FRAUD SUMMARY - SURINAME, 2ND QUARTER FY 2008

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 PARAMARIBO 000178

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP: DAJ KENDRICK, INL/HSTC, AND WHA/CAR JROSHOLT,
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS;
CARACAS FOR DHS AND LEGATT

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC NS

SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SURINAME, 2ND QUARTER FY 2008

REF: 07 STATE 171211

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1. Per the instructions in RefTel, Paramaribo submits the following
post fraud summary for the second quarter of FY 2008. Answers are
keyed to the letters found in RefTel.


A. Country Conditions
The economy, while stable, is still developing, and more than half
the population lives below the poverty line. Inferior economic
opportunities and low wages create incentives for economic migration
to other countries, including The Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles,
and, to a lesser extent, the United States. At the same time,
Suriname's inability to fully control its borders and large parts of
its interior make it an attractive place for illegal migrants,
including Guyanese, Chinese, Brazilian, and Haitian nationals. The
lack of computerized systems at the borders (including at the
airport) and within the local government creates other problems,
including information/identity verification and criminal activity
checks. Corruption within the government also leads to questions
regarding the legality/legitimacy of travel documents, residency
permits, and other government-issued documents.


B. NIV Fraud

The volume of NIV fraud is low, occurring predominantly in the
business and pleasure category. Applicants sometimes present forged
job letters, salary slips, employee identification badges, bank
statements, and other fraudulent documents in support of their
applications. Applicants also occasionally attempt to conceal prior
deportations from, or overstays in, the United States, which is
typically uncovered by checking the CLASS database.

Post recently reenergized its fraud prevention program, increasing
the number of fraud investigations. In one instance, a discovery of
similar false documents and stories used by at least six NIV
applicants, most of them Guyanese nationals, resulted in reporting a
false document provider to the local police.

In FY 2006, a woman suspected of having ties with an alien smuggling
ring attempted to procure a visa for her infant granddaughter.
Investigation into the case indicated that the woman had plans to
sell the child to a distant family member living illegally in the
United States. The visa was refused.

In FY 2007, using the text search function of the CCD, post
identified a naturalized US citizen who was "sponsoring" several
young Surinamese nationals for tourist visas each month. Although
difficult to confirm, the consular section believes that this U.S.
citizen, 20 years the senior of the individuals applying for visas,
was arranging for these young adults to work short-term in the
United States while they "visited" him. The U.S. citizen contacted
post directly in the first quarter of 2008 reporting that several of
his "visitors" had absconded in the U.S. and could not be located.

In the third quarter of FY 2007, a Surinamese applicant applied for
a NIV to visit her sister in New York. Upon interview, it became
apparent that the sister in the U.S. had entered on a B2 visa and
never departed. The visa was refused under section 214b. Upon
review of IDENT results, a previous entry into the U.S., at the same
time as the sister still living illegally in the U.S., was
discovered, showing a different first name and date of birth.
Applicant had used a younger sister's civil documents to obtain a
new passport, in a new identity, in an effort to reenter the U.S.
Applicant dressed in children's clothing and wore her hair in
pigtails, in an effort to convince the Consul that she was younger.

In the second quarter of 2008, a group of young men, some Haitian
and some Surinamese, all resident in Suriname, appeared at the
Embassy to "pick up" their visas for the U.S., which supposedly had
been arranged for by the organization sponsoring their travel to a
trafficking in persons conference in the U.S. The documents
presented were of a very low quality, obviously created by
non-native English speakers. The group of men, who were using the
invitation to attend the conference as a means to illegally
immigrate to the U.S., had, in turn, fallen victim to an advance fee
fraud scheme originating in West Africa. The conference was not
real, nor were any of the documents, and the young men had sent
their entire life savings via Western Union to the con artists in
Africa.


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NIV applicants include TCNs and recently naturalized Surinamers from
Guyana and China, as well as Haitian nationals residing in French
Guiana, which is part of the Embassy's consular district. These
cases often lack good supporting documentation and/or tend to be
riddled with fraud.

There are reports of organized smuggling rings and false document
providers catering to specific TCN communities. For instance, in
early FY 2006, a group of 30 Chinese applied for NIVs under the
pretext of a conference in the United States. These applicants were
clearly economic migrants who were using Suriname as a transit
country and were directed to the consular section by a recruiter.
One of the applicants presented an expired Chinese passport with a
photo of an apparently different individual, although his most
recent passport had his photo.

Haitian applicants from French Guiana, part of the Embassy's
consular district, frequently present false employment documents and
U.S. contact information; their claims are usually easy to disprove
as most such applicants lack familiarity with the details of the
documents they are presenting. Occasionally, Haitian NIV applicants
have presented what appeared to be forged French residency cards and
false immigration stamps in their passports. (The French Embassy has
engaged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Haitians
issued Surinamese visas on the basis of fraudulent residency cards.)
In the first quarter of FY 2008, a group of Haitians applied,
separately, but on the same day, for NIVs presenting suspicious work
documents and bank statements. All the applicants were refused
under section 214b. However, after review of IDENT results it
became apparent that at least one of the applicants had previously
attempted to enter the U.S. on a fraudulent French passport,
eventually giving CBP authorities a different name, which was, in
turn, different from the name he used when applying for the NIV at
the Embassy in Paramaribo.

The consular section has not detected any individual or systemic
employment-based, student and exchange visitor, or religious worker
visa fraud in the last two years. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, a tsunami disaster employment scam appeared as an
advertisement in a local business publication, offering disaster
relief job opportunities in the United States in exchange for a fee.
The scam was brought to the attention of local authorities. No
tsunami-related employment applications were presented at post.

SIPDIS


C. IV Fraud

IV volume is low, and with relatively low incidence of fraud. TCNs,
primarily Guyanese, make up half of the IV workload. A significant
percentage of Surinamese IV applicants are recently naturalized
former Guyanese and Chinese nationals. These cases often lack good
supporting documentation and may involve fraud. Especially in cases
of TCNs, post takes care to verify family relationships, employing
CA/FPP investigative tools such as LexisNexis.

Police certificates acquired by IV applicants are untrustworthy and
unreliable. Post began double-checking all IV applicants with the
RSO office to determine if the individuals have any criminal
backgrounds. Several cases were identified in which individuals
with violent criminal or drug trafficking histories were issued
clean police certificates by local authorities.

Due to the unreliability of civil documents in the region, Post no
longer accepts birth, marriage, death, or divorce certificates more
than 6 months old, as it is impossible to determine if the
authorities in Suriname or Guyana legitimately issued the document.

A recent marriage fraud investigation showed that the marriage
between an American citizen petitioner who filed for his Guyanese
"stepdaughter" residing in Suriname and her mother, a Guyanese
national residing in New York, was fictitious. While there was no
record of the mother ever having resided with the petitioner or
having received a green card, she appeared to have been living with
the beneficiary's biological father in a house registered as his
property. The evidence suggested that the biological parents of the
beneficiary immigrated to the United States illegally, following
which the mother proceeded with a fictitious marriage to an American
citizen in order to petition for her daughter to join them. The
consular section is currently in the process of returning the case

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file to DHS for revocation.

The consular section encountered a case of employment-based fraud in
FY 2004 when a small restaurant in Mississippi petitioned for five
Chinese applicants to work as specialty chefs (E-3 Skilled Worker
category). The interviews at post showed that none of the applicants
had any cooking experience, and were in fact related to the
petitioner. The petition was revoked.

In FY 2005, the consular section worked with DHS on a case of a
Surinamer who entered the United States in 1999 as a dependant of an
A-1 holder spouse and later sought to benefit from an
employment-based petition for "babysitting services." An
investigation showed that this applicant was already running a
shipping business in the United States and had no babysitting
experience.


D. DV Fraud

While the number of DV cases processed at post is very low, the
consular section encountered a number of cases where individuals or
bogus organizations tried to exploit public interest in the DV
Lottery to earn money by posing as the U.S. Government or an
authorized facilitating agency and soliciting fees via online credit
card payment or Western Union money transfer. In FY 2006 and 2007,
the Embassy issued media alerts and a press release to warn the
public about these schemes, and the consular officer gave an
interview about the subject to a leading local newspaper to further
raise awareness.

The consular section encountered a new case of DV Lottery scam,
reported by one of the targeted individuals, in which a bogus
organization posed as the U.S. Department of State and solicited via
e-mail a fee of $989.67 via Western Union money transfer from "lucky
winners" for further processing of their "cases." The Embassy
continued prominently displaying a DV Lottery fraud alert on its web
site and in its public waiting area to raise public awareness of
such scams.


E. ACS and Passport Fraud

The incidence of ACS and passport fraud is low. In FY 2004, the
consular section encountered one case of a Guyanese citizen posing
as an American citizen; his claim to U.S. citizenship was easily
exposed as false upon consultation with the CCD database and further
interviewing of the subject. The consular section encountered no ACS
fraud cases in FY 2005, 2006, or 2007. In FY 2008, the consular
section was contacted by the Surinamese police regarding a prisoner
who was claiming to be a U.S. citizen. While an investigation
concluded that the prisoner had lived in the U.S., he had never
become a U.S. citizen and remains a Guyanese national.


F. Adoption Fraud

The consular section's adoption workload is minimal, with one orphan
adoption case in FY 2005, two cases in FY 2006, four cases in FY
2007, and three current cases in FY 2008. While post has not
detected any indication of fraud in these cases, there are
unconfirmed reports that a criminal network is operating in Suriname
that relies on recruiters and corrupt government officials to entice
poor parents to give up their children for adoption in exchange for
money. According to a few unofficial accounts, children are being
placed with wealthier families both locally and in Europe,
predominantly the Netherlands, as well in Aruba and Curacao (there
have been no reports mentioning the United States). In cases of
child placement outside of Suriname, recruiters allegedly rely on
false document providers, including corrupt local government
officials, to obtain legal adoption documents or fraudulent birth
certificates to enable them to take the children out of the country,
entirely bypassing the lawful adoption mechanism. The legal adoption
mechanism involves a court determination that the child is an orphan
or that the child's parents are unfit or otherwise unable to take
care of the child's basic needs, a review of all documentation and
its authenticity, and an investigation into the matter by the family
legal affairs bureau. To ensure that none of its adoption cases
involve fraud, the consular officer and staff conduct field
investigations before approving any adoption case.


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G. Use of DNA Testing

Post may request DNA testing in Immigrant Visa cases when the
relationship of a beneficiary to the petitioner is in question.
Testing is coordinated through genetics testing laboratories in the
U.S. Samples are collected by a panel physician, under the
supervision of the consular officer, and then forwarded to the
laboratory by the consular section, observing at all times chain of
custody protocols. Results are sent directly to the consular
section by the laboratory and reviewed by the consular officer for
consideration in the case.


H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud

Post processes very few asylum cases, and has not uncovered any
fraud in Visa 92/93 processing. All recent cases involved derivative
following-to-join applicants: two Haitian nationals in FY 2006 and
one Surinamese applicant in FY 2004. Embassy Port-au-Prince fraud
unit assisted in assessing Haitian documents. Post has encountered
no fraud in lost or stolen I-551 cases, as was easily verified
through coordination with the DHS Forensics Document Lab.


I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel

There have been reports that TCNs, most particularly Chinese,
Haitian and Guyanese nationals, are using Suriname as a staging area
for onward travel to North America and that criminal smuggling and
possibly trafficking networks are operating in Suriname, providing
these third-country nationals with false documents and facilitating
their onward travel. In FY 2007, the consular officer assisted
DHS-ICE in identifying two young Guyanese females, using fraudulent
UK passports, being trafficking into prostitution to the U.S., via
Suriname and Aruba. The females were intercepted in Aruba by CBP
officers at pre-departure clearance and placed into a trafficking
victims' recovery program. Chinese Embassy officials have
acknowledged the large influx of Chinese migrants.

The Government of Suriname has acknowledged the problem of human
trafficking into and through Suriname and has taken measures to deal
with this problem. As a result, in 2006, Suriname was upgraded from
"Tier Two Watch" to a "Tier Two" country in the U.S. Department of
State Trafficking in Persons Report, indicating that trafficking in
persons (TIP) into and through Suriname is an issue and the local
government is taking action to prevent it. Suriname retained its
"Tier Two" ranking in the 2007 TIP report. There are reports that
some of the Brazilian, Dominican, Guyanese, and Colombian women and
girls are trafficked through Suriname to Europe for sexual
exploitation. Recent re-energized activities by the host government
to combat TIP, resulting in more police investigations and its new
cooperation with consular representatives of the origin countries of
nationals believed to be trafficked into and through Suriname, show
progress in anti-TIP efforts. The Embassy cooperates with other
foreign missions and consular representatives in Suriname, and
consular section staff meets with counterparts to discuss fraud,
TIP, and alien smuggling.

Organized crime remains a problem in Suriname, with drug
trafficking, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering being
particularly problematic. The Surinamese police have special task
forces established to counter these organizations. With this in
mind, the consular section takes particular precautions to identify
these individuals and looks for several indicators in visa
applicants that might suggest connections to these organizations.

There are no documented cases of terrorist travel through Suriname
to the U.S. or other areas; however poor control of borders makes it
difficult to make definitive statements. It is known that members
of the FARC, the Columbian resistance group which has been
designated a terrorist organization by the Secretary of State,
operate in and out of Suriname.


J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations

There have been no DS criminal fraud investigations at post to
date.


K. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry


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The consular section notes the 2005 release of an updated
machine-readable Surinamese passport reduced document fraud, as the
new passport is of significantly better quality and has more
security features than the old, non-machine readable version. In
some cases, the poor quality of the old style Surinamese passports
(which are still in circulation) and of Guyanese passports and vital
records continues to make it difficult to distinguish between
genuine and fraudulent documents. There are reports of false
document providers, including those catering to specific
third-country national (TCN) communities (i.e., Guyanese, Chinese,
and Haitians). While it does not appear easy to obtain genuine
national documents, the consular section has noted many cases with
discrepancies in names and dates and places of birth on legitimately
issued documents and several cases in which documents were issued to
imposters using another individual's civil documents.

Most civil documents are hand-written on paper with no security
features and are almost impossible to verify. Identity cards and
drivers licenses are basic and can easily be replicated or forged.
All Surinamese citizens are required to register with the civil
authority in the area they reside and should be able to obtain a
declaration of status from this office (the Surinamese Embassy if
the person is resident abroad). This declaration contains
information about the person's marital status, children, and
address. The reliability of this document, however, remains
questionable due to reports of widespread corruption among low level
civil employees.


L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities

Host government authorities cooperate with the Embassy in fraud
matters, and are consistently responsive to the Embassy's consular
fraud-related inquiries. Working with the regional security office
and local officials to enhance fraud prevention efforts, the
consular section provides travel document fraud alert information to
local immigration officials. The fraud department of the police,
which is the central point of contact for fraud-related issues in
the host government, has contacted the Embassy on several occasions
to verify the authenticity of U.S. travel documents that appeared
altered or fake, including passports and green cards. These
documents uniformly turned out to be merely in poor condition, but
in fact valid.

In the first quarter of FY 2007 and in the second quarter of FY
2008, the consular officer conducted fraudulent document detection
training at the National Police Academy with attendees from
Immigration, Intelligence, Police, Fraud Detection, and Consular
Affairs. According to the penal code, providing false documents is
an offense punishable by a prison sentence ranging from 6 months to
5 years, depending on the seriousness of the violation, and/or a
fine. The host government consistently demonstrates excellent
cooperation with requests for verification of civil documents. When
the Embassy reported a false document provider to the police, the
police treated the matter seriously; however, the offender could not
be prosecuted due to a lack of evidence.

In the second quarter of FY 2007, the consular section hosted a
fraud-focused lunch which members of the local police, intelligence,
and consular community attended. The lunch focused on regional
fraud trends and useful contacts and information was exchanged.

In the last quarter of FY 2006, the local police coordinated with
the RSO and consular section on an investigation into a visa-washing
and false document provider in Paramaribo. The arrests effectively
shut the ring down, but lack of evidence prevented prosecution.
Information netted in the investigation showed links between this
ring and other suspected rings in the Caribbean.


M. Areas of Particular Concern

The diversity of the population in Suriname allows outsiders to
easily blend in and bring attention to themselves. This is
particularly true for neighboring Guyanese, who come to Suriname to
live and work, often without legal permission.

Embassy Paramaribo is also responsible for French Guiana, and faces
several challenges in this area. Most of the applicants from French
Guiana are Haitians, supposedly with legal residence status in

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France. Their language skills in French are minimal, their
documents are suspect and are nearly impossible to verify because of
post's lack of resources in French Guiana and lack of French
speaking personnel.


N. Staffing and Training

Due to the small size of the consular section, all staff members are
tasked with fraud prevention responsibilities. Consular Chief
Gwendolyn S. Webb attended the Fraud Prevention Managers course in
June 2006. Webb and Senior FSN, Anne van Exel, attended the
regional fraud conference in Georgetown in the second quarter of FY

2007.
SCHREIBER HUGHES