Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS129
2008-01-24 16:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

TOGO: COOPERATION MINISTER BAWARA'S VISIT TO PARIS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM EAID EFIN MARR TO FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0139
RR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0129/01 0241615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241615Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1767
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1458
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2174
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000129 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EAID EFIN MARR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: COOPERATION MINISTER BAWARA'S VISIT TO PARIS

REF: LOME 16

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000129

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EAID EFIN MARR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: COOPERATION MINISTER BAWARA'S VISIT TO PARIS

REF: LOME 16

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Togo Cooperation Minister Bawara focused
on restarting bilateral and multilateral development
assistance programs for Togo during his January 16-18 visit
to France. According to MFA Desk Officer Daniel Westerink,
Togo has developed a possible roadmap that could result in
the resumption of French and EU assistance as well as support
from the African Development Bank (AfDB),World Bank, and
IMF, within the next six or eight months. The French
reinforced the need for Togo to continue democratic reform
and not to rest on the success of the October legislative
elections. Westerink said that the GOF remained cautiously
optimistic about the Faure government and Faure himself, was
interested in security sector reform, supported Togo's offer
of 800 troops for UNAMID, and remained skeptical about
opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio and the opposition's
strategies for countering Faure. END SUMMARY.

Making Peace with the IFIs
--------------

2. (C) MFA Togo Desk Officer Daniel Westerink on January 22
discussed Togo in the context of Cooperation Minister Gilbert
Bawara's visit to Paris during the January 16-18 period.
Westerink said that France wanted to provide Togo with
encouragement after the successful October elections and
indications that Faure would continue a program of democratic
reform. Thus Bawara's visit was centered on economic
assistance, with France willing to help bilaterally and to
support Togo's efforts to resume programs with the EU, AfDB,
WB, and IMF. Westerink said that the EU was ready to resume
assistance but that the EU wanted clarification regarding the
settlement of Togo's arrearages with the AfDB and WB.
Westerink described a possible arrangement where Togo would
pay back 1% of its USD 18 million in arrearages to the AfDB,
with the AfDB absorbing half of the remaining 99% and

eventual donors covering the remaining half. Togo's
arrearages to the WB amounted to about USD 150 million,
Westerink said, and he mentioned the possibility of a
short-term loan arrangement to cover them.


3. (C) Clearing the arrearages would then facilitate the
resumption of EU and WB engagement with Togo and the prospect
of renewed engagement with the IMF. Westerink said that if
Togo could make progress on these issues and arrive at a
formally accepted plan, it might be possible to organize a
donors' conference in Brussels at some point during the next
six or eight months. He acknowledged that Togo could well
have problems overcoming these obstacles quickly but that the
Togolese seemed bent on doing so. Westerink said that
bilaterally, France might be able to conclude a Partnership
Framework Agreement by this summer. (NOTE: The Partnership
Framework Agreement is the vehicle the French have used for
the past several years to formalize assistance programs with
recipient countries. The PFA runs for five years and is
intended to be modifiable during its course, so that initial
funding commitments can be adjusted to meet changing
circumstances. END NOTE.)

Reform in Togo Must Continue
--------------

4. (C) Bawara met with State Secretary Jean-Marie Bockel
(Cooperation and Francophonie),a team of economic experts
from various ministries, Presidential Deputy Diplomatic (and
principal Africa) Advisor Bruno Joubert, and MFA AF A/S Jean
de Gliniasty during his visit. Westerink said that the
French, while expressing support for Togo's economic goals,
reiterated the need for Togo to continue to make progress
politically, in such areas as human rights, good governance,
and the rule of law. They also stressed that Togo should not
continue to believe that the good will generated by the
successful October legislative elections would last forever
-- the Togolese had to keep making progress if they expected
the international community to view Togo favorably.

Faure's Leadership
--------------

5. (C) Westerink said that Faure had made a positive
impression in several areas since coming to power and did not
appear intent on ruling with an iron fist as had his father.
Reducing his brother Kpatcha's power was a sign that Faure
was seeking a moderate course. However, he risked angering
the hard-liners (which included Kpatcha) and provoking their
reaction. Westerink said that Faure would face more

PARIS 00000129 002 OF 002


difficulties if economic and political reform began to
threaten certain state-owned economic entities, which were
the source of much wealth for Togo's elite. Given these
potential difficulties, and given continuing uncertainties
about Faure's ultimate goals, Westerink cautioned that
Faure's apparent commitment to reform might not necessarily
hold. Still, Westerink said that the GOF remained cautiously
optimistic about Faure's leadership, which was already an
improvement over his father's.

Security Sector Reform
--------------

6. (C) Westerink said that France was interested in
promoting security sector reform in Togo, believing that the
military was too big for Togo's defense needs and that the
police and gendarmerie were too small and not well trained.
Westerink said that the Togolese army should not also double
as its internal security force. France therefore intended to
offer training in modern police techniques to Togolese police
and gendarmes, which would include the need to respect the
legal rights of citizens, a basic understanding of the
judiciary's role in law enforcement, and exposure to methods
other than brute force when having to maintain public order.

Troops for Darfur
--------------

7. (C) Westerink noted Togo's recent offer to send about
800 troops to Darfur to serve in UNAMID. He said that France
supported this contribution, which UN DPKO had not yet fully
cleared. Westerink said that Faure made this offer for two
reasons: 1) to bolster Togo's international image and 2) to
reduce the military's visibility in Togo by giving them
something to do elsewhere. Troops assigned to UNAMID were
likely to return to Togo better trained and more experienced,
a further benefit. Westerink said, however, that deploying
the troops to Darfur would likely take place toward the end
of 2008 or beginning of 2009, in part a function of how
rapidly UNAMID comes together.

Togolese Politics
--------------

8. (C) Westerink said that Bawara "said the right things"
about democratization but surprised them with his focus on
the 2010 presidential elections in Togo. Westerink noted
that the French Embassy in Lome was not sure where Bawara
stood in Togo's political spectrum, but Westerink commented
that he had had little good to say about the UFC opposition
party. Westerink said that the GOF had no contact with UFC
leader Gilchrist Olympio, even though he lived much of the
time in Paris. In the GOF's view, the opposition had been
thoroughly out-maneuvered by the Faure government over the
question of legislative electoral districts, which allowed
Faure's party to win a disproportionate number of seats
despite a much closer popular vote. This had all been done
transparently, demonstrating that the opposition had
underestimated Faure and the number of Togolese who supported
him. Westerink added that Olympio was doing the opposition
few favors by refusing any role in the government and
remaining aloof. Westerink observed that Olympio,
understandably, was rooted in the past and in his family's
conflicts with Eyadema. Olympio did not seem to understand
that Faure, who was canny enough to tone down the annual
January 13 celebration of his father's rise to power
(reftel). was not his father and that revised strategies were
perhaps necessary if the opposition wanted to challenge him.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA