Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OTTAWA1234
2008-09-17 21:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

U.S. AND CANADA DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Tags:  PREL MOPS NATO EAID AF PK CA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 001234 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/A - H. ENSHER AND N. SINGH, EUR/PRM - R.
CARLAND, AND SCA/FO - N. KROMASH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO EAID AF PK CA
SUBJECT: U.S. AND CANADA DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

REF: A. OTTAWA 790 (CANADA FURTHER INCREASES AFGHANISTAN
AID)

B. OTTAWA 1122 (CANADA SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT FOR
BORDER ACTION PLAN)

C. OTTAWA 1152 (CANADA SEEKS U.S. HELP TO PRESS ISI)

OTTAWA 00001234 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 001234

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/A - H. ENSHER AND N. SINGH, EUR/PRM - R.
CARLAND, AND SCA/FO - N. KROMASH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO EAID AF PK CA
SUBJECT: U.S. AND CANADA DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

REF: A. OTTAWA 790 (CANADA FURTHER INCREASES AFGHANISTAN
AID)

B. OTTAWA 1122 (CANADA SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT FOR
BORDER ACTION PLAN)

C. OTTAWA 1152 (CANADA SEEKS U.S. HELP TO PRESS ISI)

OTTAWA 00001234 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: An inter-agency USG delegation met recently
in Ottawa with Canadian counterparts to discuss civilian and
military cooperation in South Afghanistan. Canadian
interlocutors described the strategic coordination and
outreach efforts embodied in their Kandahar Action Plan.
Canada seeks to engage Afghan citizens by delivering on
promises made by the international community and the
Government of Afghanistan (GOA),working directly and
indirectly to build the GOA capacity to lead. Canada is
hampered in this effort by security threats that reduce the
number of partners who are willing to operate in the area.
Taliban insurgents are fighting harder and smarter with
increasingly sophisticated command and control, according to
Canadian analysts. End summary.

Kandahar Action Plan
--------------


2. (C) The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade's (DFAIT) Afghan Task Force Director
Richard Arbeiter began the day of meetings on September 4
with USG Afghan and Pakistan experts from State, Defense, and
USAID (delegation lists in paras 20 and 21) by giving a broad
overview of Canada's mission and political objectives in
Afghanistan. He said Canadian participation in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is based on a
"whole of government approach" that assures close cooperation
with the U.S. and responds to local Afghan concerns. Canada
has drafted a "Kandahar Action Plan" (KAP) that reflects its
strategic priorities. He described the KAP as a
"transformational agenda through strategic engagement" with
the Government of Afghanistan, based on two years, worth of
conversations with local Afghan leaders and citizens. It

provides an integrated civilian-military approach and
reflects high level guidance from Afghan and Canadian
government senior officials. The Canadians envision the KAP
as a means to deliver a more secure Kandahar that is better
governed and able to deliver basic services to Kandaharis,
said Arbeiter. They seek to reinforce the Afghan national
government so it can secure the country's borders and sustain
for the long-term the stability and reconstruction efforts.


3. (C) The plan identifies five priority subject areas:

- ANSF capacity building;
- basic service delivery (water resources, jobs, and
education);
- election support;
- Afghan-Pakistan border dialogue; and,
- support for Afghan-led reconciliation efforts.

The KAP also identifies six geographic districts for special
emphasis:

- Kandahar City;
- Arghandab;
- Zarhey;
- Panjwai;
- Dand; and,
Q- Dand; and,
- Spin Boldak.


4. (C) In the area of governance, Arbeiter said Canada seeks
to create the environment that will allow provincial- and
district-level Kandahar institutions to deliver basic
services to their citizens. As law and order improves,
Canada will concurrently seek to help those same institutions
plan, fund, manage, and monitor increasingly sophisticated

OTTAWA 00001234 002.2 OF 006


delivery of basic services. Canada believes that
sub-national governance capacity is the key to the national
government's legitimacy in Kandahar, which is why insurgents
place a priority on targeting local leadership. The
perception among local people of limited progress has eroded
public trust in the government and the ISAF
counter-insurgency mission, said Arbeiter.

Governance Strategic Engagement
--------------


5. (C) Canada has a series of objectives for its strategy to
improve governance in Kandahar, according to Arbeiter.
Canadian officials are in dialogue with IDLG and UNAMA to
clarify coordination arrangements for sub-national governance
in Kandahar. They are doing sustained outreach to provincial
and district leaders in their designated key districts. They
are increasing the presence of political officers and aid
workers in key districts. They are seeking to forge stronger
links between provincial line ministries and district
governments. Specific tasks in furtherance of these
objectives include:

- work with IDLG and UNDP to establish a secretariat in the
office of the Governor of Kandahar;
- cooperate with USAID to increase governance capacity at the
Kandahar municipal level;
- promote a secure and viable voter registration and
electoral system; and,
- support a tribal and conflict mapping exercise.

Reconstruction and Development
--------------


6. (C) Arbeiter described the goal for reconstruction and
development success in Kandahar as ensuring that local
citizens can "touch, taste, and feel" development by the GOA.
Canada seeks to engage with citizens by delivering on
promises made by the international community and the GOA and
working directly and indirectly to build the GOA capacity to
lead. Canada is hampered in this effort by security threats
that reduce the number of NGO partners who are willing to
operate in the area. These threats also limit the mobility
of aid workers to execute these programs and hinder
beneficiaries, particularly women, from enjoying the fruits
of these efforts, said Arbeiter. Canada has chosen to
address these challenges by focusing on a few crucial
programming areas, delivering humanitarian assistance as a
priority, and increasing the number of civilian staff to
advance the process. Specific objectives in the support of
reconstruction and development include:

- work with departments and line ministries to increase their
capacity to deliver basic services;
- support education activities;
- support catalytic investments in local infrastructure in
the identified key districts;
- deliver humanitarian assistance; and,
- increase capacity and access to health services.


7. (C) Arbeiter indicated that the Canadian government on
September 5 would identify 21 benchmarks to measure progress
on the six priority areas and three signature projects it
Qon the six priority areas and three signature projects it
will implement in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2011 (ref a).
The Canadian government also released a number of progress
indicators it will use to assess specific steps it has
achieved towards meeting the benchmarks. The government
plans to issue quarterly reports on progress toward the
benchmarks, and will use the reports to determine if and when
it should adjust its approaches.


8. (C) Elissa Goldberg, Representative of Canada in Kandahar
(RoCK),joined the discussion of the KAP via teleconference
from Kandahar. She commented that U.S. and Canadian military
and civilian elements have enjoyed deep and sustained

OTTAWA 00001234 003.2 OF 006


cooperation on the ground. The KAP is the product of that
intense cooperation, she said, and, at its most basic level,
is meant to solidify ISAF tactical gains through measurable
program in the priority areas, like job creation, education,
and provision of basic services. She noted that civilian
police are starting to have a "real and positive impact" in
cities in the south, and the challenge will be to solidify
those gains. She said the international community,
especially the UK, bring different approaches to civilian
policing. Goldberg asked for U.S. support in this area for
Canada's concept for civilian policing in the south.


9. (C) Goldberg opined that the key challenge is to make the
government in Kandahar function effectively. She was
categorical in saying that the counter-insurgency will not
succeed in the south unless the government can demonstrate
that it can deliver core services. She praised the new
governor of Kandahar as organized and committed to governance
reform, citing that he had taken the elementary but important
step of instituting business hours for government offices.
Goldberg also highlighted the importance of road-building in
the reconstruction and development agenda, and asked for
continued close cooperation with USAID.


10. (C) Goldberg added that the KAP envisions
counter-narcotics as focused on alternative livelihood
projects, rather than interdiction and suppression programs.
The new governor has no interest in eradication and is not
ready to open talks about government-led eradication efforts,
said Goldberg. She noted that he often speaks of the complex
politics of counter-narcotics and the need to tread
carefully, since cultivation cuts across tribal lines. She
criticized UNAMA as not being structured to deliver success.
She noted that UNAMA has only seven civilians in the south,
who are smart and dedicated but spread too thin to be
effective, and are also burdened with a "weak leader who
means well" but is not up to the job. Arbeiter and Goldberg
concluded by emphasizing that Afghans in this part of the
country are savvy and tough political operators, who know how
to manipulate foreigners for their own parochial or tribal
benefit. They urged that Canada and the U.S. must avoid
being divided and conquered by in individual tribes and
political actors in the south.

Security situation
--------------


11. (C) Canadian interlocutors briefed the U.S. delegation on
their just completed quarterly security assessment. The
insurgents are emphasizing spectacular attacks, such as the
June attack on Sarpoza prison, and soft targets, such as the
civilian food convoys on Highway 1. Insurgents are fighting
harder and smarter with increasingly sophisticated command
and control. Insurgents are easily defeatable on the
tactical level, said Canadian analysts. They found a growing
Qtactical level, said Canadian analysts. They found a growing
intensity of violence in the RC-South area. They estimated
kinetic attacks and violent intimidation are up between 40
and 50 percent since the same quarter last year. They found
a significant increase in IED usage by insurgents, up 40
percent. IED discoveries are also increasing at a greater
rate as ISAF forces are getting more tip-offs from local
residents, though Canada does not have precise data on this
metric.


12. (C) NGOs, international organizations, and private
contractors all report feeling less secure than last year,
which has slowed the delivery of humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance. This year the Afghan National
Police (ANP) has seen a drop in casualties as its performance
has improved but also because the Afghan National Army (ANA)
has increased its tempo of operations in the south.
Consequently ANA casualties are up 80 percent this year.
Canadian analysts said ISAF does not have the troop density
it needs to provide security in all key districts. Average
citizens are intimidated by insurgents where ISAF forces are

OTTAWA 00001234 004.2 OF 006


not present. As a result many citizens in the south are
taking a watchful attitude toward the insurgency, unwilling
to support counter-insurgency, causing further delay in
development program implementation. In outlying areas the
Taliban are seeking to create a permanent presence but the
strategic goal for them remains to retake Kandahar city.


13. (C) Canada assesses that much of the insurgent problem in
the south requires working with Pakistan to solve border
permeability issues. Arbeiter said recent tensions between
Afghanistan and Pakistan have caused the breakdown of
bilateral talks on border issues. He said that technological
solutions and infrastructure upgrades on the frontier are too
costly for Canada to contemplate, which makes a political
solution between the two countries the only real long-term
solution.

Pakistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
--------------


14. (C) Assistance: Canada provides approximately $30 million
per year in bilateral development assistance to Pakistan, and
plans to increase this amount to $50 million per year by

2010. By contrast, Canada currently provides $300 million
per year to Afghanistan. Canada's assistance to Pakistan
focuses on education, health, and democratic governance, with
an emphasis on Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions. Canada
is ramping up its funding related to the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border. Specifically, Canada has contributed funding to the
Peace Jirga process and is providing equipment and training
to the Pakistani Frontier Corps. Canada believes the
international community should standardize its approach to
customs and border official training, and wants to improve
communication with ICE and CBP. The Canadians had no
immediate reaction to the idea of establishing a Friends of
Pakistan donor coordination group. The Canadians were
receptive to the concept of a Frontier Trust Fund, to be
administered by a Pakistani Border Czar. They will discuss
the idea further and will get back to the U.S. The Canadians
will also get back to the U.S. on whether Canada can respond
to the UN and ICRC appeal for funds to address the
humanitarian situation resulting from the Bajaur conflict.


15. (C) Engagement with Pakistan: Canada believes it needs to
engage more frequently and at a higher level with Pakistan.
According to the Canadians, this could help dispel Pakistan's
belief that Canada only engages with Pakistan through an
"Afghan prism." SCA/FO's Neil Kromash emphasized the U.S.
would welcome increased Canadian engagement. Canada would
also like to see the international community better explain
its objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Canadians
suggested that the international community could look to
"non-traditional partners" such as Saudi Arabia or China to
encourage Pakistan to implement reforms, since Islamabad has
Qencourage Pakistan to implement reforms, since Islamabad has
a "certain confidence" in their long-term commitment to
engaging with Pakistan.


16. (C) Dubai Process: Canada is focused largely on the Dubai
Process regarding Afghanistan-Pakistan relations (ref b).
Canada intends the next phase of the process to be a
"summitive" meeting that will result in an action plan laying
out projects focused on the border and identifying areas for
international assistance. Canada will present a draft action
plan for the parties to review at the next meeting, which
will take place at a third location -- likely Dubai. Once
the parties agree to a plan, Canada will determine which
projects it can help fund, and will shop around the remaining
projects to its G8 partners, including the U.S. The
Canadians acknowledged they could use the G8 coordinating
group to facilitate implementation of the plan, but said they
agreed with the U.S. view that, thus far, the coordinating
group appeared to be ineffective. Canada shared its draft
action plan with the U.S. delegation, asking that it keep it
close-hold, as Canada has not sent it to Afghan or Pakistani
officials. Canada does not plan to invite representatives

OTTAWA 00001234 005.2 OF 006


from partner countries to the "summitive" meeting in an
effort to allow the Pakistanis and Afghans to be less
inhibited in their discussions, but would fully debrief the
U.S. and other partners on the results of the meeting.
Canada had tried to hold the meeting in both June and July
2008, but canceled it each time due to heightened tensions in
the region and domestic political concerns in Pakistan.
Canada is now aiming to hold it between October 10-20. It is
concerned, however, about Pakistan's lack of cooperation in
scheduling the meeting, and specifically about attempts by
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to set up roadblocks (ref
c). Canada would appreciate U.S. assistance in urging senior
Pakistani officials to continue with the Dubai Process.

Improving security
--------------


17. (C) Canada is focusing its attention on detention
facilities and detainees, partly as a result of an Amnesty
International law suit regarding detainee transfers. Canada
is spending approximately $4 million on improving the
infrastructure of Sarpoza Prison and training prison staff.
Canada is also working with the UK to build a National
Directorate of Security facility -- Canada is contributing $2
million to this project. In response to a question from the
Canadian delegation, a U.S. official said that the U.S. will
phase out community self-defense by the end of 2008, and will
support community responsibility rather than the arming of
community defense forces. The Canadians also inquired about
needs-assessments regarding training for the Afghan Border
Police. The U.S. delegation responded that the U.S. is
always open to contributions from other countries, and said
that one additional brigade would be particularly useful.

Assistance
--------------


18. (C) The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
is focused on four main areas of development within Kandahar:
establishing democratic governance; providing subsidized
credit to SMEs; strengthening access to financial services;
and, assisting with food security and agricultural recovery.
The time is ripe for strengthening assistance collaboration
between the U.S. and Canada, according to a CIDA official.
Specifically, Canada would like to cooperate with the U.S. on
election assistance. Canada hopes to be a concerted provider
of election assistance, although it will obviously not be
able to match U.S. levels of support. Canada plans to work
with the UNDP on election assistance, but will be very hands
on, according to a CIDA official, as the UNDP has a mixed
record on election-related support. Canada also plans to
explore options for direct bilateral support for elections in
Kandahar.

Reconciliation
--------------


19. (C) Reconciliation is a new area of focus for Canada, and
Canada would like to see Afghanistan conduct a more
transparent reconciliation process, according to a DFAIT
Qtransparent reconciliation process, according to a DFAIT
official. At a national level, Canada believes transitional
justice is necessary for long-term peace and stability in
Afghanistan. The international community should be working
toward this now, not just after peace is achieved, said the
DFAIT official. Canada is already working on some pillars of
the transitional justice plan, but believes the international
community should be working on all aspects of it. Canada
would like further information on U.S. views regarding
transitional justice. U.S. and Canadian officials will meet
soon in a secure setting to discuss further details of the
reconciliation process.

Participants
--------------


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20. (U) Canada
- Richard Arbeiter, Afghan Task Force Director, DFAIT
- Elissa Goldberg (by phone),Representative of Canada in
Kandahar (RoCK)
- Jim Nickel, Director South Asia Division, DFAIT
- Peter Fawcett, Deputy Director, South Asia Division, DFAIT
- Christopher GIbbins, Deputy Director, Afghanistan Task
Force, DFAIT
- Rebecca Netley, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy,
Washington, DC
- Rhett Sangster, Senior Policy Advisor, Regional and Border
Issues, DFAIT
- Andrew Barnes, Policy Advisor, Pakistan, Bangladesh &
Pakistan/Afghan Border Issues, DFAIT
- James Gilmour, Regional Policy Advisor, Afghanistan Task
Force, DFAIT
- Cindy Kleiman, Prevention and Peacebuilding Division, DFAIT
- Michel Legault, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- Joey Cloutier, Seinor Policy Advisor, Public Safety Canada
- Tolly Foerstner, Canadian Border Services Agency
- Hasit Thankey, Policy Advisor, Directorate of Afghanistan
Policy, National Defence
- Nathan Taylor, Senior Program Officer, Asia Division, CIDA
- Abdullah Mojaddedi Seinor Analyst, Afghanistan Task Force,
CIDA
- Karolina Guay, Analyst, Kandahar Unit, CIDA


21. (U) USG
- Neil Kromash, Senior Advisor, Afghanistan-Pakistan
Frontier, SCA/FO, State
- Henry Ensher, Director, SCA/A, State
- Nisha Singh, Desk Officer, SCA/A, State
- Raphael Carland, Desk Officer, EUR/PRM
- Robert Newberry, Director, European and NATO Policy
Office, DOD
- Julia Parks Schoenfeld, Desk Officer, NATO Operations
Afghanistan Office, DOD
- Caroline Brearley, Officer-in-charge, Afghanistan Desk,
USAID
- LtCol. Frank Sturek, Director, Afghanistan, J5, DOD
- Ian Rainey, Desk Officer, DOD
- Kurt van der Walde, U.S. Embassy Ottawa
- Elizabeth Zentos, U.S. Embassy Ottawa

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