NORWAY, RUSSIA AND GEORGIA; OPPORTUNITY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000513

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: ENRG EPET MARR PREL RS NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY, RUSSIA AND GEORGIA; OPPORTUNITY TO
STRENGTHEN TIES TO NORWAY

REF: A. A: OSLO 500

B. B: OSLO 482

C. C: OSLO 488

D. D: OSLO 489

E. E: OSLO 497

F. F: 2007 OSLO 1161

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary. The GON is coming to terms with the changing
nature of the West's relations with Russia after Georgia.
Publicly, the GON has been critical of Russia's (and
Georgia's) actions while stressing the need to continue close
and productive bilateral relations with Russia. Privately,
officials stress the differences between Georgia's and
Norway's relations with Russia, but some admit that the
return of geopolitics and the use of force will require some
adjustments in GON strategic thinking. Norway's two-track
approach -- criticizing Russia over Georgia while rejecting
sanctions and pushing partnership with Moscow -- presents
challenges and opportunities. This moment offers us an
opportunity to strengthen Norway's commitment to NATO and to
improve our bilateral relationship. End Summary.

Norway is not Georgia
--------------

2. (C) The starting point for almost all Norwegian viewpoints
on Georgia is that Norway's relationship with Russia is
categorically different from all other bordering Russia,
especially Georgia. Norwegians, including current and former
Ministers, Parliament members, the CHOD and other military
officials, political advisors and journalists unanimously
stress, inter alia, that Norwegians are "too smart" to
provoke Russia. This stress on the difference is
understandable and accurate in many aspects but may indicate
an unwillingness to acknowledge similarities. Georgia and
Norway have approximately the same population and both have
unresolved border and sovereignty questions with Russia (for
Norway this is the maritime border, Svalbard and fishing
issues). Norwegian officials and the public do not believe
that Russia would ever attack Norway militarily, but some are
increasingly aware that Russia is willing to at least
consider force as a legitimate tool of international
politics. A few recognize that Russia could take a step short
of force (e.g. sending an oil rig to Svalbard) to provoke.
The threat of force is not imminent, but less "out of the
question" than before August 7. FM Stoere noted publicly
that Article Five covers Svalbard (Reftel A). (Note: The
unique legal status of Svalbard could provide a tempting
place for Russia to flex its muscles.)

NATO is Important, a Reminder
--------------

3.(C) Russia's actions have re-invigorated the long-stagnant
domestic debate over defense and security matters.
Proponents of a stronger defense and a closer relationship
with the U.S. have been strengthened by the events in Georgia
and have been able to challenge the conventional wisdom that
dialogue and negotiation will resolve all disputes. Some
argue for closer ties to the EU to seek "political security".
The use of force is anathema to dialogue-loving Norwegians
and not all wish to accept that the potential use of force by
Russia is an eventuality that needs to be considered; or, if
it is considered, the answer is to seek dialogue to forestall
it, not to prepare in case dialogue fails. Despite this
reluctance, even the most hardened dialogue proponents have
stressed Norway's NATO membership as the ultimate difference
in Norway's and Georgia's relationship with Russia. This is
a welcome change from recent drift on the relevance of NATO.
Many Norwegians never fully accepted NATO's mission of
fighting terror or why NATO was in Afghanistan. Support for
NATO is consequently difficult to maintain based on out of
area operations. With Article Five seeming ever more
relevant, however, a shift in attitude on NATO may positively
impact future decisions on Norway's defense budget, the
purchase of fighter aircraft (JSF),and strengthening
Norway's relationship with the United States.

Nordic Cooperation Complementing NATO?
--------------


4.(C) Alternatively, the Georgian crisis could deepen Nordic
defense cooperation and reduced reliance on trans-Atlantic
ties. Norway claims that its support for Nordic Defense is
based on logistics and training savings as well as from a
desire to encourage Swedish and Finnish membership in (or
closeness to) NATO. However, as reported in Reftel F, Norway
is searching for security arrangements to compliment its NATO
membership. Nordic Defense could be one such area as all
Nordic countries are equally concerned with Russia and take
events in the North seriously. Supporters of the Swedish JAS
Gripen have claimed that it was designed specifically to
counter Russian fighters. Differences in defense strategy, as
well as Sweden and Finland's neutrality have prevented closer
cooperation in the past but Norway will continue to push for
common defense strategies.

Article Five Key...But Keep Russia a Partner
--------------

5.(C) Other implications from the Georgia crisis will impact
Norway's approach to upcoming NATO issues. The Deputy Defense
Minister has repeatedly stressed the need to return to core
NATO values such as Article five protections. Any Norwegian
increase to its commitment in Afghanistan will likely be
accompanied by calls for increased attention to NATO
territory, most significantly in the Barents. Another
reaction will be increased GON reluctance to take any steps
which could be characterized as antagonistic towards Russia.
Norway has been one of the more skeptical NATO members
regarding granting MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia and this
skepticism will most probably increase. This reflects the
reality that a significant segment of Norwegian officials and
the public remain convinced that the West, with the U.S. in
the lead, have pushed Russia so far that a response was
inevitable. They blame Georgian miscalculations for the
Russian response and remain convinced that Norwegians would
never make the same mistakes. It also reflects the GON's
instinct to pacify Russia rather than challenge. (Comment: It
is noteworthy that the GON has not stressed this publicly,
rather criticizing Russia and demanding compliance with
international law. The temptation to turn to a "carrots
only" approach to Russia is strong here, however, we should
not take Norway for granted on this. End Comment)

No Sanctions, Work with Russia a Priority
--------------


6. (C) GON officials have made it clear that Norway will
continue its close cooperation with Russia on Barents Sea
issues and will oppose any attempts to impose sanctions on
Russia. The GON has openly stated that any break in
cooperation with Russia in the North would hurt Norway's
interests more than Russia's and would throw away years of
work in developing cooperative organizations and ties.
Cooperation on energy developments in the Barents will also
continue, including StatoilHydro's partnership with Gazprom
and Total on development of the Shtockman field.

Challenges and Opportunities for the U.S.
--------------


7. (C) At a time when Norway feels vulnerable, it would be of
great benefit to stress in interactions with Norwegian
officials (at UNGA and elsewhere) the continued commitment of
U.S. to NATO Article 5 protections and the importance of NATO
solidarity. Stressing international law and the
vulnerability of small states will also be important as well
as any increase of USG attention to the Arctic (military,
scientific, general). NATO solidarity has increased relevance
now, and we should stress that when Russia threatens Poland
or the Balts. If Russia succeeds in re-establishing its
sphere of influence in Central Europe, stronger designs in
the North could follow. It will also be important to
re-emphasize the continuing importance of Afghanistan to
ensure that Norway does not lose focus. The possibility of a
structured dialogue with Norway takes on additional
importance and could help return our bilateral relationship
to its former strength. The USG could also benefit from
accentuating and building on close ties with Norway's
intelligence and defense Russia experts. Unlike many
countries, Norway maintained a robust analytical and

intelligence capability on Russia and the benefits of
increased ties with the GON in these areas would reassure the
Norwegians and provide the USG with valuable perspectives on
Russia.
WHITNEY