A/S KIMMITT'S OCTOBER 15-16 VISIT TO OSLO

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000582

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MCAP MASS NO
SUBJECT: A/S KIMMITT'S OCTOBER 15-16 VISIT TO OSLO

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

1.(C) Summary: PM A/S Mark Kimmitt met with senior Norwegian
officials in Oslo on October 15-16 for discussions on
Norway's High North initiative and Norway's activities in
Afghanistan in support of ISAF. Kimmitt met with the Deputy
Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide, the Prime Minister's
National Security Advisor Ingvard Havnen, and the MFA's
political advisor Vegard Ellefsen. In light of Norway's
upcoming decision on its fighter aircraft purchase, A/S
Kimmitt emphasized U.S. interest in Norway's defense
capabilities while noting "I'm not here to sell you
airplanes." Kimmitt also briefed the officials on the
situation in Iraq, and raised U.S. concerns over Norway's
approach to the proposed CCW cluster munitions protocol. End
Summary

Stroking the Norwegians on High North
--------------

2. (C) Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs
Mark Kimmitt raised Russia and Norway's engagement in the
High North with all his interlocutors. He praised Norway's
activity in the region and its efforts to get NATO to focus
more on the core areas. A/S Kimmitt stressed increased
U.S.-High North engagement, noting broad support for Norway's
initiative and our shared interest in cooperation in the
region and in dealing with Russia. He noted the upcoming
release of our Arctic Policy and mentioned plans for U/S
Dobriansky to travel to the region to brief Norway and other
regional nations on this policy.

Urging a Fighter Decision Based on Capability, Not Politics
-------------- --------------

3. (C) A/S Kimmitt was careful about directly raising
Norway's upcoming decision on whether to buy the F-35 or the
Swedish Gripen in his meetings, telling the Norwegians up
front that "I'm not here to sell you an airplane, but we are
interested in a transparent decision-making process based
upon capabilities." At a private dinner A/S Kimmitt
spoke at length with Deputy Defense Minister Eide who
indicated that things appeared to be moving in a positive
direction, but argued the best thing the U.S. could do was to
"shut up" about JSF and not make any noise about denying AESA
radar to the Swedes. Should the U.S. appear to be pressing
on those topics, Eide said, it could potentially scuttle an
otherwise transparent process and build sympathy for Sweden.

Afghanistan
--------------

4. (C) In his meetings, A/S Kimmitt highlighted the need for
support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and asked Norway to
contribute $7 million annually from 2010-2014 to NATO's ANA
sustainability trust fund. GON interlocutors did not respond
directly, but said they agreed with the importance of this
effort along with improvements in civilian assistance. A/S
Kimmitt mentioned three reasons for optimism in Afghanistan:

1. Both POTUS candidates have indicated strong interest in an
increase of U.S. support in Afghanistan; 2. The upcoming
Afghan strategy review; 3. The appointment of General
Petreaus as new theater commander and the application of
lessons learned in Iraq.

Iraq
--------------

5. (C) A/S Kimmitt noted need for engagement and the helpful
role Norwegian expertise could play. The Norwegians did not
respond directly and appeared well aware of how their
assistance could be directed in Iraq, but were clearly not
interested in establishing a diplomatic presence yet. (Note:
The GON clearly has no appetite to engage in Iraq before the
new U.S. presidential administration. Post nevertheless
presses at every opportunity the importance of action on Iraq
and is working with the Iraqi Ambassador to
encourage Norway to open an embassy in Baghdad and to
increase its engagement).

No movement on Cluster Munitions
--------------

6. (C) A/S Kimmitt pressed all his interlocutors on the need
to work together on mitigating the humanitarian impact of
cluster munitions and asked the Norwegians for help in
facilitating a CCW agreement which could be complimentary to
the Dublin treaty. The Norwegians listened politely but did
not budge from (their perceived) need to stick to
"principles" on CCM. A/S Kimmitt pointed out that pushing
only for CCM would allow those countries possessing the large
amounts of cluster munitions (e.g., China, Russia, Pakistan,
and India) to avoid any steps to improve their cluster
munitions policies. The Norwegians appeared unconvinced by
this argument. Comment: The Foreign Minister himself
maintains that any outside agreement on cluster munitions
would legitimize their continued use and destroy the
international norm created by the Dublin treaty. This
position is unlikely to
change. End Comment.

First Impressions are Important
--------------

7. (C) A/S Kimmitt also pointed out that the GON should note
that three Norwegian decisions currently under consideration
(Afghanistan, cluster munitions, JSF) will to a great degree
form the first impressions for the next administration.


8. (U) A/S Kimmitt cleared on this message.
JOHNSON