Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OSLO327
2008-06-13 14:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY'S ENIGMATIC IRAQI POPULATION: A RISK FOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL KIRF IZ NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8798
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNY #0327/01 1651421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131421Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6851
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0097
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000327 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KIRF IZ NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S ENIGMATIC IRAQI POPULATION: A RISK FOR
RADICALIZATION?

REF: OSLO 207

Classified By: Acting DCM Kristen F. Bauer for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000327

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KIRF IZ NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S ENIGMATIC IRAQI POPULATION: A RISK FOR
RADICALIZATION?

REF: OSLO 207

Classified By: Acting DCM Kristen F. Bauer for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) SUMMARY: An increasingly large Iraqi population in
Norway (over 22,000, which constitutes the third largest
group of immigrants, and second largest among non-Europeans)
continues to remain out of the spotlight, neither actively
engaged in politics as is the long-established Pakistani
population, nor a subject of media hysteria, as is the Somali
population (see Reftel). Efforts to find reliable
(non-Kurdish) community leaders that speak for the population
have been frustrating, both for post and for the Norwegian
government, which is concerned about growing numbers of
fraudulent asylum applications from Iraqis but lacks the
resources to fully investigate the situation. Statistics
that the government has gathered on the Iraqi community show
that they suffer the same unemployment and educational
challenges as other 'new' communities. END SUMMARY.

WHO ARE THE IRAQIS IN NORWAY?


2. (U) The majority of Iraqis residing in Norway have arrived
in the last nine years, with a peak of 4,400 arriving in

2000. This wave of asylum seekers and refugees is expected
to continue, meaning that the population will likely continue
to grow at a rapid clip in the years to come unless Norwegian
authorities decide to tighten their policies. The Iraqis
community tends to have large families, with 3.3 children per
family, compared to 2.0 for all women in Norway and only
behind the Somali and Pakistani population in this regard.
Less than half of the male population is employed, and less
than a quarter of the women. Educational statistics are
unreliable, but general indications are that the educational
level is low. Only 8 percent of the 19-24 age group is in
higher education, compared to 31 percent of the general
Norwegian populace.


3. (C) A discussion with an employee at UDI, the GON office
responsible for immigration and refugee/asylum processing,
provided insight into the GON's growing concern that
fraudulent claims are becoming more common among Iraqi
applicants. For example, a significant number of those
claiming to be Assyrian Christians from Iraq have been

identified as fakes by the existing community in Norway
(instead, they were Sunni Muslims). Our contact mentioned
that their most effective tool in determining the validity of
addresses and applicant backgrounds in Iraq is by using
Google Earth to see if the area that applicants claim to come
from exists and accurately reflects their religious/ethnic
background. Otherwise they are very much operating in the
dark, he says, when it comes to determining the actual
identity of some Iraqi applicants.


4. (C) The GON and post have had difficulties in identifying
reliable community leaders in the Iraqi community. Although
our UDI contact believes that many of them are silent due in
part to their physical absence. He claims that many of them
register in Norway and then spend their time in neighboring
Sweden, which has a larger Iraqi population and more
media/stores catering to their needs). The statistics do not
seem to bear that out, as the majority of the Iraqis in
Norway do not live in border towns as he claims, but in Oslo,
Bergen and other high-population areas, much like the Somali
and Afghani populations. The Statistical Bureau's 2007
report on the Iraqi population in Norway notes that the high
unemployment, low education, and lack of involvement in the
community is comparable to the other 'new' immigrant groups -
neither significantly worse nor better. The only two
statistical items that stand out are that Iraqis are
over-represented in the hotel and restaurant industries and
that their rate of inter-marriage with Norwegians is higher
than other populations. Although neither of those statistics
is determinative, on the surface they suggest that the
population is less isolated than the Somalis, Afghans, or
Pakistanis: a positive sign for integration.

ARE THEY A THREAT?


5. (C) The enigmatic nature of the Iraqi population in Norway
is unsettling to some. TV2 reporter Kadafi Zaman (of
Pakistani descent) requested a private meeting with the Pol
office in early 2007 to discuss growing concerns about 'the
Shia population' (including, in part, Iraqis) in Norway,
which he had been surreptitiously videotaping as an
undercover reporter for several months. Although nothing
came of the story idea because he could not find roof of
illicit activity, it reflects the suspicous that these new
immigrants are somehow going o bring the violence of the
region with them to Nrway.


OSLO 00000327 002 OF 002



6. (C) The single most prominent Iraqi in Norway is Najmuddin
Faraj, (aka Mullah Krekar) the former leader of the Ansar al
Islam group. Krekar has been declared a threat to national
security and is awaiting deportation, due to his previous
activities and published statements calling for jihad. He
has lost all appeals of this decision most recently on
November 12, 2007 when Norway,s Supreme Court upheld
previous court decisions which expelled him from Norway.
Due to human rights concerns, the GON has determined that he
cannot be deported to Iraq. He has shown a deft touch with
the media and remains a media figure, with a profile of his
situation appearing June 13, in a major newspaper,s
magazine. Krekar remains under virtual house arrest and
cannot be considered a representative of the larger Iraqi
community but is the most visible.


7. (C) Odd Olsen Ingero, the director of Kripos (National
Criminal Investigation Service),says his organization is
increasingly concerned about the Iraqi influx. They assess
that most of the jobs they have in the restaurant and
car-washing business are simply covers for multi-faceted
criminal activities. This prompted Kripos to do a formal
threat assessment which highlighted concerns to the broader
law enforcement community. The Iraqi community's use of
fraudulent passports has been of one of the main concerns,
and has been discussed in cables from both Oslo and Stockholm
(Iraq's mission in Sweden covers Norway). There is an
additional complication, which is that some who carry Iraqi
passports are not really Iraqi.

8. (C) However, unlike the Somali population, which has been
portrayed in the media again and again as a significant
problem due to gang violence, the import of Khat, female
genital mutilation, and a public downtown beating of a female
activist, the Iraqi population has so far remained out of the
spotlight. Although post has been approached by both Kurdish
political activists for support in their efforts to promote a
Kurdish homeland, the population has generally remained off
of the public radar. There are concerns by GON officials,
but they seem to be trumped by other priority populations,
such as the Somalis, absent any incidents involving the Iraqi
community which would indicate radicalization.
WHITNEY