push through an Article 16 suspension, then
the P-3 -- especially the USG with Latin American countries
-- would have to exert substantial influence in the Security
Council to ensure the support of the non-permanent members of
the Council to secure an appropriate outcome. Joubert agreed
that delaying a decision in the Security Council could add
pressure to the Sudanese to reform, but cautioned that doing
so for too long might allow them to "escape," which they have
done repeatedly in the past. Joubert believes that African
Union and Arab League countries -- who view the ICC as an arm
of the West against the developing world -- might also
complicate matters if a resolution was introduced in this
year's UN General Assembly. He noted that since the
threatened ICC indictment of Bashir several Sudanese
officials are beginning to fear for their future, which could
also help to bring about change in the country. END SUMMARY.
Unified P-3 Against Article 16 Suspension
--------------
2. (C) S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with French
presidential advisor Bruno Joubert in Paris on September 12
to discuss the results of Joubert's September 2 visit to
Khartoum (ref) and to gather support against Sudanese efforts
to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir in the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Williamson noted that
Sudan had indicated through common allies that they were
looking for fissures among the P-3, believing the U.S. was
the only country pressing hard against an Article 16
suspension. He asserted that P-3 unity was desirable on this
question so as not to embolden the Sudanese. He also
cautioned Joubert that Sudan must not believe there was any
sort of quid-pro-quo arrangement on the issue or that
negotiations had begun and it was only a matter of agreeing
on a deal. Williamson added that a final decision on an
Article 16 deferral would likely be taken by President Bush
personally and that he would likely set a very high threshold
before even considering the possibility.
3. (C) Joubert said it was important to know there was a
possible presidential decision for the USG on a potential
Article 16 suspension. He sought to allay USG concerns
noting he had been firm with Khartoum during his September 2
visit, making clear that the bar had been raised very high
and that there was no "deal" on ICC-related issues (ref).
The Sudanese would have to show real proof of change and "not
just words" or the international community would continue to
come down hard on them, he said. He said while France and
the UK did not yet have a formal position on the Article 16
suspension, the USG could assume that the GOF was on their
side. Joubert also noted he was promised a "white paper"
response from Khartoum regarding how they planned to
implement changes, but in the 12 days since his trip he had
yet to receive anything.
4. (C) Joubert cautioned that if China or Sudan and its
friends try to push through an Article 16 suspension, then
the P-3 would have to use its influence in the Security
Council to ensure they were convinced to stay on our side.
This would be especially important for the U.S. to influence
non-permanent Council members from Latin American. Regarding
the UN General Assembly (UNGA),Joubert said the African
Union (AU) and Arab League countries were very sympathetic to
the Sudanese because he said they see the ICC as biased
against Africa. Joubert said that because of this it would
be extremely difficult to change opinions, which could
especially complicate matters if a resolution was introduced
in this year's UNGA.
Pressuring Sudan to Change
--------------
PARIS 00001761 002 OF 002
5. (C) Williamson noted it might work to the international
community's advantage to delay a decision on the Article 16
suspension in the UNSC as long as possible, since this delay
would keep pressure on Sudan to act. Joubert agreed but
cautioned the need to be careful, timing everything well
enough to pressure the Sudanese without giving them too much
time to "escape," which he believed they have been doing all
along. Joubert said since his first visit to the country as
OCSE ambassador in April 2003, for example, Sudan has been
continuously cheating the system. Joubert noted it was
important to ensure that any ICC indictment against Bashir be
handled separately from next steps regarding the two Sudanese
officials already indicted by the ICC (ref).
Bashir's Inner Circle: Fear Brewing
--------------
6. (C) Reporting on his meetings in Khartoum, Joubert
noticed that support for Bashir was not as strong as commonly
viewed outside of Sudan. Since the threatened ICC indictment
of Bashir there had been a lot of endless finger-pointing
going on among the ruling elite. He said some officials were
afraid for the first time about their future. Williamson
asked about Bashir and his inner circle. Joubert said it was
very difficult to penetrate, but all indications were that
Bashir realizes that if he is indicted he is a "dead man,
politically." Joubert believed that if one of them fell and
was sent to the ICC -- presumably Bashir -- then the rest now
realize they might follow. For this reason, they were
keeping a united front, he said.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KAWC SU FR UN
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GATHERING FRENCH SUPPORT
REF: PARIS 01671
Classified By: PolMC Kathleen H. Allegrone for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with
French presidential advisor Bruno Joubert in Paris on
September 12 to discuss the results of Joubert's September 2
visit to Khartoum and gather support against Sudanese efforts
to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir in the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Seeking to allay USG
concerns, Joubert said the GOF has offered Sudan "no deal" on
the ICC. Rather, the French have told the Sudanese they must
reform or face increased pressure from the international
community. Joubert cautioned that if China or Sudan and its
friends try to push through an Article 16 suspension, then
the P-3 -- especially the USG with Latin American countries
-- would have to exert substantial influence in the Security
Council to ensure the support of the non-permanent members of
the Council to secure an appropriate outcome. Joubert agreed
that delaying a decision in the Security Council could add
pressure to the Sudanese to reform, but cautioned that doing
so for too long might allow them to "escape," which they have
done repeatedly in the past. Joubert believes that African
Union and Arab League countries -- who view the ICC as an arm
of the West against the developing world -- might also
complicate matters if a resolution was introduced in this
year's UN General Assembly. He noted that since the
threatened ICC indictment of Bashir several Sudanese
officials are beginning to fear for their future, which could
also help to bring about change in the country. END SUMMARY.
Unified P-3 Against Article 16 Suspension
--------------
2. (C) S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with French
presidential advisor Bruno Joubert in Paris on September 12
to discuss the results of Joubert's September 2 visit to
Khartoum (ref) and to gather support against Sudanese efforts
to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir in the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Williamson noted that
Sudan had indicated through common allies that they were
looking for fissures among the P-3, believing the U.S. was
the only country pressing hard against an Article 16
suspension. He asserted that P-3 unity was desirable on this
question so as not to embolden the Sudanese. He also
cautioned Joubert that Sudan must not believe there was any
sort of quid-pro-quo arrangement on the issue or that
negotiations had begun and it was only a matter of agreeing
on a deal. Williamson added that a final decision on an
Article 16 deferral would likely be taken by President Bush
personally and that he would likely set a very high threshold
before even considering the possibility.
3. (C) Joubert said it was important to know there was a
possible presidential decision for the USG on a potential
Article 16 suspension. He sought to allay USG concerns
noting he had been firm with Khartoum during his September 2
visit, making clear that the bar had been raised very high
and that there was no "deal" on ICC-related issues (ref).
The Sudanese would have to show real proof of change and "not
just words" or the international community would continue to
come down hard on them, he said. He said while France and
the UK did not yet have a formal position on the Article 16
suspension, the USG could assume that the GOF was on their
side. Joubert also noted he was promised a "white paper"
response from Khartoum regarding how they planned to
implement changes, but in the 12 days since his trip he had
yet to receive anything.
4. (C) Joubert cautioned that if China or Sudan and its
friends try to push through an Article 16 suspension, then
the P-3 would have to use its influence in the Security
Council to ensure they were convinced to stay on our side.
This would be especially important for the U.S. to influence
non-permanent Council members from Latin American. Regarding
the UN General Assembly (UNGA),Joubert said the African
Union (AU) and Arab League countries were very sympathetic to
the Sudanese because he said they see the ICC as biased
against Africa. Joubert said that because of this it would
be extremely difficult to change opinions, which could
especially complicate matters if a resolution was introduced
in this year's UNGA.
Pressuring Sudan to Change
--------------
PARIS 00001761 002 OF 002
5. (C) Williamson noted it might work to the international
community's advantage to delay a decision on the Article 16
suspension in the UNSC as long as possible, since this delay
would keep pressure on Sudan to act. Joubert agreed but
cautioned the need to be careful, timing everything well
enough to pressure the Sudanese without giving them too much
time to "escape," which he believed they have been doing all
along. Joubert said since his first visit to the country as
OCSE ambassador in April 2003, for example, Sudan has been
continuously cheating the system. Joubert noted it was
important to ensure that any ICC indictment against Bashir be
handled separately from next steps regarding the two Sudanese
officials already indicted by the ICC (ref).
Bashir's Inner Circle: Fear Brewing
--------------
6. (C) Reporting on his meetings in Khartoum, Joubert
noticed that support for Bashir was not as strong as commonly
viewed outside of Sudan. Since the threatened ICC indictment
of Bashir there had been a lot of endless finger-pointing
going on among the ruling elite. He said some officials were
afraid for the first time about their future. Williamson
asked about Bashir and his inner circle. Joubert said it was
very difficult to penetrate, but all indications were that
Bashir realizes that if he is indicted he is a "dead man,
politically." Joubert believed that if one of them fell and
was sent to the ICC -- presumably Bashir -- then the rest now
realize they might follow. For this reason, they were
keeping a united front, he said.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce
STAPLETON