NORWAY: A LONG WAY TO GO ON TERRORISM AND HSPD-6

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000351

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: ASEC CVIS PINR PREL PTER NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY: A LONG WAY TO GO ON TERRORISM AND HSPD-6
SHARING

REF: A. OSLO 308

B. 2006 STATE 109771

C. OSLO 303

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------

1. (C) In reviewing the Bhatti terrorist case (REFTEL A) with
the Ambassador on June 18, Police Security Service (PST)
Director General Jorn Holme said he was disappointed the
synagogue shooting was not classified as terrorism, but
pleased at the long sentence Bhatti received. He felt the
recently revised terrorism law was adequate but complained
that the legal case had not been well argued, and said that
PST had pressed for the GON to appeal. To his obvious
disappointment, the GON prosecutor decided not to appeal.


2. (C) Troublingly, Holme described Bhatti as more criminal
than terrorist. This combined with the apparent lack of any
terrorist watch list in Norway seems to reflect a general GON
and public view that downplays the threat of terrorism. Post
will continue to press to sharpen the GON view of what
terrorism is and why watch lists are important. Holme's fall
trip to DC will be an important opportunity to reinforce this
message. On the proposed HSPD-6 Agreement (REFTEL B),Holme
promised PST would consult with the Embassy on how to move
forward. End Summary.

Bhatti Case
--------------


3. (C) Both the government and the defendant had an
opportunity to appeal in the Bhatti case. Despite PST
desires and early speculation, the prosecutor declined to
appeal the judge's decision that the synagogue shooting did
not reach the level of terrorism and that the planned attacks
against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies were not sufficiently
far along to constitute conspiracy to commit a terrorist act.
Bhatti, on the other hand, appealed the judge's ruling
against him on the charge of attempted murder. He also
appealed the judge's use of law concerning Bhatti's
involvement in the synagogue shooting, but not the verdict
concerning the synagogue shooting. The state prosecutor now
has the right to respond to the specific elements of Bhatti's
appeal. The prosecutor has until the end of this week to do
this.


4. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, PST Director
General Jorn Holme explained that the decision by the GON on
whether to appeal the decision that shooting the synagogue
was not a terrorist act was a close one. PST had asked the
prosecutor to appeal in order both to win the point about the
synagogue shooting and also to then use that as evidence of a
commencement of a terrorist conspiracy which included plans
to attack the US and Israeli embassies. This would then
overcome the judge's ruling that the plans to attack the
embassies had not sufficiently progressed to meet the
terrorist law standards. Holme explained that he believed
the legal aspects of the cases had not been well argued by
the prosecutor, as there was clear evidence in the
parliamentary notes to the law that attacks against
minorities as well as against national interests could be
considered terrorism. (The judge had ruled only attacks
against national/majority interests such as a government
building or a Lutheran church could be considered terrorism
so hence an attack against a synagogue could not be
terrorism.)


5. (C) Holme however was very pleased with the sentence
Bhatti received and believed the tapes PST provided were
instrumental in showing that Bhatti was a clever and
dangerous person. He said that the sentence had the total
support of the Norwegian public, despite the fact it is very
lengthy in Norwegian terms. Further, he felt the law was
quite sufficient although the judge had ruled that none of
Bhatti's actions met the criteria under the terrorism
legislation.

When is a Terrorist not a Terrorist?
--------------


6. (C) In a disturbing rumination however, Holme went on to
say that Bhatti was not a typical terrorist and essentially
was a criminal although motivated by international political
events. When pressed, he said that Bhatti was fine when in a
good mood hanging out with his girlfriend, and it was only
when he got depressed that he was dangerous. He felt that
Bhatti's friends remain a threat but that their lawyers would
advise them to be careful.


7. (C) Comment: It is very troubling that the person in
Norway who should most appreciate what terrorism is feels
comfortable making excuses for why Bhatti really isn't so bad
and is not a "real" terrorist--a line of reasoning which was
the main defense argument. This type of comment is echoed by
many in senior GON positions who seem to feel if our view
that Bhatti is a terrorist were true than all civilian
murderers would be terrorists. They seem to view our
reasoning as a paranoid U.S. view that terrorism lurks
everywhere and pride themselves on being more "civilized."
Somewhere along the way, they have lost sight of the
motivation making a difference. In the Bhatti case, no one
in the know denies he was motivated by the Israeli-Lebanon
war and sought to have a political impact. This clear
political motivation, however, does not seem to influence
their consideration of whether he is a terrorist. End Comment.

Other Cases
--------------


8. (C) Looking ahead, Holme felt the Bhatti case would have
no impact on the Somali financier case they are pursuing,
except to raise the question of whether PST can afford to
have two losses in a row. He also said the case had prompted
PST, Oslo Police, and KRIPOS (Norwegian Criminal
Investigative Service) to get together and decide who would
have responsibility to investigate and prosecute in various
different types of terrorist scenarios. (Note: Problems
arose in the Bhatti case when PST handed over the case to
Oslo Police when it was decided to arrest Bhatti and his
associates, but was forced to retake control of the
investigation and initial prosecution.) Finally, he noted
that the Bhatti case had raised serious public concern about
PST methods and the extent of details obtained in tapping
that then ended up in the public domain. PST is working with
the Storting to try to change the law to restrict who gets
access to the tapes and the form of access given in an
attempt to keep defense attorneys from
giving all the tapes to the media as happened in this case.

HSPD-6
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador raised the concept of an HSPD-6
Agreement and pointed out the benefits it would have for
Norway and the fight against terrorism in general. Holme
agreed to look into the matter and for a follow-up meeting
among experts. During the course of this discussion, it
became clear however that the GON does not keep its own
terrorist watch list. (Note: This is consistent with
Norway's philosophical opposition to putting names to lists
unless international bodies have clearly found them to be
terrorists. Nonetheless, we continue to be surprised that
the GON does not see the need to check who enters Norway
against some kind of list that would include suspected
terrorists. Given that the GON also doesn't check people
against published war criminal lists until they apply for
citizenship (REFTEL C),it is clear there is a ways to go
here. End Note)

Opportunity to Create Change?
--------------


10. (C) Holme announced that he will be going to DC in
October and would be interested in visiting NCTC. This is an
important opportunity for us to reinforce the concept that
there are varied faces of terrorism, there is a need to check
people entering a country against watch lists, and a need to
cooperate worldwide. Post will coordinate closely with
Washington agencies to make the most out of this trip.
Meanwhile, we are exploring with like-minded friends options
on how to increase understanding of what terrorism is among
GON officials. Some proposals include case studies with
security personnel, seminars for MFA, and using the HSPD-6
negotiations to raise awareness. We will also continue
through public outreach to encourage more thoughtful debate
on this point in the media and among the public.

WHITNEY