Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OTTAWA1552
2008-12-12 21:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND US-EU

Tags:  PREL EUN UN XG XF IR CA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 OTTAWA 001552 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN UN XG XF IR CA
SUBJECT: US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND US-EU
MIDDLE EAST TROIKA MEETINGS IN OTTAWA, DECEMBER 8

OTTAWA 00001552 001.2 OF 011


Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 OTTAWA 001552

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN UN XG XF IR CA
SUBJECT: US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND US-EU
MIDDLE EAST TROIKA MEETINGS IN OTTAWA, DECEMBER 8

OTTAWA 00001552 001.2 OF 011


Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On December 8, the United States, European
Union, and Canada held their regularly scheduled trilateral
discussion on Iran at the Canadian Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa. Later in
the day, U.S. and EU representatives met at the French
Embassy in Ottawa to hold their regular bilateral exchanges
on all other Middle East issues. On Iran, there was a
consensus that the international community needed to do more
to increase the pressure on Iran to change its negative
regional policies, to curb its support for terrorism, to
counter its nuclear program, and to improve its dismal human
rights record. Participants highlighted the need for more
regular, close U.S.-EU-Canada coordination in all of these
areas. The bilateral U.S.-EU talks that followed covered
Iraq, Syria/Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,
and the EU's new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The U.S.
welcomed the EU's efforts with the UfM, and its growing unity
and positive engagement on Iraq. But the U.S. delegation
cautioned the EU against freelance intervention on
Israeli-Palestinian final status issues and urged the EU to
condition any further engagement with Syria on concrete
improvements in Syrian behavior. End Summary.

IRAN'S REGIONAL ROLE AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
-------------- -


2. (C) NEA Iran Office Director Schwartz began the
trilateral Iran discussion at DFAIT by noting that, while
there might be some changes in U.S. Iran policy under the new
administration, particularly in terms of the specific carrots
and sticks used, core U.S. interests would not change. These
included the nuclear issue, Iran's support for terrorism and
its regional ambitions, and its poor human rights record.
Iran's regional ambitions were a threat to the stability that
we needed to address with regional partners, such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) 3 (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq). Iran's
support for terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hizballah, and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, jeopardized all our regional

goals. Syria continued to play a key role facilitating
Iranian assistance to these groups. Iran was still training
and arming Shia militias in Iraq. It also appeared that some
elements in Iran were arming the Taliban to fight the
international coalition in Afghanistan.


3. (C) The GCC 3 and other regional partners often expressed
Q3. (C) The GCC 3 and other regional partners often expressed
concern about such Iranian actions to us in private, but most
were reluctant to stand up to Iran directly or in public;
thus the Iranians felt little pressure to change anything.
The international community needed to recognize that Iran's
problematic behavior extended far beyond its nuclear program
and to do more to hold the Iranians accountable in public.
Greater Arab engagement with Iraq, evidenced by the opening
of additional embassies and the appointment of ambassadors,
was helping to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, but the
momentum needed to be sustained via still greater engagement
in the form of additional trade and exchanges of all kinds.
The U.S. was planning an informal P5 1/GCC 3 meeting in New
York for December 16 to raise many of these issues with
Iran's neighbors. They might never be willing to confront
Iran in public, but they could still send subtle signals that
Tehran would notice, such as shifting their votes on
Iran-related resolutions in the UN.


4. (C) DFAIT Director General for Middle East and Maghreb
Relations Buck agreed that Iran often played a spoiler role

OTTAWA 00001552 002.2 OF 011


in the region. Some elements in Iran were aiding the Taliban
just enough to be an irritant and were also supporting
political rivals to Afghan President Karzai (a move she
termed "the anti-Karzai squeeze play"); this would need to be
watched closely as Afghan presidential elections approached.
While Iran and the international community seemed to have
some common interests regarding Afghanistan, including border
control and counter-narcotics efforts, it was difficult to
judge whether cooperation with Iran was possible. Buck also
wondered what effect the declining price of oil might have on
Iran and its regional ambitions. She asked for any specific
information the United States or the EU had on how much money
Iran provided to its regional proxies. In response to these
questions, Schwartz suggested that since most Afghan drugs
ended up in Europe, the EU might want to take on a greater
role in that area. He doubted whether lower oil prices would
change Iranian behavior much; Tehran would subject its people
to significant deprivation before it would shift resources
away from its external ambitions. Still, the international
community needed to do all it could to maintain the sanctions
and economic pressure on the regime, which might encourage
Iran's neighbors to speak up more. Schwartz said he would
try to follow up with the Canadians to provide more detailed
information on Iranian support to Hizballah, Hamas, and other
proxies.


5. (C) French MFA Deputy Director for North Africa and the
Middle East Loiseau noted that the December 14 Afghan
neighbors' conference in Paris would include Iran; Foreign
Minister Mottaki was expected to attend. This might offer an
opportunity to see if Iran had anything constructive to
offer. Iran was currently in the strongest regional position
it had ever had, thanks to the elimination of hostile regimes
on its eastern and western borders. Loiseau agreed that
Iran's neighbors were all alarmed by its actions, but afraid
to stand up to it. Loiseau and EU Council Secretariat Middle
East specialist Hove noted that Iran's neighbors were
particularly weak in public, as evidenced by their constant
invitations to Iranian leaders to visit their countries.
Still, there were limits to Iran's regional influence.
Loiseau and Schwartz agreed that Hizballah and others saw
themselves as nationalists, had their own agendas, and were
not simply puppets. Loiseau also noted that instability was
not always in Iran's interest. Total chaos in either Iraq or
Qnot always in Iran's interest. Total chaos in either Iraq or
Afghanistan would not serve Iran well. Moreover, progress on
any of the regional peace tracks in the Middle East
(Israel-Palestinians, Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon) would
lessen Iran's influence. Iran could not arm and support its
proxies effectively without Syrian cooperation, which was one
reason why the EU was trying to separate Damascus from Tehran
as much as possible.


6. (C) Both Schwartz and DFAIT Deputy Director (Iran/Iraq)
of the Gulf and Maghreb Division McLaren emphasized that,
while there are a variety of power centers in Iran, we should
not exaggerate the independence of any of them from Supreme
Leader Khamenei. Otherwise, we would play Tehran's game by
allowing the regime to wash its hands of responsibility for
its actions. McLaren felt that Iran sought to maintain ties
with all elements in all countries in the region so as to be
able to retain its influence no matter who came out on top in
a particular place. Hove added that Tehran seemed to favor
"divide-and-conquer" tactics across the board. The Iranians
were currently engaged in a campaign of visits to individual
EU Member States while giving the EU itself the cold shoulder.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

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--------------


7. (C) Loiseau opened the discussion of the Iranian nuclear
program by summarizing the recent history of UN and IAEA
engagement on the issue, commenting that the IAEA estimated
Iran now had at least 45 percent of the enriched uranium that
it needed for a nuclear weapon, at a time when Russia and
China were opposing additional UNSC sanctions. On the other
hand, Iran's weakening economy could give existing sanctions
more bite, provoking greater internal debate on Iran's
methods, if not its objectives. In this situation, the EU
looked to the new U.S. administration to provide a policy
direction. Internally, the EU had implemented all existing
UNSCRs in a robust manner and had developed an independent EU
designation list, implemented an embargo on sales of weapons
and dual-use items, and banned any financial assistance to
Iranian organizations involved in proliferation activities.
The EU had recently decided to add more names to its
autonomous designation list and was presently considering
which individuals and organizations to add. European
governments were also talking with their businesses about
limiting engagement with Iran. Some EU Member States,
including France, were also working with the United States
and others to consider what national measures might be
implemented to place additional pressure on Iran. However,
such measures were controversial within the EU and not all
Member States supported them. Looking towards the new U.S.
administration, Loiseau said the EU supported greater U.S.
involvement in both the sanctions and negotiations tracks.
U.S. dialogue with Iran could be useful, but it would have to
be timed and calibrated very carefully, and closely
coordinated with the EU. Finally, Iran's neighbors and
others had to do a great deal more to implement existing
sanctions UNSCRs.


8. (C) Schwartz stressed that the U.S. remained committed to
the P5 1 process, even if no new UNSC sanctions were likely
in the near future. We welcomed all of the EU's autonomous
steps to increase the pressure on Iran and considered
additional EU designations to be vital. This, along with the
national measures campaign and efforts to move East Asian
countries to do more, was intended to show Iran that it did
not have a "free pass" even at times when new UNSC action was
not forthcoming. Schwartz asked the EU to help us press
third countries to implement the Iran UNSCRs effectively,
including persuading China, the UAE, and South Korea
Qincluding persuading China, the UAE, and South Korea
vigorously to implement UNSCR 1803's inspection provisions on
Iranian shippers. Unanimous UNSCRs had a big impact, but
smaller steps could have an effect too. The national
measures campaign encouraged each country to do what it could
within its domestic legal system. Both political and
economic pressures were necessary. Neither would be
sufficient on its own. Over time, the goal must be not
merely to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but
to stop Iran from wanting to obtain one.


9. (C) McLaren said that Canadian laws made it easier to
take some steps vis-a-vis Iran and tougher to take others.
Some of the things that Canada had done could serve as models
for others. The Canadian government had asked the national
export credit agency to shut down export finance for Iran and
advised Canadian banks to cut ties with Iran, both of which
had produced results. DFAIT Deputy Director for
Non-Proliferation Caza specified that passing Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) decisions on Iran to Canadian banks
had gone a long way to reducing their business with Iran.
Unfortunately, said McLaren, Canada's legal system made it

OTTAWA 00001552 004.2 OF 011


difficult to implement formal autonomous sanctions on any
country without formal cabinet approval, which was an
unwieldy process. Sanctions were much easier for Canada to
implement when some multilateral organization of which Canada
was a member called for such sanctions. European Commission
representative Hostrup said informal sanctions could be
effective alongside formal ones. He noted that most large
European banks had gotten the message and pulled back from
Iran, which was being felt in Tehran. But there were many
loopholes to be closed in Russia, China, the Persian Gulf
states, and elsewhere.


10. (C) Caza noted that IAEA reports on Iran seemed to be
shortening the timeline by which Iran might have all it
needed for a nuclear weapon. This "point of no return"
raised the specter that someone might opt for a "military
solution" to the problem. Canada was not advocating a
military option, but with late 2009 now the likely timeline
for Iran to have material for a nuclear weapon, "someone"
might act to try to stop it. The more their nuclear
technology progressed, the more emboldened the Iranians
became, making it ever harder to persuade them to suspend
their activities. The international community needed to do
more to slow Iran's progress, and to maintain the UNSC track
to show the unity of the world in opposing Iran's actions.
We also needed to do more in the IAEA to demand full
transparency and accountability from Iran and to counter
Iran's broken-record argument that it is complying with all
its IAEA obligations. Perhaps if voters in Iran elected a
new president in 2009, that president would take on board the
message that the world was not against Iran having a nuclear
program, but rather against the kind of nuclear program Iran
was developing.


11. (C) Loiseau said there was no military solution to
Iran's nuclear program; any military response would be a
catastrophe that would, at most, delay the nuclear program,
not stop it. She also said bluntly that Iran did not want a
civilian nuclear program; it wanted a nuclear weapon. She
doubted whether a new president would change anything
significant about the nuclear program. Loiseau believed more
public diplomacy was necessary to spread awareness of the
P5 1 offer to Iran amongst the Iranian populace and show that
the international community was not threatening Iran. The EU
also needed to bring more Iranians to Europe so that they
could be exposed to arguments and ideas that they would never
Qcould be exposed to arguments and ideas that they would never
hear at home. In this vein, Hove described an outreach
program that the EU was developing, including visits,
seminars, and translating programs and information into
Farsi. She described a recent program that brought 15
Iranian journalists (some of which were clearly not
journalists but rather regime "handlers" for the others) to
Brussels to meet HR Solana and be exposed to international
views on Iran's nuclear program. The EU regarded this effort
as a success, but Hove noted at the same time that the
Iranian regime had effectively killed a planned December 8-9
EU-Iran seminar in Tehran by refusing to grant visas to any
of the EU officials slated to attend it. Schwartz noted that
the USG faced similar challenges in its outreach efforts to
the Iranian people, and agreed on the need to expand
awareness of the P5 1 package in Iran. Schwartz said that
Iran likely sought to produce a fait accompli with its
nuclear program; Tehran likely thought that the entire
sanctions regime would then collapse. For this reason, it
was necessary to show resolve on all fronts.

POLITICAL SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN

OTTAWA 00001552 005.2 OF 011


--------------


12. (C) Buck opened this portion of the meeting with a
discussion of possible scenarios for the 2009 Iranian
presidential elections and the question of whether it really
mattered who won. Factors favoring the reelection of
President Ahmadinejad included public support of him by
Supreme Leader Khamenei, solid support by a significant
segment of the public, Ahmadinejad's willingness to engage in
populist government spending, and the possibility that a
candidacy by ex-President Khatami might cause all
conservative factions to rally around Ahmadinejad. Factors
working against Ahmadinejad included his alienation of much
of the clergy, the elite, and the business class, his
terrible management of the economy, and his loss of support
in the provinces due to inflation and poor government
management. Viable challengers to Ahmadinejad included
Khatami, ex-nuclear negotiator (and current Majlis Speaker)
Larijani, and Tehran mayor GHALIBAF, among others. However,
the Canadians felt that no matter who won the election, there
would be little real change, save perhaps in tone.


13. (C) On the human rights front, Buck said there had been
no improvements in 2008. Executions seemed to be down
slightly, although this might merely be a result of greater
censorship. Amputation sentences remained common, and
persecution of religious minorities and human rights
activists had increased. Leaders of the Baha'i community
remained imprisoned. In an effort to improve its image, the
regime had instituted a ban on juvenile executions, but had
included an exception for murder cases, which were precisely
the type of case involving almost all those minors who were
executed. Iran had been surprised at the extent of its
defeat on the Canadian-sponsored human rights resolution in
the UNGA Third Committee, and had been very severe in its
retaliation against Canada. The Iranian MFA was under
pressure due to the failure of its diplomacy against the
resolution and was threatening to expel a number of Canadian
diplomats from Tehran. The Iranian press had also been very
severe on Canada. Buck joked that, as a result, Canada was
very anxious for the United States to open an office in
Tehran so that Canada would not have to absorb the full brunt
of Iranian ire alone. While the annual UNGA resolutions were
important, it was also crucial to try to advance the human
rights situation in Iran the rest of the year via other
Qrights situation in Iran the rest of the year via other
means. The U.S., EU, and Canada needed to coordinate quietly
behind the scenes, sharing information and coordinating
messages, in order to maximize their impact.


14. (C) Schwartz congratulated the Canadians on the success
of the Iran resolution in the third committee and commented
that the plenary UNGA vote on it might come as early as
December 12. The sharp Iranian reaction showed just how big
an impact the annual resolution had. Schwartz noted that the
USG wondered whether there might be some sort of crackdown in
Iran prior to the presidential elections or whether the
regime might resort to electoral fraud to ensure the desired
outcome. The Iranian elections were worth watching, but they
should not be allowed to affect our policy decisions, and, in
any case, some presently-unknown candidate could emerge out
of obscurity to win them as Ahmadinejad had done in 2005.
The election might offer some insights into where the Iranian
people wanted to go. They would also likely show whether
Khamenei had come to regard Ahmadinejad as a liability or an
asset. A comprehensive public diplomacy campaign, using all
means available, was necessary to get our views to the
Iranian public. U.S.-EU-Canada coordination would be useful,

OTTAWA 00001552 006.2 OF 011


but it must indeed be quiet in order to avoid fueling the
paranoia of the Iranian regime.


15. (C) Loiseau agreed that the Iranian presidential
election would change little; the conservatives were clearly
ascendant, although economic problems were causing
Ahmadinejad some difficulty. There were no easy answers
about concrete steps to improve the human rights situation,
but more effective public diplomacy was definitely necessary.
Hove noted that Iran had broken off its bilateral human
rights dialogue with the EU in 2004 and had more recently
refused to accept EU demarches in Tehran on human rights
issues. The EU had thus sometimes been forced to summon
Iranian ambassadors in European capitals to receive its
demarches. If necessary, this practice would continue under
the Czech Presidency, with EU demarches delivered to the
Iranian ambassador in Prague. Hove noted that while Iran's
candidacy for a seat in the UN Human Rights Council was
ridiculous on the one hand, on the other hand it might serve
as a pretext that Iran would find hard to refuse for the EU
to engage Tehran on human rights issues. Loiseau noted that
part of the current Iranian "charm offensive" going on in
European capitals included offers to discuss human rights
with individual countries rather than with the EU as a whole.
She said that the Iranians did care about their image and
that EU statements on their human rights record did have an
impact. Hostrup commented that the European Commission
regarded the human right situation in Iran as being as bad as
or worse than in recent years. The Commission was trying to
carry out as much public diplomacy and as many exchanges with
Iran as it could, but the environment was very difficult.

IRAQ
--------------


16. (C) Schwartz opened the bilateral U.S.-EU discussions at
the French Embassy by describing the major issues facing Iraq
in the coming months. He informed the EU that preparations
for the January 31 provincial elections in Iraq were
proceeding well. Iraqi electoral authorities were planning
for a massive international and domestic election monitoring
mission, and security preparations were ongoing. Because
many provincial governments had been ineffective at using
government funds up to this point, the USG hoped that the new
elections might result in more effective provincial
governance. The U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework agreement
(which included the Status of Forces Agreement--SOFA) had
been approved by the Iraqi legislature and the Presidency
Qbeen approved by the Iraqi legislature and the Presidency
Council; now only a July 2009 referendum on the agreement
remained pending. The referendum would not prevent the
agreement from taking effect January 1, and Iraqi SOFAs with
other countries based on ours could now be negotiated.
Schwartz expected that the referendum vote would be positive
as long as the SOFA had been effectively implemented up to
the time the vote took place; one concern was that Iran might
try to provoke some sort of violent incident involving U.S.
forces shortly before the referendum in order to try to
produce a "no" vote. On the U.S. side, the SOFA was an
executive agreement not subject to Congressional approval.
Overall, said Schwartz, the path towards stabilization for
Iraq was much clearer now, and we all needed to work to
realize that goal. Violence and other serious challenges,
including fighting corruption and protection of minorities,
would continue for some time, but the Iraqi capacity to deal
with the challenges it faced was also growing. PM Maliki and
many of his ministers had grown into their jobs, and the
process of handing over security to the GOI on a

OTTAWA 00001552 007.2 OF 011


province-by-province basis had gone well thus far. Although
we could not be certain what policy changes might occur when
the new U.S. administration took office, Schwartz expected
that U.S. troops would be withdrawn gradually as conditions
permitted.


17. (C) Loiseau said that the EU had come a long way in its
Iraq policy. It was now united on Iraq, with a common
assessment of the situation and a desire to support USG and
GOI efforts. Czech Ambassador Smetanka hoped that the
upcoming provincial elections would lead to more Sunni
participation in the political process, which could further
improve the security situation. The EU did not plan to send
election observers, but was providing technical assistance to
the Iraqi authorities. The upcoming Czech EU Presidency
planned to hold an EU-Iraq political dialogue at the
political directors level, while EU-Iraq negotiations on a
trade agreement were ongoing. The EU rule of law mission for
Iraq (EUJUST LEX) was expanding its activities and hoping to
start carrying out some of its training in Iraq (a move
Schwartz strongly encouraged). EU Commission Representative
Hostrup noted that the kinds of trade and association
agreements that the EU was signing with Iraq and other
countries in the region could serve as an example to Iran of
what it could have if it changed its course. EU Council
Secretariat representative Barwinkel commented that EU High
Representative Solana wanted to visit Baghdad at some point,
but Barwinkel did not know when this might occur, while
Loiseau stated that French FM Kouchner was likely to make
another trip to Iraq in the coming months.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE
--------------


18. (C) Schwartz said that the USG understood concerns in
the international community regarding the possibility of
stagnation in Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts during the
transition from one U.S. administration to another. However,
there was a bipartisan consensus in the United States
supporting the peace process, and both the outgoing and
incoming administrations were committed to a smooth
transition. The approach agreed on at Annapolis--determined,
professional negotiations, sustained support from the
international community, and improvements on the
ground--remained the best way forward. It was crucial that
the talks remain confidential and bilateral, and that the
international community maintain its Quartet commitment not
to intervene in the negotiations in ways that would force the
Qto intervene in the negotiations in ways that would force the
two parties to react in public. Schwartz stressed that
developments in the Israeli-Palestinian talks invariably
affected everything else in the region, and he noted USG
appreciation for ongoing EU financial support for the
Palestinian Authority.


19. (C) Barwinkel agreed with Schwartz's points and welcomed
his comments on U.S. plans for a smooth transition. He noted
that 2009 would also witness Israeli and Palestinian
political transitions that could produce upheavals. If polls
were accurate, Israel could have a new government that would
make the situation for the next U.S. administration more
difficult. Schwartz agreed, noting that this was one reason
why the USG stressed continuity in the Annapolis process to
all parties and the importance of preserving momentum.
Barwinkel commented that Annapolis had produced a year of
relative calm, and (hopefully) some progress in the
confidential talks; he hoped that this would not turn out to
be the calm before the storm. The EU was concerned about the

OTTAWA 00001552 008.2 OF 011


end of President Abbas's term and did not want to see any
developments that might reduce his status. Much had to be
done to strengthen the Palestinian side in order for a
two-state solution to be viable, and we all needed to remind
the Israelis of this. It would be disastrous for everyone if
the possibility of a two-state solution were to be lost,
although some on the Israeli right did not seem to understand
this. The long-term sustainability of international
assistance to the Palestinians was also an issue that had to
be faced. The international community had to be ready for
all possible scenarios in 2009 in order to be able to shape
events rather than allow others to do so.


20. (C) Schwartz agreed on the need for considering all
scenarios, but stressed that we should not telegraph our
concerns or we might produce the very developments that we
feared. The status quo could not go on forever, nor could
the negotiations, and the parties had to understand that.
The Israeli election would be crucial, and we should all be
clear in our expectations of what we expected any Israeli
government that might be elected to do. The December 15
Quartet meeting in New York was intended in part to
demonstrate continuity from one U.S. administration to
another and reiterate the U.S. commitment to the Annapolis
process going forward.


21. (C) Loiseau expressed concern that not everyone was
weary of violence and the status quo; she highlighted the
need to improve the situation on the ground even as talks
were ongoing. The EU was particularly concerned about
Israeli settlement activity, checkpoints, and blocking of
movement of people and goods. The EU was doing a great deal
to help developments on the ground, including hosting the
December 2007 Paris donors conference and training
Palestinian security forces, but no real development in the
Palestinian territories would be possible as long as Israeli
choked off movement and discouraged investors. The EU was
weary of being merely the "checkbook" for the peace process
and was actively studying ways to become more involved to
show that results could be achieved on the ground. The
current situation in Gaza and the division among the
Palestinians were also very serious problems. Hostrup added
that the Israeli blockade of Gaza was making it very
difficult for the EU to deliver assistance there, while
Loiseau said the EU supported Egyptian efforts to mediate
between the Palestinian factions and hoped other Arab states
Qbetween the Palestinian factions and hoped other Arab states
would join this effort.


22. (C) Schwartz agreed that the situation on the ground was
a problem and that it bred radicalism, something the USG
regularly told the Israelis. Hove feared that the
construction of the security barrier had given Israelis a
false sense of security that blinded them to the fact that it
was not a long-term solution. Hove and Loiseau both noted
that, of late, the Israelis seemed to be giving more
attention to the Arab Peace Initiative and suggested that the
new U.S. administration might show more interest in it as
well. Schwartz said that the USG supported the basic ideas
in the Arab Peace Initiative, but preferred to keep the focus
on the Annapolis process.

LEBANON AND SYRIA
--------------


23. (C) On Lebanon, Loiseau highlighted what she described
as the many positive developments during 2008, including the
election of President Sleiman, the establishment of a

OTTAWA 00001552 009.2 OF 011


functioning government, the effective functioning of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),and the establishment of a
national dialogue that would consider the issue of
Hizballah's arms. Hizballah would not give up its weapons
any time soon, but the international community could help to
pressure it by removing the pretexts Hizballah used to
justify retaining them. This included pressuring Israel to
move on Shebaa Farms and Ghajar. The French were relieved
that Hizballah had not targeted UNIFIL up to this point, and
they credited Syria with a role in all of the positive
developments in Lebanon. Elements in the Palestinian refugee
camps could also threaten UNIFIL, but everyone in Lebanon now
seemed aware of the threat of these camps to the Lebanese
state, and everyone was determined to prevent another Nahr
al-Bared.


24. (C) Hostrup said the European Commission was also
pleased that parliament and government were functioning in
Lebanon and that Lebanon-Syria relations had improved. The
upcoming Lebanese parliamentary elections were now the focus
of most political activity in the country, and the EC had
allocated 3 million euros for the elections and electoral
reform issues. Another 2 million euros were in the pipeline.
The EU also planned to send a robust observer mission to
Lebanon for the elections. Hostrup also noted that the EU
was the single largest donor to the effort to reconstruct
Nahr al-Bared and asked what the USG might do or was doing to
help rebuild the camp. Schwartz said he would get back to
the EU with details on our assistance to reconstructing Nahr
al-Bared. More broadly, the USG was working with the LAF to
increase its capacity to maintain security throughout
Lebanon, which would eliminate another of Hizballah's
pretexts for its weapons. We were making similar efforts
with all other parts of the Lebanese state. Schwartz agreed
that the 2009 parliamentary elections were crucial, and
Hizballah's arms and the Syria-Hizballah relationship would
be big issues in the elections. He doubted that Hizballah
would see it as being in its interest to target UNIFIL and
hoped it would not do so, not even as a proxy for Iran. The
EU agreed emphatically on the importance of strengthening the
Lebanese state rather than taking sides in Lebanese politics.


25. (C) On Syria, Loiseau said the EU had decided to resume
dialogue with Damascus because of a number of "interesting
signals" it had received, including the positive developments
Qsignals" it had received, including the positive developments
in Lebanon she had described, hints that the Syrian
government (SARG) wanted out of its isolation, and the start
of Syria-Israel negotiations with Turkish mediation. These
developments had led the EU to "test the waters" with
Damascus, inviting President Assad to the Union for the
Mediterranean summit in July, an invitation that Assad had
accepted immediately. The EU had its "eyes wide open" and
"knew what it was doing" with Syria, and the agenda included
Lebanon, Iraq, non-proliferation, and human rights. The EU
was still pushing for more progress in all of these areas,
including exchange of ambassadors with Lebanon by the end of
the year, demarcation of the border with Lebanon, movement in
Lebanon-Syria security talks, and progress on Lebanese
prisoners/disappeared persons in Syria, although this last
subject was a very difficult one. Loiseau stressed that all
of the EU's actions were intended to strengthen the hand of
those in the SARG seeking better relations with the west. In
order to give Assad some incentives, the EU had updated the
EU-Syria association agreement and it was ready to be
initialed on December 14. Damascus was very enthusiastic
about progress on the agreement, but the EU was determined to
use it as leverage. The agreement was very similar to those

OTTAWA 00001552 010.2 OF 011


that the EU had with other states in the region, and included
provisions to discuss human rights, terrorism, and
non-proliferation. The French doubted that Syria could be
induced to abandon Iran entirely, but its position could be
shifted and it could be used to send messages to Tehran.
Hostrup seconded Loiseau's comments and added that the EU was
also stressing to Syria that it must fulfill its obligations
with the IAEA.


26. (C) Schwartz agreed that Syria had a role to play in the
stabilization of Lebanon and said that the U.S. welcomed
Syria-Israel contacts as long as they did not damage the
Israeli-Palestinian track. The USG was more skeptical of
SARG intentions than the EU, and did not think that a SARG
promise to assign an ambassador to Beirut was worth the EU
moving on the association agreement. Something as important
as that agreement should have more concrete benchmarks, such
as full Syrian compliance with relevant UNSCRs, cutting
support for terrorist groups, stopping the flow of foreign
fighters to Iraq, full cooperation with the IAEA, and border
demarcation with Lebanon. Robust EU engagement with the SARG
absent such policy changes would reward the SARG
unnecessarily and undermine the democratic forces in Lebanon.
We understood what the EU was trying to do with Syria, and
it was clear that the EU understood the risks, but we still
disagreed with the EU's decision. There had been hopes for
change in SARG policies previously, as when President Assad
took office, but these had been disappointed. Schwartz
doubted that U.S. policy on Syria would change significantly
when the new U.S. administration took office. Loiseau
replied that the EU was constantly reviewing the situation
with Syria and insisted that Syria had "lost a lot of ground"
in Lebanon in recent years. Schwartz concluded by
reiterating that, while we would love to see a wedge driven
between Syria and Iran, we differed with the EU on how much
engagement with the SARG was appropriate at this time.

UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN
--------------


27. (C) Loiseau explained that the impetus behind the EU's
new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was the desire to
revitalize the previous Barcelona Process for EU engagement
with its southern neighbors and to give more ownership of the
process to the south. Because Middle Eastern political
conflicts had prevented the Barcelona Process from reaching
its full potential, the new UfM would focus on concrete
Qits full potential, the new UfM would focus on concrete
development projects, such as fighting the pollution of the
Mediterranean, cooperation in education, economic
development, and energy sustainability. All of the EU's
southern partners were participating fully, except for Libya.
The July summit showed the high level of interest, and the
presence of Israeli PM Olmert alongside Arab leaders was
particularly important. The November ministerial in
Marseille had focused more on institutional issues, such as
the establishment of a secretariat in Barcelona. The UfM was
still looking for a secretary general, who would come from
one of the southern countries. Schwartz said that the United
States supported the success of the UfM as a means of
addressing regional issues and welcomed the spirit of
compromise that its progress thus far had demonstrated. The
focus on depoliticized projects was very welcome, and could
have a real impact on the region, fostering cooperation in
ever-wider areas. The United States looked forward to
coordinating closely with the EU as all of our projects in
the region went forward.


OTTAWA 00001552 011.2 OF 011


NEXT MEETINGS
--------------


28. (U) The incoming Czech EU Presidency has proposed that
the next U.S.-EU-Canada trilateral meetings on Iran and the
U.S.-EU Middle East troika meetings take place in Brussels
May 26-27, 2009.


29. (U) Participants:

United States:

Todd Schwartz, Office Director, NEA/IR
Jeffrey Giauque, Senior Political Officer, EUR/ERA
Kurt van der Walde, Deputy Political Counselor, Embassy Ottawa

Canada:

Kerry Buck, Director General, Middle East and Maghreb
Relations, Canadian DFAIT
Jeffrey McLaren, Deputy Director, Iran/Iraq, Gulf and Maghreb
Division, Canadian DFAIT
Alistair Wallbaum, Iran Desk Officer, Gulf and Maghreb
Relations, Canadian DFAIT
Jennifer Metayer, Privy Council Office
Gwyn Kutz, Director, Human Rights, Gender Equality, Health
and Population, Canadian DFAIT
Evelyn Puxley, Director, International Crime and Terrorism,
Canadian DFAIT
Shawn Caza, Deputy Director, Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, Canadian DFAIT

EU Council Secretariat:

Lene Hove, Middle East/Mediterranean Unit
Wolfgang Barwinkel, Middle East/Mediterranean Unit

EU Commission:

Jesper Hostrup, Middle East Regional Dimension

France:

Nathalie Loiseau, Deputy Director for North Africa and the
Middle East, French MFA
Arnaud Pescheux, Iran Desk Officer, North Africa and Middle
East Division, French MFA
Marie-Anne Courrian, Second Counselor, French Embassy in
Ottawa

Czech Republic:

Tomas Smetanka, Ambassador, Middle East Coordinator,
Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU
Karel Hej, Czech Embassy in Ottawa


MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

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