REGIME'S "NATIONAL DIALOGUE" BEGINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000775

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: REGIME'S "NATIONAL DIALOGUE" BEGINS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The long-awaited National Dialogue on
Democracy (Etats Generaux de la Democratie) started December
27 to a full house. President Abdallahi's FNDD party has
boycotted the meeting as have several key elements of civil
society. Official opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD
party decided to participate but with conditions concerning
the outcome that may see Ould Daddah disassociate himself
from the final outcome. The leadership of the National
Dialogue is notable for its lack of notability. While the
membership is considered "80% weighted in favor of the High
State Council" the Dialogue has reported some frank and
diverse discussion in its halls concerning the future
political direction of Mauritania albeit with nobody calling
for Abdallahi's return. More skeptical participants doubt
the dialogue will actually have much impact -- assuming the
"results" have already been drafted. The Gaza crisis has
made Mauritania's ties to Israel a central element of
discussion. End Summary


2. (U) The National Dialogue on Democracy opened December 27
to a packed house of over a thousand delegates. General Aziz
started the session with short remarks calling upon delegates
to "examine the current political situation and to define the
necessary mechanisms to organize democratic and transparent
elections." He urged them "to look for the points of
weakness in our young democratic system and the gaps that
create them in order to adapt our system to our political,
social and cultural situation with the goal of avoiding them
-- particularly to avoid the derailment at the head of the
executive such as we saw with the former regime." Finally,
Aziz renewed the engagement of the High State Council to
"respect the decisions and recommendations that will come
from the consensus of the majority of the participants."


3. (C) The participants in the Dialogue came from the
provinces (as chosen by each governor to "fairly represent"
the social leaders, parliamentarians, political parties, and
civil society. As expected, President Abdallahi's FNDD
coalition boycotted the proceedings as did several notable
elements of civil society including the bar association, the
major trade unions, and Mauritania's leading human rights
NGO. Former transition leader Col. Vall was critical of the
event and did not participate although a small delegation of
loyalists are participating. Opposition leader Ahmed Ould
Daddah's RFD party, and Ould Daddah personally, did
participate after last week's political wrangling within the
party. Ould Daddah is reportedly managing his delegates from
the guest house where President Abdallahi was previously
detained to gain one thing out of the process -- the
exclusion of any current or former military (i.e. Aziz and
Vall) as possible candidates. The expectation is that Ould
Daddah will fail in this goal and, ultimately, will
disassociate himself from the results.


4. (SBU) Some 25 diplomats attended with the German
Ambassador drawing the most press. The Spanish were
represented by their Charge d'Affaires while the French sent
a reporting officer. The Chinese Ambassador attended while
the Russian sent their DCM (unclear if the Russians were
sending a policy statement since the new Ambassador has not
presented credentials). Regional neighbors Morocco (dean of
the diplomatic corps),Senegal and Algeria attended but it
appears Mali was absent. The U.S. was the only significant
mission to send nobody.


5. (SBU) The leadership of the Dialogue is made up of
relative unknowns. The President of the Dialogue is 72 year
old Abdallahi Ould Cheikh who served as a member of the 2005
National Electoral Commission. The dialogue is broken into
five main working groups: Group I - Supervision and
Oversight of Elections under El Hamdrari Ould Abdessalam;
Group II - Scheduling of the Election under Aziz Ould Dahi
(Minister of Public Administration under the first Abdallahi
government said to be General Aziz' nephew); Group III -
Electoral Calendar under Youssouf Diagana; Group IV -
Political Institutions under Hamdy Ould Soueiyih; and, Group
V - Public Powers under Ahmed Ould Sidi Ahmed (a former

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Foreign Minister under Taya).


6. (SBU) The debates are not being broadcast with summaries
in the official media being closely controlled. Mission
contacts indicate they understand most issues are open for
debate with an unwritten rule that (1) the HCE must control
the transition and (2) that Aziz needs to be able to run.
There has already been some fairly broad debate on issues
ranging from the length of the transition (from 6 months to
the end of Abdallahi's original mandate in 2012),the
criteria for candidates (some saying they must have spent
most of the previous 5 years in Mauritania, some saying he
must read/write Arabic, some saying he needs to run with a
vice-president of another race). A fundamental discussion
revolves around whether the powers of the president need to
be limited by a stronger parliament.


7. (C) Skeptics participating in the Dialogue have indicated
to Mission personnel that they assume the "results" are
already prepared. Despite the open debate, they note there
is no effort to build a common text working from one day's
discussion to the next. Given the "majority rules" nature of
adopting the Dialogue's final report, they assume the
organizers will let the 20% they don't control say whatever
they want and then get a majority approval for a document
they have prepared from the 80% they do control.


8. (C) The Gaza crisis has added an unanticipated element to
the dialogue as delegates are quickly seeking planks
demanding the cessation of diplomatic relations with Israel.
While there have reportedly been some efforts by the regime
to turn the conversation towards urging a decision by a
future elected president, the timing of the renewed violence
puts Aziz in an awkward position particularly given his
stated commitment to abide by the decisions of the Dialogue
(Comment: The Foreign Ministry confirmed today that
Mauritania is still committed to the relationship. End
Comment). Baathist and Islamist elements of the President's
FNDD coalition have reportedly offered to support the
National Dialogue if Aziz cuts relations.


9. (C) Comment: The National Dialogue is so far playing out
pretty much as expected. The regime managed to pack the
house with the strongest critics staying away. The
ever-on-the-fence Ould Daddah finally joined but is already
assumed to be ready to renounce the results if he doesn't get
what he wants. The internal dialogue seems fairly open
except for the fact that it assumes the coup as a fait
accompli. International representation gives credibility to
the occasion that will undoubtedly be used in an effort to
fend off sanctions. The close on the 5th of January will
demonstrate whether this is all theater or just a bit of
theater -- whether there are any serious policy discussions
or not. Clearly, the report will not call for the reversal
of the coup and the return of the elected president. End
Comment.
HANKINS