Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NOUAKCHOTT777
2008-12-31 14:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
AZIZ CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT IN SECURITY SERVICES --
how-toVZCZCXRO7984 PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO DE RUEHNK #0777 3661425 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311425Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7977 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0411 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0333 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0387 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1929 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0721 RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0453 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0828
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000777
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC MR
SUBJECT: AZIZ CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT IN SECURITY SERVICES --
FRICTION REPORTED ON THE RISE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000777
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC MR
SUBJECT: AZIZ CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT IN SECURITY SERVICES --
FRICTION REPORTED ON THE RISE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) In the past ten days we have seen signs of continued
efforts by General Aziz to reposition his supporters in lower
levels of the administration. Four governors were reassigned
a week ago. Over the weekend senior police officials were
reassigned and it is understood changes in the military
commands were attempted. Senior LES report these changes are
generating friction within the military and security forces.
2. (C) Our senior RSO FSN reported that the Chief of the
Nouakchott Central Police, Col. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Moutaly,
was demoted to become the head of the police contingent for
the Nouakchott airport. The transfer came with a number of
other transfers that Moutaly said were all political -- based
on the officers' perceived personal loyalty to General Aziz.
Moutaly accepted the transfer but is livid -- no replacement
has yet been named. Also demoted was the Director of the
Judicial/Public Security Police Col. Mohamed Abdellahi Taleb
Abeidi who has been shifted to be an "advisor" for the
Minister of Interior (a typical Mauritanian method of
"parking" someone on the outs with the political leadership.
Col. Abeidi has been a key contact for the Mission as he has
overall responsibility for security of diplomatic missions.
RSO, who meets frequently with Abeidi, noted that he became
much more guarded in discussions in recent weeks saying he
would have to refer to his superiors responses to security
questions. Abeidi, who has a good reputation, is very upset
with his demotion.
3. (C) Our senior democracy and development FSN heard from a
government official with clandestine ties to Ould Daddah's
RFD party (strongly negative about President Abdallahi but
equally keen to see the military out) that General Aziz tried
to remove Sixth Military District (covering the Nouakchott
capital region and Trarza province) Commander Col. Mohamed
Cheikh Bourour on or about December 27. We have no
independent confirmation of this report but our FSN is
usually very accurate in his reports. Bourour was reportedly
offered a "promotion" onto the High State Council but would
have lost his command. He declined the offer and,
reportedly, when Aziz insisted threatened back that if he was
removed he ould "burn everything from Toujounine (the
Distrct where the military commend is headquartere)(t your
palace." As the capt a aarrssnn hh ixth Military
District is coni(e e the best equipped second only to Aziz'
own Presidential Security Battalion (BASEP). Aziz reportedly
backed off and is said to have sent a peace emissary to
Bourour yesterday. (Comment: DATT will look for
confirmation of this report but was aware that Col. Bourour
is among the senior military leaders who have been less than
supportive of General Aziz and his coup).
4. (C) Comment: President Abdallahi's political strategy is
to see political, economic, diplomatic and security pressures
build on Aziz until a tipping point is reached leading to a
counter-coup. Abdallahi believes Aziz will prove his own
worse enemy by his own style of management that blatantly
seeks to consolidate power. These three changes (two
confirmed and one rumored) seem to confirm Aziz is rapidly
building military and security enemies. End Comment.
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC MR
SUBJECT: AZIZ CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT IN SECURITY SERVICES --
FRICTION REPORTED ON THE RISE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) In the past ten days we have seen signs of continued
efforts by General Aziz to reposition his supporters in lower
levels of the administration. Four governors were reassigned
a week ago. Over the weekend senior police officials were
reassigned and it is understood changes in the military
commands were attempted. Senior LES report these changes are
generating friction within the military and security forces.
2. (C) Our senior RSO FSN reported that the Chief of the
Nouakchott Central Police, Col. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Moutaly,
was demoted to become the head of the police contingent for
the Nouakchott airport. The transfer came with a number of
other transfers that Moutaly said were all political -- based
on the officers' perceived personal loyalty to General Aziz.
Moutaly accepted the transfer but is livid -- no replacement
has yet been named. Also demoted was the Director of the
Judicial/Public Security Police Col. Mohamed Abdellahi Taleb
Abeidi who has been shifted to be an "advisor" for the
Minister of Interior (a typical Mauritanian method of
"parking" someone on the outs with the political leadership.
Col. Abeidi has been a key contact for the Mission as he has
overall responsibility for security of diplomatic missions.
RSO, who meets frequently with Abeidi, noted that he became
much more guarded in discussions in recent weeks saying he
would have to refer to his superiors responses to security
questions. Abeidi, who has a good reputation, is very upset
with his demotion.
3. (C) Our senior democracy and development FSN heard from a
government official with clandestine ties to Ould Daddah's
RFD party (strongly negative about President Abdallahi but
equally keen to see the military out) that General Aziz tried
to remove Sixth Military District (covering the Nouakchott
capital region and Trarza province) Commander Col. Mohamed
Cheikh Bourour on or about December 27. We have no
independent confirmation of this report but our FSN is
usually very accurate in his reports. Bourour was reportedly
offered a "promotion" onto the High State Council but would
have lost his command. He declined the offer and,
reportedly, when Aziz insisted threatened back that if he was
removed he ould "burn everything from Toujounine (the
Distrct where the military commend is headquartere)(t your
palace." As the capt a aarrssnn hh ixth Military
District is coni(e e the best equipped second only to Aziz'
own Presidential Security Battalion (BASEP). Aziz reportedly
backed off and is said to have sent a peace emissary to
Bourour yesterday. (Comment: DATT will look for
confirmation of this report but was aware that Col. Bourour
is among the senior military leaders who have been less than
supportive of General Aziz and his coup).
4. (C) Comment: President Abdallahi's political strategy is
to see political, economic, diplomatic and security pressures
build on Aziz until a tipping point is reached leading to a
counter-coup. Abdallahi believes Aziz will prove his own
worse enemy by his own style of management that blatantly
seeks to consolidate power. These three changes (two
confirmed and one rumored) seem to confirm Aziz is rapidly
building military and security enemies. End Comment.
HANKINS