Burkina Faso: Demarche on Security Council Meeting on

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 000514

DEPT FOR IO/UNP ROBIN MEYER AND REBECCA GOLDENBERG
AF/W FOR TOM DOUGHERTY, EMILY PLUMB

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2023
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR UNSC ZI UV LY SF
SUBJECT: Burkina Faso: Demarche on Security Council Meeting on
Zimbabwe

REF: STATE 63183


1. (C) On June 12, DCM, accompanied by PolOff, presented reftel
demarche to MOFA Cabinet Director Vincent Zakane. While DCM noted
that President Compaore had informed Secretary Rice of Burkina Faso's
intention to support a Security Council meeting on Zimbabwe, Zakane
only acknowledged that Compaore had spoken positively about working
together on Zimbabwe with the Secretary, and had expressed the desire
to "implicate Burkina Faso more in the work of the UN Security
Council." Zakane added, however, that he would have to consult
internally to be able to give a more detailed response to the
demarche, and agreed to meet with Emboffs at 10:00 on June 13.

Waffling on "Yes" Vote on UNSC Meeting on Zimbabwe
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2. (C) Comment: Zakane's cautious response re Burkina Faso's position
in favor of a Security Council meeting on Zimbabwe may have simply
reflected the fact that information from Compaore's meeting with
SecState had not yet filtered down to him. We understand from IO/UNP
that the Burkinabe were not able to commit to voting "yes" to a
formal UNSC meeting on Zimbabwe on June 12 in New York. At the same
time, in a June 12 telcon by Ambassador to Burkinabe Ambassador to
the United States Paramanga Yonli, Yonli stated that he had been
present at the Compaore-Rice meeting, and that his President had
clearly committed Burkina Faso to vote in favor of a UNSC meeting on
Zimbabwe. Yonli called back Ambassador to say that the Burkinabe UN
PermRep had assured him that Burkina Faso would vote affirmatively
for the meeting on Zimbabwe. We hope that Zakane will be more
forward leaning on June 13. End comment.

African Approach: Regional Bodies, then African Union
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3. (C) Zakane then explained the larger context of relations with
fellow African nations that would shape Burkina Faso's approach to
the issue of Zimbabwe. He explained that, when there is a conflict
between two African states, African Union (AU) members wish that, in
the first instance, the relevant regional body intervene to seek a
peaceful solution. For Zimbabwe, the relevant regional body is the
Southern African Development Community (SADC). If the regional body
is unable to find a solution, then the AU can intervene, even
militarily, if necessary. A third but relatively rarely used option
if for one AU country to engage bilaterally in the conflict
situation. This AU country is usually a neighbor of the countries in
conflict, but in theory even Burkina Faso could be an interlocutor
with Zimbabwe. While Burkina Faso could be a useful, neutral
interlocutor, this approach would be problematic without South
Africa's support because of Pretoria's important national interests
in Zimbabwe, Zakane said.


4. (C) Zakane stated that it would have been President Compaore's
preference that SADC advocate a solution to the Zimbabwe crisis, but
that clearly it had failed so far to do so. He also stated that he
had not yet seen the agenda for the "June 30" AU Summit in Egypt to
see whether Zimbabwe was on its agenda. (Note: the AU's website
indicates that the Summit will be from June 24-July 1. End Note.)
When DCM noted that an AU meeting starting June 30 would fall after
the June 27 Presidential run-off elections in Zimbabwe, Zakane said
that another option would be for the Permanent Representatives of AU
countries on the AU's Peace and Security Council to call an urgent
meeting to discuss Zimbabwe, out of which could result a
"declaration, final communiqu, or resolution." This new AU action
on Zimbabwe could, in turn, facilitate African countries' ability to
support potential UNSC decisions on Zimbabwe, Zakane felt. (Note:
Zakane stated that South Africa was a current member of the AU Peace
and Security Council, Zimbabwe was not, and that he was uncertain
whether Libya was a current member. Burkina Faso, South Africa, and
Libya are the three current members representing Africa on the UN
Security Council. End Note.)

Advocates UN-Africa Union Joint Approach on Zimbabwe, Citing March
UNSC Communique, Failure of EU Approach
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5. (C) Zakane acknowledged that the UNSC could bring up the question
of Zimbabwe without a concurrent effort to win support in the AU, but
warned that the Security Council needed to be "careful" about doing
so. SADC has yet to officially ask the AU to intervene in the
Zimbabwe issue, even though it is clear from the planned presence of
AU observers that the AU wants the Presidential run-off election to
go well. To win African buy-in, the UN should work collaboratively
with the AU and, if at all possible win SADC's support as well, he
said. (Comment: While Zakane advocated that the UN engage SADC on
Zimbabwe, he also acknowledged that key SADC member-country South
Africa had not been helpful on Zimbabwe. While recalling hearing

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radio reports from June 11 that South African President Thabo Mbeki
had admitted "mistakes" in its recent policies toward South Africa
(and also implying that some positive adjustments might be possible),
Zakane felt that SADC was unlikely to substantively address the
Zimbabwe issue in the coming days. End Comment.)


6. (C) To reinforce his point about the need for AU support, Zakane
recalled that South Africa, during its one-month rotating Presidency
of the UN Security Council, had won the adoption of a March 17, 2008
communique indicating that the United Nations needed to work
cooperatively with regional bodies, particularly on issues related to
security and peacekeeping. He said that, whatever the UNSC
initiative on Zimbabwe, it needed political legitimacy. To win the
"adhesion" of Africans, and overcome their "reticence," the UNSC and
AU "needed to work together," he emphasized.


7. (C) As a second example to make his point, Zakane cited what he
described as the European Union's failed approach on Zimbabwe - an
issue that "divided European and African countries." He suggested
that the (December 8-9, 2007) EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon had been
controversial, with several African countries threatening not to
attend if Zimbabwe were not invited (and if Zimbabwe itself became a
focus instead of relations between the two continents). Instead,
Zakane advocated, the EU should have worked first collaboratively
with the AU to come to a "common vision regarding Zimbabwe."

Calling on United States to
"Prepare the Terrain" for More Activist Burkina Faso
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8. (C) In summarizing, Zakane stated that Burkina Faso -- in both the
UNSC and AU Peace and Security Council-- found itself at an
"intermediary echelon" (hinting perhaps that he considered Burkina
Faso to be a weaker, second tier player). He specifically requested
the help of the United States to "prepare the terrain" for Burkina
Faso by convincing South Africa to be more forthcoming on Zimbabwe.
While not stating clearly that Burkina Faso would not vote in favor
of a formal UNSC meeting on Zimbabwe, he said that we needed to try
to convince South Africa and Libya to vote in favor of the meeting as
well. If at least two of three African UNSC member-countries - and
preferably all three - voted in favor of the meeting, then other
African countries would follow in supporting it, he said.


9. (C) DCM called Zakane back after the meeting to give him a heads
up that Ambassador would be seeking an appointment with President
Compaore to urge Burkina Faso to take, as a Pan-African leader, the
most forward leaning positions possible on Zimbabwe. When Zakane
asked whether the United States would be seeking a vote on a
resolution on Zimbabwe, DCM indicated that we needed nine affirmative
votes and therefore sought Burkina Faso's clear vote in favor of the
agenda for a formal Security Council meeting, and not just an
abstention.

Cabinet Director Plays Influential
Role in Foreign Policy Formulation
--------------


10. (C) Zakane, who works concurrently as a professor of law at the
University of Ouagadougou, views foreign policy issues through the
eyes of a jurist. Because Burkina Faso's Foreign Minister is a
gendarme (rural policeman) by background, and because the Vice
Minister is more of a Compaore loyalist than intellectual, Zakane
likely plays a more influential role in formulating Burkina Faso's
foreign policy than his roughly number three ranking in his Ministry
-- and quiet demeanor -- might suggest. While some of his comments
appeared to reflect personal musings, they were interesting in
revealing what, in many ways, were also representative of a typical
African cautiousness to issues affecting the continent.


11. (C) Zakane, for example, noted that one potential difficulty with
attempting to win the African Union's support for a more activist
policy on Zimbabwe would be a response by the Zimbabwe Government,
and possibly also South Africa, that its intervention represented a
violation of the principle of non-interventions in the internal
affairs of a country, and that the current situation in Zimbabwe did
not represent a threat to international peace. Making his own
counterargument, Zakane stated that the UN had developed in recent
years a new concept of peace that could justify its intervention in a
country where national instability threatened a broader regional
conflagration. Referring again to reftel talking points, DCM noted
that the situation in Zimbabwe was clearly already threatening
stability in the region - to which Zakane agreed.

Jackson