Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OSLO303
2008-06-03 15:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY: A POTENTIAL HAVEN FOR WAR CRIMINALS?

Tags:  PREL ASEC KCRM NO 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0303 1551535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031535Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6824
INFO RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2428
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0030
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0239
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000303 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/W CI AND AF/C; COPENHAGEN FOR LEGAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC KCRM NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY: A POTENTIAL HAVEN FOR WAR CRIMINALS?

Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000303

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/W CI AND AF/C; COPENHAGEN FOR LEGAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC KCRM NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY: A POTENTIAL HAVEN FOR WAR CRIMINALS?

Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. In a June 2 meeting, the head of Norway's
Criminal Investigation Service noted the constraints on
pursuing war crime cases in Norway. Norway is still
investigating the Kabuga case, but the source placing him in
Norway is not very credible. The conversation highlighted
the lack of coordination within the GON on terrorism and
indicated no Norwegian terrorist watch list exists. End
Summary.

War Criminals
--------------

2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on June 2, Odd Olsen
Ingero, the Director of Kripos (National Criminal
Investigation Service),reviewed Norway's approach to
identifying and prosecuting war criminals. He noted that
Norway only checks names of proposed citizens against various
Interpol and other war criminal name lists. Checks are not
made of asylum seekers or at other stages prior to
application for citizenship. Kripos, which was given the
responsibility for war criminals in 2005, has a 10 person
team working on the issue. This unit will increase to 18
staff members this summer. However, until then staffing and
other resource constraints greatly limit what Kripos can do.
At the moment, they have 100 open war criminal
investigations, including 19 cases where the Rwandan
government has identified alleged war criminals living in
Norway.


3. (C) Turning to the specifics of two recent cases, Ingero
explained that the case of the Rwandan fugitive, Felicien
Kabuga, remains open as they are still investigating whether
he was ever in Norway as alleged in an interview posted on an
internet site. Although they have not reached a conclusion,
the webmaster for the site is well known to the GON and has
little credibility with Kripos. In the other case, Ingero
confirmed newspaper accounts of the first ever GON
extradition of a war criminal in May when Norway sent Damir
Sireta, a Croatian national, to Serbia pursuant to a national
war crime warrant. Sireta had been living in Norway under
his real name for nine years before his arrest.

Terrorism
--------------

4. (C) In discussing these cases and trafficking in persons
cases, it became clear that Kripos does not cross check
people it is investigating against any terrorism lists.
Indeed, Norwegian terrorist watch lists do not seem to exist.
(Note: See septel on Norway and the HSPD-6 which will
discuss this further.) Coordination with PST (Police
Security Service),which is responsible for countering
terrorism, is at best ad hoc based on individual officer's
initiative and discretion.

Comment
--------------

5. (C) This meeting reinforced our view that Norway is a
relatively easy place for war criminals to reside, at least
until they want to apply for Norwegian citizenship. Although
the political pressures are forcing Kripos to ramp up its war
crimes unit, prosecutions are still a ways off. Similarly,
Norwegian coordination and action to counter terrorists is
also limited.

WHITNEY