AHMED OULD DADDAH SEES POLITICAL LETHARGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000741

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON MR
SUBJECT: AHMED OULD DADDAH SEES POLITICAL LETHARGY

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 590

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Leader of the Opposition Ahmed Ould Daddah
continues to try to stake out a middle option between the
military and President Abdallahi. Ould Daddah sees little
chance of political movement in the near future but sees the
economic cards stacked against General Aziz. While
disagreeing with the U.S. on the need for Abdallahi's return,
Ould Daddah praises U.S. insistence that the military quit
politics. He sees to upcoming National Dialogue on Democracy
as theater and will only participate if the military accepts
conditions he knows they won't. Ould Daddah supports
targeted sanctions. End Summary


2. (C) Charge met December 16 with RFD Party President and
official Leader of the Opposition Ahmed Ould Daddah at RFD
party headquarters. This was the first substantive meeting
since mid-October (REFTEL). Ould Daddah said he saw
political lethargy in the current situation with lots of
"activity" but little action. Seeing no interest in real
dialogue between the military and the FNDD, he said he was
somewhat at a loss to see a resolution in the short term.


3. (C) Ould Daddah said he had dined the night before with
General Aziz to see if there was any movement on the
General's side -- the dinner did not seem to go well. Ould
Daddah had found no indication the General was prepared to
cede power and get the military out of politics -- points he
saw as preconditions for his support for the transition route
being presented by Aziz. At the same time, Ould Daddah said
he had failed in efforts to develop any real dialogue between
the military and the FNDD -- the regime was willing but the
FNDD not (Charge noted this would be consistent with
President Abdallahi's position that any negotiation with the
military legitimizes the coup). Ould Daddah said that, under
the circumstances, his strategy continued to be to stake out
a position in the middle -- neither willing to work with the
military nor going all out against them. Ould Daddah said
his party would serve as the "alliance" (rassemblement)
between the two sides "as is in the title of our party."


4. (C) Ould Daddah, an economist by training, said he had
warned Aziz that the economy is working against him after the
initial political windfall Aziz got after the coup from
falling world food and energy prices. Ould Daddah warned
that 2009 will be extremely difficult for Mauritania
economically since all the main sources of revenue were
shrinking -- iron ore and copper prices are dropping and oil
revenues will be sharply reduced. Ould Daddah cautioned that
even Mauritania's current modest oil production (around
13,000 barrels per day) could be suspended as uneconomical
(Comment: An expatriate close to the petroleum industry made
the same observation to Charge. The off-shore production was
originally estimated as profitable on the assumption of
production of 75,000 barrels per say at $45 per barrel. Last
year remained marginally profitable at the lower production
rate because of the markedly higher world price for oil. It
was estimated oil operator PETRONAS would suspend operations
if faced with both low production and low sales price. End
Comment). Ould Daddah told Aziz that left only fishing
revenue which his regime had effectively botched by setting
an unrealistically high price on the full warehouses of fish
that nobody is willing to buy. Ould Daddah told Aziz any
money he has to work with will soon be gone and, with it, his
ability to engage in the populist politics he has used over
the past months. Ould Daddah noted to Charge that, with the
possible exception of the fish debacle, Abdallahi would have
faced the same world economic picture but that now Aziz owns
the problem.


5. (C) Ould Daddah said his party would determine its
position on the upcoming National Dialogue on Democracy in
coming days. He saw the Dialogue as presented so far as a
charade -- noting Laghdaf was talking about the results of
the Dialogue (early elections) before the meeting already
started. He saw the Dialogue being set up as "a collection
of insignificant parties and NGOs that have no grounds to

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talk about politics" that will deliver a pre-arranged
conclusion heading to new elections. As for those elections,
he said that "any election organized while either of the two
generals in control can have no credibility." That said,
Ould Daddah said the party would likely not "reject the
Dialogue completely" but condition participation on the High
State Council giving a firm and early date for being
dissolved and committing that no member of the Council will
run for president. He had little expectation Aziz would
accept either condition.


6. (C) Ould Daddah praised the U.S. for maintaining an
unwavering demand for the departure of the military from
politics. He worried that the French, while they had started
with some same attitude, seemed increasingly willing to
accept a military government or some sham government
controlled by the military. Ould Daddah disagreed with the
U.S. position that the return to constitutional order
naturally required the return of President Abdallahi (saying
an interim government under the President of the Senate met
the constitutional requirement),but still saw the U.S.
position to date as having been extremely important. Ould
Daddah added that he was confident the African Union would
proceed with sanctions and hopeful the Europeans would do the
same -- but in the case of the Europeans not until the end of
the 120 day Article 96 dialogue process in late January.
Ould Daddah supports targeted sanctions for the political and
psychological effect -- particularly sanctions against
financial supporters.


7. (C) Ould Daddah saw the Europeans as being misguided by
the thought that a military regime offered greater stability
and security. Noting that the problems of terrorism, drug
trafficking and alien smuggling had emerged under previous
military rule, Ould Daddah said the military could not ensure
security because (a) it could never build political consensus
and common cause around itself, and (b) because its attention
on political power necessarily diverts attentions and
resources from its legitimate military missions. Ould Daddah
saw those military missions were more important now than at
any time in Mauritania's history but could not be met by Aziz
as head of state. Charge added that the U.S. also saw
military governments as aggravating internal radicalization
which we see as the greater long-term security threat. Ould
Daddah said he agreed absolutely.


8. (C) Ould Daddah continued to see Abdallahi as being in
many ways as much a cause of the coup as Aziz by having, in
the first place, accepted military political and financial
support and then managed his office abysmally. He told
Charge "I have absolutely no respect for Sidi" and noted his
offense in reported statements from Abdallahi that he would,
"talk to anyone except Ould Daddah. He added that he would
meet with Abdallahi if invited but didn't expect the
invitation. From his dinner with Aziz the night before, Ould
Daddah believed Abdallahi would indeed be released
"unconditionally" by December 24. He suggested Abdallahi
would be able to do political activities but opined "nobody
will really come out for him anymore."
HANKINS