NOT YOUR FATHER'S NORWAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000057

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR NO
SUBJECT: NOT YOUR FATHER'S NORWAY

REF: A. OSLO 1161

B. OSLO 922

Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney
for reasons 1.4b and d

1.(C) Summary: The current center-left Government of Norway
is systematically attempting to alter Norway,s foreign
policy consensus, making it more distant from the U.S.
Influential members of the government, including the Foreign
Minister, Development Minister, and Finance Minister have
capitalized on broad Norwegian trends to garner support for
this new approach. If unchecked, this could threaten even
our closest ties with Norway (intelligence and military
cooperation). General displeasure with U.S. policy has
dampened reaction from those opposed to "going too far" in
this realignment, but Norwegians are beginning to ask if
fundamentally weakening key relationships with the U.S. and
NATO is positive. While the U.S. should not overreact, we
should persistently and firmly respond to unhelpful Norwegian
approaches. This may restrain the GON and will strengthen
those Norwegians alarmed by the implications of this foreign
policy shift. End Summary.

A Break From Traditional Norwegian Foreign Policy
-------------- --------------

2. (SBU) Norway's foreign policy traditionally stressed
transatlantic ties (including close relations to the U.S. and
maintaining a seat in the "inner circle" of NATO),an
emphasis on the UN and other international organizations, a
generous development program and close, but not too close,
cooperation with the EU and other Nordic nations. This
policy consensus remained, under both Labor and Conservative
governments, until the election of the current GON in October
of 2005.

Sharp Shifts in Policy
--------------

3. (C) The new GON (a coalition of the Labor, Center and
Socialist Left Parties elected in the fall of 2005) quickly
set out to distinguish itself from past foreign policy,
immediately withdrawing Norway's small presence in Iraq and
shifting Norwegians in Afghanistan out of OEF. Shortly
afterwards, the Finance Minister's proposed (and later
dropped) boycott of Israel signaled a major ideological
shift. After over two years in power, a number of decisions
indicate that the shift is real, strategic, and not limited
to specific issues such as Iraq. Indications include:
unilaterally normalizing relations with Hamas during the
short-lived Palestinian unity government; intense debates
over the principle of sending troops to Afghanistan;
increased relations with (and development aid to) leftist
Central and South American countries including Cuba;
disinvestment of companies by Norway's Pension Fund as a
political tool; continued high-level meetings with Iranian
officials, including the FM, in opposition to our requests; a
vocal push for civilian over military international
involvement; an almost ideological emphasis on dialogue and
on peace and reconciliation facilitation; repeated
inappropriate and public criticism of President Bush (ref B);
refusals to meet high-level USG visitors on controversial
topics (missile defense and cluster munitions); and a pattern
of regularly defining and defending GON policies by
criticizing ours.

What is Driving the Independent Agenda
--------------

4. (C) This shift in foreign policy has several causes,
including the influence of the Socialist Left party on the
coalition (an anti-NATO, anti-US, anti-EU party) and the need
to adjust to Norway's extreme wealth and corresponding global
sovereign interests. Norway's wealth provides the means to
conduct an active foreign policy and also triggers a desire
in many Norwegians to use this wealth responsibly, to solve
problems. In pursuit of this impulse the GON has often shown
a frustration with existing processes and is tempted to take
independent, &coalition of the willing,8 type actions. In
addition Norway is beginning to realize the influence that
the $380 billion Pension Sovereign Wealth Fund and energy
resources can give its foreign policy.


5. (C) Another significant influence is the personal impact
of Norway's Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Stoere. Stoere is a
charismatic, highly self-confident, ambitious, and forceful
personality who believesstrongly in the ideals of dialogue,
the use of cvilian rather than military power, and in
Norways unique ability to influence world events. Some
observers have charaterized his style as &old8 Frnch
diplomacy, perhaps reflecting his education t the Institut
d,Etudes Politiques de Paris. Stere remains the most
popular politician in Norwa and has been mentioned as a
potential future candidate for Prime Minister.


6. (C) Stoere has set out to change Norwegian foreign policy,
prohibiting MFA employees from referring to Norway as a
"little country," a phrase which long symbolized Norway's
self image as a harmless peripheral nation. Instead, Stoere
has spoken of Norway as a "surplus nation" with an obligation
to assist and engage. In pursuit of this priority, Stoere
shows a clear willingness to depart from international
consensus, most prominently demonstrated by his decision to
speak with and give money to the Hamas members of the
Palestinian Unity Government. The February 2007 launch of
the Oslo Process to ban cluster munitions is another example
of how Stoere's personal convictions drive Norwegian foreign
policy. Stoere's activism is popular with the public which
is eager to expand Norway's pristine international image.

Russia: Carrots Only Please
--------------


7. (C) The GON's Russia policy is characterized by a
consistent stress on the positive and a reluctance to
criticize even the most blatant of Russia actions. This stems
from Norway's focus on the High North, its desire to increase
economic ties with Russia, continued unsettled relations with
Russia over Svalbard and over the maritime boundary in the
Barents, and its reluctance to be seen as joining U.S.
criticisms of Russia. Russian threats to allies over missile
defense, aggressive behavior against Estonia and Georgia, and
unhelpfulness on Kosovo all received no public comments from
the GON. Instead, while on a visit to Russia, the PM echoed
inaccurate Russian claims on missile defense. The GON gives
Russia the benefit of the doubt, to a much wider and deeper
degree than it does to the U.S. MFA Political Director Kai
Eide commented at a recent e-Pine meeting that Russia's sins
are the West's fault for isolating Russia. The MOD takes a
different tack, finding increased Russian military actions
concerning, but the GON as a whole refuses to remove its rose
colored glasses. Increased economic ties will only reinforce
the GON's kid glove approach to Russia's missteps. The GON
was quick to point to Gazprom's inclusion of StatoilHydro in
the Stockman gas field as confirmation of its Russia
strategy.

North, South, East or West: Which Suits Norway Best
-------------- --------------

8. (C) The GON regularly proposes various strategic
priorities. The GON's High North strategy (focus on the
Barents and Arctic regions emphasizing close relations with
Russia),closer ties to the EU, and increased cooperation
with Sweden and Finland are all touted as high priorities.
The security link with the U.S. through NATO is mentioned,
but is clearly far less compelling. The GON's vacillations on
support for ISAF are a good example of this development.


9. (C) The central (if unspoken) question now appears to be
what will replace the NATO and transatlantic link as the
primary orientation for Norway. At a recent conference Stoere
made a revealing comment, referring to the transatlantic
alliance as a "strategic hedge" which allows Norway to pursue
other options. This is a far cry from the traditional
Norwegian view that NATO and the U.S. are the "anchors" of
Norwegian foreign and security policy.


10. (C) In October 2007, Stoere launched the two-year
"Refleks" project to identify key Norwegian interests,
explore the challenges of globalization, and suggest
priorities for Norwegian foreign policy. This is an attempt
to rally domestic support for a deep and abiding foreign
policy change. It will explore Norway's relationship with
Russia, the EU, the U.S., China, Africa etc., and likely
recommend priorities quite different from previous
governments. The current government's clear goal is to cement
these new priorities so that any new government in 2009 will
be hard placed to change them.

The Dilemma of Europe (and the Nordics)
--------------

11. (SBU) Relations to the EU remain both appealing and
difficult for the GON. Norwegians enjoy nearly all the
privileges of EU citizens and Norway is a substantial annual
contributor to the EU budget. The GON generally agrees with
EU foreign policy. Despite official claims that remaining
outside the EU allows Norway freedom of action, many Labor
Party leaders would like to be in the EU. However, Norwegian
society and the current GON coalition are split on the EU
issue (the Socialist Left and the Center Party strongly
oppose EU membership). Referendum defeats over EU membership
and strong opposition in opinion polls prevent any formal
increase in Norway's ties to the EU.


12. (C) Informal agreements such as participation in the EU
Nordic battle group and with EU Security and Defense Policy
bodies, and closer ties to EU members Sweden and Finland are
alternatives. Nordic cooperation appeals to the GON but lacks
sufficient weight and substance to replace the traditional
bedrocks of Norwegian foreign policy. The Nordic arena also
would not provide Norwegian foreign policy priorities with
the international impact that Stoere and others seek.
Cooperation with Sweden and Finland on Defense issues is
substantial and growing (for details see reftel A).

Is the UN the Answer?
--------------

13. (SBU) The current GON has continued the traditional focus
on the UN, with PM Stoltenberg actively involved in UN reform
efforts and the GON insisting on a UN mandate before any
commitment of troops to international operations. However,
the limitations of the UN to resolve issues such as Kosovo,
Iran's nuclear development, terrorism and climate change have
led some Norwegians to question the weight that the UN holds
in Norwegian foreign policy. While the UN will remain a
central part of any new Norwegian foreign policy consensus,
the GON is seeking complementary foreign policy means as
well.

Beginnings of a Debate
--------------

14. (SBU) Spurring some debate, the President of Parliament,
Thorbjorn Jagland argued in a recent newspaper article that
despite a grand self image Norway (outside the EU) lacks the
international weight to effectively influence policy on
essential issues such as climate change, terrorism, and
democracy promotion. Jagland's comments created a flurry of
counter-arguments defending the effectiveness of Norway's
peace promotion efforts and Norway's global influence. We
expect the debate to grow as the traditional consensus
fractures and consequences of the shift become more apparent
to the public.

Implications for the USG and Comment
--------------

15. (C) The success or failure of the GON's attempt to change
Norway's foreign policy consensus will have a significant
impact on our bilateral relations. In the short-term, it is
clear that the current GON will continue to pursue its
activist and independent line until the next election in

2009. In interactions with the GON, senior USG officials
should not assume generally common interests and policies.
This is not the Norway many remember, and relations with the
GON include more disagreements than in the past.


16. (C) However, despite general skepticism of U.S. policies,
the relationship with the U.S. still is important to the
Norwegian people and elements of the GON. Domestically, no
government can afford to be seen as the one which "lost the
U.S." It is therefore important to make very clear, in
public and in private, our objections to GON policies.
Failure to do so will encourage more drift and give GON
politicians room to claim U.S. approval of their actions.


17. (C) Longer-term, the lack of opposition leaders with
foreign policy experience complicates the crafting of a
viable alternative foreign policy and of an articulate
defense of the traditionally strong links with the U.S. If
not challenged, many of the changes the current GON is
pursuing could become the basis for a new consensus in
Norwegian foreign policy, complicating our bilateral
relationship. Respectful but clear senior level USG
responses when Norway acts against U.S. interests (missile
defense, Russia, Iran, etc.) can stem, or even help
Norwegians turn this trend. GON actions on Kosovo,
commitments and comments on missile defense and Afghanistan
at the Bucharest NATO summit, and the decision on whether to
buy the Joint Strike Fighter will all be pivotal indications
of just how far the GON is willing to pursue its inclinations.
WHITNEY