Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NOUAKCHOTT745
2008-12-18 13:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
how-toVZCZCXRO9642 RR RUEHPA RUEHTRO DE RUEHNK #0745 3531324 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 181324Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7948 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0399 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0321 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0375 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1917 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0708 RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0441 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0816
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000745
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR MR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000745
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR MR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) Summary: The French Ambassador sees no movement
towards a resolution with General Aziz proceeding with a
transparently manipulated "democratic transition" and
President Abdallahi offering no political alternative. With
no prospects for an early resolution, the French are
re-engaging on a revised military cooperation program limited
to counterterrorism efforts. End Summary
2. (C) Charge met December 18 with French Ambassador
Vandepoorter prior to his departure for the holidays.
Vandepoorter saw little likelihood of any political change in
the offing. He derided the upcoming National Dialogue on
Democracy as being transparently stacked by General Aziz with
hand-picked tribal and religious leaders filling the seats
but precious little real political diversity being presented.
What might have offered at least the potential argument of a
true dialogue for an exit from the political impasse was
being so openly manipulated that he could imagine no way the
international community could bless the process.
Vandepoorter anticipated a process that will attempt to bless
the coup and lead to elections "with only one candidate" that
will, in the end, leave Aziz with no more legitimacy than he
has now. The ambassador saw Aziz as tactically playing this
badly since, in all probability, there would be no public
ground swell for President Abdallahi were the process truly
open. Vandepoorter said the Embassy had not yet received
instructions on whether to participate in the National
Dialogue or not.
3. (C) Vandepoorter saw President Abdallahi as also
tactically missing opportunities. He told Charge that in his
last discussion with President Abdallahi he had stressed the
three things needed for any possible return: (1)
International pressure which he had, (2) Internal pressure
which he told the President "much to your credit" had been
built and maintained despite tremendous obstacles, and (3) A
political plan which he told the President needed to be more
than his laudable and righteous position of principle.
Vandepoorter saw the President putting far too much faith in
the coercive power of sanctions noting, "We have been
imposing visa sanctions for a few months now, including
several instances of denying visas to Aziz' family, and we
presume you are doing the same -- that doesn't seem to overly
concern the military." Vandepoorter recognized that more
sanctions were on the way and saw that the FNDD was doing an
excellent job shoring up support among African Union PSC
members in advance of next Monday's meeting -- which he
assumed would result in some concrete AU actions. That said,
he did not see those efforts in themselves, or any possible
Security Council efforts, as being able to dislodge Aziz.
The ambassador was strongly critical of any FNDD thoughts
that negotiations were not needed since continued pressure
would ultimately result in a pro-Abdallahi counter coup. "If
anything, there are even harder line elements in the military
who want a normal coup plain and simple without all this
bother of having to set up civilian front men -- if there is
a counter coup, it will likely be against whatever level of
democratization Aziz is willing to accept."
4. (C) Vandepoorter told Charge Paris had completed a policy
review on Mauritania and, with no political solution in
sight, had started limited military cooperation "in the
interests of the 2000 French citizens who live and work in
Mauritania." French military re-engagement (DATT report
SEPTEL will provide details) follows a revamping of the
previous program and is designed to "only target those needs
directly related to counterterrorism" with the main effort
being focused on helping the High Command complete a
reorganization of units for a stronger counterterrorism role
and renewed training/advisory assistance for the Paratroop
Battalion in Atar as well as the rudimentary new "GLATR II"
unit being pulled together there. Vandepoorter noted France
would also continue to include Mauritania in region-wide
counterterrorism meetings and exchanges. France will not,
however, work on broader mil-to-mil programs for the time
being.
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR MR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) Summary: The French Ambassador sees no movement
towards a resolution with General Aziz proceeding with a
transparently manipulated "democratic transition" and
President Abdallahi offering no political alternative. With
no prospects for an early resolution, the French are
re-engaging on a revised military cooperation program limited
to counterterrorism efforts. End Summary
2. (C) Charge met December 18 with French Ambassador
Vandepoorter prior to his departure for the holidays.
Vandepoorter saw little likelihood of any political change in
the offing. He derided the upcoming National Dialogue on
Democracy as being transparently stacked by General Aziz with
hand-picked tribal and religious leaders filling the seats
but precious little real political diversity being presented.
What might have offered at least the potential argument of a
true dialogue for an exit from the political impasse was
being so openly manipulated that he could imagine no way the
international community could bless the process.
Vandepoorter anticipated a process that will attempt to bless
the coup and lead to elections "with only one candidate" that
will, in the end, leave Aziz with no more legitimacy than he
has now. The ambassador saw Aziz as tactically playing this
badly since, in all probability, there would be no public
ground swell for President Abdallahi were the process truly
open. Vandepoorter said the Embassy had not yet received
instructions on whether to participate in the National
Dialogue or not.
3. (C) Vandepoorter saw President Abdallahi as also
tactically missing opportunities. He told Charge that in his
last discussion with President Abdallahi he had stressed the
three things needed for any possible return: (1)
International pressure which he had, (2) Internal pressure
which he told the President "much to your credit" had been
built and maintained despite tremendous obstacles, and (3) A
political plan which he told the President needed to be more
than his laudable and righteous position of principle.
Vandepoorter saw the President putting far too much faith in
the coercive power of sanctions noting, "We have been
imposing visa sanctions for a few months now, including
several instances of denying visas to Aziz' family, and we
presume you are doing the same -- that doesn't seem to overly
concern the military." Vandepoorter recognized that more
sanctions were on the way and saw that the FNDD was doing an
excellent job shoring up support among African Union PSC
members in advance of next Monday's meeting -- which he
assumed would result in some concrete AU actions. That said,
he did not see those efforts in themselves, or any possible
Security Council efforts, as being able to dislodge Aziz.
The ambassador was strongly critical of any FNDD thoughts
that negotiations were not needed since continued pressure
would ultimately result in a pro-Abdallahi counter coup. "If
anything, there are even harder line elements in the military
who want a normal coup plain and simple without all this
bother of having to set up civilian front men -- if there is
a counter coup, it will likely be against whatever level of
democratization Aziz is willing to accept."
4. (C) Vandepoorter told Charge Paris had completed a policy
review on Mauritania and, with no political solution in
sight, had started limited military cooperation "in the
interests of the 2000 French citizens who live and work in
Mauritania." French military re-engagement (DATT report
SEPTEL will provide details) follows a revamping of the
previous program and is designed to "only target those needs
directly related to counterterrorism" with the main effort
being focused on helping the High Command complete a
reorganization of units for a stronger counterterrorism role
and renewed training/advisory assistance for the Paratroop
Battalion in Atar as well as the rudimentary new "GLATR II"
unit being pulled together there. Vandepoorter noted France
would also continue to include Mauritania in region-wide
counterterrorism meetings and exchanges. France will not,
however, work on broader mil-to-mil programs for the time
being.
HANKINS