A PENSIVE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000779

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: A PENSIVE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The President of the National Assembly
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir is pleased with the results of his
extensive round of African contacts leading to a tough policy
line by the Peace and Security Council. He praises the U.S.
position while he worries about the Europeans. Ould
Boulkheir was pleasantly surprised by the decision of the
High Constitutional Council that thwarted efforts to remove
him from his position but is ill at ease with the current
"cohabitation" with the members of his own chamber. The
Assembly President sees nothing useful coming from the
National Dialogue on Democracy but voices frustration with
President Abdallahi's lack of an alternative option. End
Summary


2. (C) Diplomatic Mission: Charge met with President of the
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir on December 31 at
Ould Boulkheir's Assembly office. Charge congratulated Ould
Boulkheir on the success of his extensive diplomatic mission
on behalf of President Abdallahi. Ould Boulkheir took the
opportunity to thank the U.S. for its extensive support to
his delegation during his trip highlighting particularly his
meetings with Ambassador Simon at USAU and DCM LaLime in
Pretoria.. Ould Boulkheir said he had found a consistent
strong message of support throughout his mission and he had
succeeded in getting the PSC to accept two of his main
objectives -- getting the AU to invite President Abdallahi to
appoint his own representative and getting AU support to pass
the Mauritanian dossier to the UN Security Council. Ould
Boulkheir said he had noted the effectiveness of the U.S.
position (as well as direct interventions) throughout his
trip. He worried that the French position remained "vague"
but noted that AU Chairman Kikwete told him he had discussed
Mauritania with President Sarkozy at the Doha Summit and had
found the French Presidential position to be unwavering.
Ould Boulkheir noted some confusion over the German position
since the Germans had previously been strong supporters of
Mauritania's democracy under President Abdallahi and now
seemed the regime's most vocal supporters -- more so than the
Spanish who Ould Boulkheir saw motivated by their own sense
of security and commercial interests. He was particularly
concerned since the German Ambassador will now represent the
European Union on behalf of the Czech EU Presidency.


3. (C) Constitutional Contortions: Ould Boulkheir was
surprised that the High Constitutional Council had rejected
changes pushed through by General Aziz' "Parliamentary
Battalion" in the Assembly that would have forced him out of
his office. That said, he said, "I'm not at all comfortable
with this current arrangement of 'cohabitation'" noting he
was sitting in his office at the Assembly while the combined
Congress was being convened -- illegally so -- at the
National Dialogue for Democracy. Ould Boulkheir saw nothing
useful coming from the Dialogue noting, first and foremost,
that it had been convened and managed by an "illegitimate
president" and his "illegal government." The Dialogue itself
had no standing to convene the Congress as a sub-set of the
conference. Recognizing that some political parties against
the coup had decided to try to change things from within,
Ould Boulkheir said they were already complaining that the
participation in the Dialogue was so weighed in favor of
traditional "notables" that the political parties were being
pushed aside. Ould Boulkheir asserted that, regardless of
how open the debate might be, the results of the Dialogue
will have no legal standing adding, "The military would have
made life much easier for themselves by just launching a
traditional coup. This affair of trying to pretend that all
other aspects of constitutional order remain in place doesn't
work because the changes they are trying to force are
inherently unconstitutional."


4. (C) Time For A Strategy: Ould Boulkheir noted he had not
gone to Lemden to brief President Abdallahi on his diplomatic
mission because "I thought he would be back in town by now --
now I understand he won't come back until after the Dialogue
is over." He noted that bringing the President back to
Nouakchott poses some very difficult administrative and
security challenges for the FNDD but saw that it is difficult

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to demonstrate that Abdallahi's liberation is not
"unconditional" if it remains untested. He is uncomfortable
with the emerging long-term strategy of the FNDD and said,
"it's time for the President to table some specific plan for
a resolution to the problem" since the Aziz "National
Dialogue" effort was the only thing out there for now. Ould
Boulkheir said the basic tenets of his earlier proposal --
for the President to announce he will schedule early
elections as soon as the military leave and he is returned to
office -- remains the most viable. He allowed that short of
actually giving up his mandate, the President had to at least
put it at risk through a referendum or early parliamentary
elections. Ould Boulkheir said international pressure
remains vital but saw that, eventually, something has to be
done internally.


5. (C) Comment: Ould Boulkheir continues to impress with
his commitment to principle coupled with a sincere effort to
find some negotiating room. He is not without political
ambition, of course. Many Mauritanians see Ould Boulkheir's
leadership of the FNDD African diplomatic mission as
burnishing his own credentials as a future president --
building his credibility to, as some Mauritanians put it, "do
an Obama" of having a black Mauritanian elected President.
While still a crucial element of the FNDD coalition, Ould
Boulkheir is the most outspoken in his willingness to have
Abdallahi give up his position once he is returned to office
and constitutional order is re-established. End Comment.
HANKINS