NORWAY RAISES QUESTION REGARDING US CLUSTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000676

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NB AND PM/WRA (KBAKER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NORWAY RAISES QUESTION REGARDING US CLUSTER
MUNITIONS

Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary. MoD Director of Security Policy, Svein
Efjestad explained on December 17 that an MOD
miscommunication caused a document to be sent to Parliament
that erroneously indicated that the US is not storing CM in
Norway. Efjestad outlined some possible ways to approach the
USG regarding this issue. Embassy requests guidance on how
to respond. End Summary.

The Problem
--------------

2. (C) On December 17, the Defense Attache met MoD Director
of Security Policy, Svein Efjestad, to discuss Cluster
Munitions(CM) stored in Norway. According to Efjestad, on
October 17, MFA forwarded Proposition Number 4 to the
Parliament in preparation for ratification of the CM treaty.
This document was appropriately coordinated with the working
level of the MoD, but a miscommunication occurred. The MoD
action officer appropriately queried the Norwegian military
point of contact for the Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program
- Norway (MCPP-N) to determine if there were any US weapons
that could be classified as CM stored in Norway. The answer
was that the remaining CM had been destroyed in 2006. This
was forwarded to MFA, who then forwarded it to Parliament
within Proposition Number 4. In early December 2008, during
the press coverage of the CM Convention signing in Oslo, a
Norwegian MCPP-N action officer felt obligated to ensure that
MoD was aware that there were weapons that could be
classified as CM
in the MCPP-N caves. This information made its way to
Efjestad on Monday, December 15. On Tuesday, December 16,
Efjestad sent a letter to MFA which informed MFA of the
actual status of US CM in Norway and requested that MFA
correct the record with Parliament. The letter also
indicated that MoD was fully responsible for the previous
incorrect information that had been provided to MFA.


3. (C) According to Efjestad, Norwegian legal experts are of
the opinion that Norway has jurisdiction over all CM stored
on Norwegian soil, including the US CM stored in the MCPP-N
caves. Therefore, on behalf of the MoD, Efjestad is under
pressure to work out an arrangement with the USG to remove or
destroy the remaining US CM. Efjestad intends to handle the
situation at the lowest possible level, to limit public
awareness. He feels obligated to provide a formal letter
requesting the removal/destruction. He offered the following
possible methods:
--MoD directs the Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization
(NDLO) to work with US authorities to remove/destroy the
remaining US CM. (This is Efjestad's preference.)
--MoD letter to US Embassy
--MoD letter to OSD Policy
Efjestad stated that the Norwegian goal was to destroy the
remaining Norwegian CM over the next two years, and mentioned
that from the Norwegian perspective, it would be appreciated
if the US could match this timeline. He acknowledged that
the CM Convention states the signatory nations will meet a
deadline of eight years from the date of entry into effect.

Norwegian Inventory of US CM
--------------

4. (C) MoD Senior Advisor for International and Military Law
believes the US has the following CM stored in Norway:
--D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM):
2,544 rounds
--D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM: 2,528 rounds

Efjestad's Views
--------------

5. (C) Efjestad believes that it is unlikely that this
situation will become a major issue in the press. However,
if it does get attention, he expects that the focus will be
on the MoD and not the US. He went on to say that any
suspicion of US involvement would be nipped in the bud by MoD
because the miscommunication was clearly a problem that
occurred with the MoD with no US involvement whatsoever.


6. (C) Efjestad asked for responses to the following:
--What is the preferred method for MoD to deliver to the USG
the request to remove/destroy the remaining US CM in Norway?
--Are the remaining US CM likely to be destroyed or removed?
(Of note, Efjestad suggested that if the US intends to
destroy the CM, then it might be possible to include them
with the 50, 000 warheads that Norway will be destroying.)
--In order to ensure the US and Norwegian inventory

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information is consistent, what is the US version of how many
of what type of CM is stored in Norway?

Embassy Assessment
--------------

7. (C) Based on Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)
interaction with HQ USMC, we agree with the Norwegian list of
US munitions in Norway that can be classified as CM.
Although one could argue that the dual purpose munitions in
their unitary mode are no longer CM, we believe this argument
would likely not resonate with the Norwegian CM experts.


8. (C) A question has arisen whether the MCPP-N program
supports NATO. The Marine Corps has informed ODC that the
precursor to the MCPP-N program did, in fact, support NATO
force goals, but the current MCPP-N program does not.

Embassy Action Request
--------------

9. (C) The Embassy requests answers to MOD's questions as
well as contingency press guidance, in case this becomes a
public controversy.
WHITNEY