SUDAN/ICC/SANCTIONS: "WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001726

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KAWC SU CD FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/ICC/SANCTIONS: "WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING WITH
SUDAN"

REF: PARIS 1671

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent for Sudan Helene Le Gal
stressed on September 12 that "we are not negotiating with
Sudan" concerning its recent discussion with the Khartoum
regime during which the French explained to the Sudanese the
things Sudan needed to do to improve its standing in the
international community (reftel). She said that France
wanted to see how the leverage provided by the possible ICC
warrant against President Bashir could be used to induce
improved Sudanese behavior, but she emphasized that France
had not promised anything in return and that the bar had been
set very high before France would even consider changing its
position on Sudan. Le Gal reported that MFA AF
A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty had recently visited
N'Djamena, where he discussed with President Deby follow-on
options for EUFOR/MINURCAT, with Deby agreeing to a UN
operation to succeed EUFOR. Gliniasty also discussed with
Deby the domestic political situation in Chad and the need
for increased openness. END SUMMARY.

SUDAN
--------------

2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent for Sudan Helene Le Gal on
September 12 provided an update on Sudan, beginning with the
ICC issue. She stressed that France's recent contact with
Sudan (reftel),during which Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno
Joubert explained in blunt terms the steps Sudan needed to
take to demonstrate cooperation with the international
community, should not be viewed as a French attempt to
"negotiate" with Sudan over the ICC issue. She emphasized
several times that "we are not negotiating with Sudan" and
that "it is wrong to think we are doing so." She said that
several other countries had consulted with the GOF (she
mentioned specifically Egypt) and that they reported that the
USG was saying that France was "negotiating" with Khartoum.
She said it was most unfortunate if Washington had reached
this conclusion because it was not true, although she
acknowledged that she understood how the perception could
have arisen.


3. (C) Le Gal said that the ICC prosecutor's move to indict
Bashir provided an unexpected opportunity that the French
believed should be exploited. Moreno's announcement had
caused widespread concern and worry among Khartoum's ruling
class. The GOF believed that it was worth exploring how far
Sudan would be willing to go in order to obtain a more
favorable stance from the international community. "We
haven't promised them anything, we haven't put anything on
the table, and we have made it clear that they must improve
their behavior before we would even think about doing
anything in response." Le Gal said that it was not a
question of meeting Sudan halfway -- Sudan would have to move
all the way to accept what the international community
demanded with respect to Darfur, humanitarian relief,
cooperating with UNAMID and the ICC (regarding those already
indicted),a halt to support for Chad's rebels, and peace
talks with the rebel factions, to name the most pressing
concerns. Until Sudan offered full cooperation in all these
areas, France would not lift a finger to help Sudan or
relieve international pressure, she said. "We will continue
to say 'no' until they do everything asked of them. The bar
has been set very high." Le Gal said that Sudan had not
responded to Joubert's visit.


4. (C) In this context, Le Gal said it would not be
productive to impose sanctions, as the U.S. had been
contemplating. She observed that doing so end to any
inclination that the Chadian and Sudanese rebels would talk
to their respective GOC and GOS interlocutors, and vice
versa. The ICC issue had rendered the sanctions issue
inoperative, at least for now, she said. Perhaps sanctions
would be in order if, within the next few months, we saw
little or no movement on the part of the various parties.
Until then, we should hold off. Moreover, she said, even if
the P-3 did agree on sanctions, there was a strong
possibility that such an effort would not gain the support of
Russia, China, and other Security Council members. She also
expected Sudan and the ICC to be widely discussed at the
upcoming UNGA, with a good number of African and Arab League
states likely to press for a suspension of ICC action. At
the same time, the rainy season would end, with an increased
prospect of military activity on the part of both the Chadian
and Sudanese rebels.


5. (C) In passing, Le Gal said that Darfur rebel faction
leader Abdulwahid el-Nur had not changed his position much,

PARIS 00001726 002 OF 002


still stating that there would be no compromise on his part
so long as insecurity reigned in Darfur. While she expressed
understanding for his position, she said that it would be
helpful if he were more engaged and played a more
constructive role rather than remaining aloof. She noted
that his residency permit to remain in France was now
renewable on a month-to-month basis, rather than on the
previous longer-term basis. "Just a small reminder that we
could end his stay in France if he were to prove to be a
decidedly negative influence."

Chad
--------------

6. (C) Le Gal said that MFA AF A/S-equivalent Jean de
Gliniasty had traveled to N'Djamena a few days before, where
he met with Chad President Deby to discuss two issues -- the
possible successor mission to EUFOR/MINURCAT, and Chad's
internal politics. On the first issue, Deby seemed agreeable
to a UN mission that would succeed EUFOR/MINURCAT. Some
EUFOR countries, she said, had indicated that they would
continue to contribute troops to a UN successor operation.
When asked, she said that the French military opposed
maintaining the high level of French troops presently serving
in EUFOR but that the MFA wanted a continued strong French
presence.


7. (C) On the domestic political issue, Le Gal said that
Gliniasty again encouraged Deby to open up Chad's political
arena and to work with opposition groups, but she did not
elaborate further. Le Gal commented that the Commission of
Inquiry established after the February 2008 rebel offensive
and which was charged with investigating the disappearance of
opposition figures, seemed to have done a good job, not
shying away from suggesting the apparent death of one such
figure (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh). If he had died, that was
unfortunate but the fact that the commission was able to
discuss his fate was a positive sign, Le Gal said. (NOTE:
In its September 10 press briefing, the MFA spokesperson
responded to a question about Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh as
follows: "The Commission of Inquiry has not formally
established the death of Mr. Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh. Like
other international observers, we have saluted this report by
the Commission and have subscribed to its recommendations, in
particular those concerning the opening of judicial
procedures against responsible parties. We continue to hope
that all light will be focused on this disappearance, about
which (FM) Bernard Kouchner has been concerned since he first
learned about it on February 3. The pursuit of truth and
justice must continue." END NOTE.)


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