MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI -- A VERY LONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000723

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI -- A VERY LONG
TERM STRATEGY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: President Abdallahi has restated his
absolute rejection of negotiations with the Mauritanian
military but expressed a realistic view of American capacity
to bring others around to the U.S. policy approach -- a
"standard" for others to compare themselves to. Abdallahi
also recognizes that sanctions have limited practical effect
but still sees their political and psychological utility.
Ultimately, he sees General Aziz as his own worse enemy --
bound for failure by the pattern of governance he has already
established. Abdallahi and his FNDD will help push the
process, but are waiting for Aziz to fail. End Summary


2. (C) Meeting with the President: Charge met December 9
for four hours with President Abdallahi in his home village
of Lemden where he remains under house arrest. Abdallahi's
Chief of Staff Mohammed Kaber Ould Hammoudi and the
President's son, Mohamed, and daughter, Amal, sat in at
various parts of the meeting. Security around the
President's village was significantly less present than
during the Charge's previous visit with no security officials
registering the visit as before. (Comment: The assumption is
the regime has established more discreet monitoring.) The
President was fit but appeared more fatigued than before. In
is starting to express a certain nostalgia about his time in
office and has a habit now of speaking about himself in the
third-person (i.e. "When the Head of State met with so and
so....") that was not noted in previous meetings. When asked
how he was doing, his daughter confirmed he was good mentally
and physically but, concerning his morale, said "some days we
get up full of hope, but other times it seems so depressing."
From conversation, it was clear Abdallahi continues to see a
steady stream of supporters but it appears there has been no
effort to reach out to rivals who might have some limited
shared interests like opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah and
former coup leader/head of state Col. Vall. The tendency to
cocoon himself from divergent Mauritanian voices was seen in
Abdallahi's increasing acceptance of some of the FNDD
conspiracy theories -- for instance the idea that the
December 24, 2007, AQIM murder of French tourists near Aleg
was orchestrated by General Aziz.


3. (C) A Restatement of policy: Abdallahi reviewed his
meeting of December 7 with the multiagency delegation headed
by the African Union's representative to the European Union.
As with the previous French delegation, Abdallahi said the
AU-led delegation offered no proposals but asked to hear his
viewpoint. Abdallahi first approached the idea being pushed
by Aziz that Abdallahi had accomplished nothing during his
time in office. The President noted the significant increase
in press freedoms, political freedoms and national unity
issues (slavery and return of refugees) accomplished during
his time in office. On the economic front he highlighted the
significant increase in fiscal transparency that had reforged
relations with the World Bank and IMF. His Government's
well-considered development plan had garnered strong donor
support at the December 2007 donors conference. Abdallahi
told the delegation, "If there were any failures, they were
failures of execution. Not of ideas or good will."
Abdallahi saw the coup d'etat as a terrible step backward for
Mauritania with Aziz no only taking over the Presidency but
manipulating all branches of government to consolidate power.
The President told the Charge his bottom line position
remains unchanged, " I can't imagine any participation in any
negotiation with General Aziz since that only legitimizes
him. The only discussion I'll have with him is about the
details of his departure. Once constitutional order is
re-established, with my return, I'll engage in any political
discussion needed." Abdallahi dismissed Aziz' talk of
National Dialogue saying all Aziz wanted was a controlled
theater that would make some "cosmetic changes" to the status
quo and then arrange for Aziz to take "legitimate" power.


4. (C) Role of the international community: Charge reviewed
with President Abdallahi the position forwarded by the AU-led
delegation which, in the U.S. view, was too weak in entering
with an idea of anticipated elections (suggesting Abdallahi's

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resignation has a precondition) and its apparent acceptance
of Aziz' "National Dialogue" as a template for getting "the
people's will." Charge told Abdallahi that the AU Chief,
just as the French Ambassador previously when he represented
the EU delegation, may have had a tougher
organizational/national view than that presented but that
they were constrained by the need to present a "common view."
Abdallahi, noting that neither the UN nor EC representative
spoke during the meeting, said he fully understood that some
of the groups had tougher views than those presented. He
noted he was satisfied with the position of the AU's Lamamra.
He had found strong support from the Secretary General of
the Francophonie Abdou Diouf who had called from Cairo --
saying he had just complained to the Arab League's Amr Mussa
for allowing Aziz to be invited to a Arab economic meeting in
Kuwait in February (a meeting Mussa said was strictly a
Kuwaiti affair). Abdallahi said he had also been called by
OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu with a strong
message of support. Abdallahi saw the international
community weakening somewhat on the details but still strong
in condemnation of the coup. He told Charge he did not see a
role for the international community to serve as a mediator
to find a solution to the crisis but to look at their rules
to determine whether the coup required censorship or not --
through sanctions, expulsion or other tools available. He
thought that even European countries that were backpedaling
could not get past the fact that the coup is unacceptable
under their own guidelines.


5. (C) The U.S. Position: Abdallahi started his meeting
with Charge saying, "What is truly amazing is the change of
Mauritanian attitudes (suggesting of his own as well)
concerning the United States. Prior to the coup we saw the
U.S. as a super power mainly interested in its own narrow
needs and not necessarily as a defender of democracy."
Abdallahi acknowledged that the U.S. influence over the
various organizations looking at Mauritania or over bilateral
partners like France and Spain was, while important, still
limited. That said, he praised the U.S. for maintaining "the
most clear, consistent and principled" position through the
coup. Even if the U.S. could not bring others to the same
policy stand, Abdallahi said the U.S. "sets the standard
against which the others will compare themselves" suggesting
that in that comparison, the rest of the international
community will find itself lacking.


6. (C) The French: Abdallahi told Charge he was most
concerned about the staying power of the French. He
appreciated the personal interest of President Sarkozy and
marveled that the French leader still seemed to reserve some
attention for Mauritania despite his many national and
EU-Presidency commitments. He said, though, he found the
late November presentation by French envoy Romain Serman as
disingenuous. He noted he could not get a straight answer on
whether the French supported his return or not and, if not,
what their current policy was. He noted the French
Ambassador, in meetings with FNDD leaders, would often stray
far from the Elysee position only to then say, "Of course,
this is only my personal position." Abdallahi noted a recent
interview with Foreign Minister Kouchner where, despite three
very direct questions, he danced away from answering whether,
for the French, "return to constitutional order" included the
return of the President. Abdallahi pressed the Charge on why
the Europeans had "so quickly abandoned their principles."
Charge noted that some, like the Spanish, are straightforward
in highlighting their perception that the military, despite
the lamentable coup, offer the best assurance of stability
and control of drugs, boat people and terrorism. Charge
noted some had also picked up on a theme sadly heard too
often among Mauritanians themselves that the country was
perhaps too immature to be ready for democracy. Finally,
Charge noted that Mauritania remains a second-level issue in
Africa compared to Darfur, Zimbabwe, and Congo. Abdallahi
completed the analysis that on the global stage, then,
Mauritania was an issue of only the third or fourth order.


7. (C) The African Union: Despite the relatively weak
presentation by the AU-led delegation, Abdallahi said he
still had confidence the African Union was prepared to take

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serious steps. He was also aware Algeria will have the
rotating presidency of the AU's PSC in January which will
enhance the chance of strong measures which he understood to
be exclusion of Mauritania from all AU meetings and
diplomatic isolation. He wants to see the Africans recommend
United Nations Security Council Chapter 7 sanctions.


8. (C) The Power of Sanctions: The President told Charge he
was aware the effective impact of sanctions would be limited
on the Generals who generally don't travel much, have limited
assets outside of Mauritania, and are in it more for real
power than the trappings of power. He saw European sanctions
as having the most direct effect but accepted the Charge's
point that, once announced, the regime could probably figure
out how to get around financial sanctions -- they will,
however, miss their trips to Paris and the Canary Islands.
Abdallahi also recognized that the idea of Chapter 7 Security
Council sanctions was a long shot and, at best, a process
needing at least a year of UNSC deliberations. That said,
the President highlighted the usefulness of sanctions for
their political and psychological effectiveness saying, "No
head-of-state wants to be excluded, and the idea of sanctions
keeps them nervous." In sum, Abdallahi did not see sanctions
as the means to topple the regime but a steady form of
pressure and condemnation.


9. (C) Africa's Aung San Suu Kyi? Abdallahi said the AU-led
delegation had ended their meeting with two observations from
their meeting: (a) That the positions between the two sides
(Abdallahi and Aziz) are very far apart and frozen leaving no
room for negotiations between the two. and (b) that Abdallahi
supports targeted sanctions but recognizes their limited
utility. Abdallahi said he agreed with both points. Charge
asked whether he was prepared to be an African equivalent of
Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi who had been under house arrest for
some 19 years -- resting in opposition to a coup that had
always and consistently been condemned by the international
community all the while rejecting many "deals" that had been
offered. Abdallahi said he didn't know all the details of
Burmese politics but, in principle, "yes" he was prepared to
play that role -- not for himself, but for Mauritanian
democracy. That said, he didn't believe he had to wait that
long.


10. (C) Aziz is Aziz' Own Worst Enemy: Abdallahi told
Charge he did not believe it would be either international
sanctions or the internal resistance of the FNDD that will
ultimately dislodge Aziz -- his fall will be of his own
making. Abdallahi saw the seeds of Aziz failure already. He
knew the coup was driven primarily by Aziz himself with "most
of the twelve members of the High State Council only hearing
about the idea after they had already been named." Despite
Aziz' efforts to implicate everyone else in supporting the
coup, Abdallahi still believes most of the military
leadership does not support him. Of those close to Aziz,
Abdallahi had different views. He noted Ghazwany was "well
educated and sophisticated" compared to Aziz and had, prior
to the coup, apologized to Abdallahi for Aziz' actions. He
noted , "Some believe he is well intentioned and believes he
can moderate Aziz by sticking close -- others think he is
weak and afraid. I would like to think the former but
probably it's the latter." As for Hady, Abdallahi said, "he
is someone who will kill for power." Abdallahi saw that Aziz
will become more and more radical and isolated as he tries to
hang on, eventually inviting someone to push him out. He saw
Aziz as openly bolstering his small Ould Bousba tribe over
others and in open warfare with significant tribes such as
the Smassid that will engender the resistance of those not
tied to his tribe. He also saw that Aziz would block
previous progress on slavery issues and the return of
refugees generating enmity of Afro-Mauritanians and Black
Moors. He did not believe Aziz has the charisma or vision to
garner public support once the money runs out -- which will
be soon. Abdallahi recognizes it is hard to guess how the
end will come -- whether those around Aziz will force him out
or whether there will be a coup. His hope is that those who
are disaffected will gradually rally back to the FNDD as the
path that gets Mauritania back on the track to legitimacy.
Abdallahi conceded the Charge's point that it could also lead

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to another bloodier coup or in Aziz dropping all pretext and
ruling as a tyrant.


11. (C) Torture: Abdallahi raised the recent Amnesty
International report on torture in Mauritania. He said that
soon after coming to office he had ordered that torture not
be used in interrogation. Ghazwany told him, "I will not
hide the fact that torture was used in the past but we will
respect your wishes." Abdallahi believed they were true to
their word particularly after the debacle of the high court
decision to release suspected terrorists in June 2007.
Abdallahi said, "the military knows I was very unhappy with
that decision but the only option we had was to appeal. At
that point I found repeated military resistance to cooperate
with the Justice Ministry" and found they could not mount an
effective appeal. Abdallahi thought Hady was capable of
ordering torture despite his orders.


12. (C) Comment: Charge's concern coming into the meeting
was that those close to Abdallahi were placing too much
emphasis on the U.S. position as the vehicle to bring
President Abdallahi back to power -- perhaps serving as a
disservice in closing off the possibility of dialogue. The
meeting demonstrated that Abdallahi has a clear appreciation
of just how much the U.S. position can deliver and is making
a calculated strategy option for the long haul. His position
will not allow for mediation and suggests an extended crisis
(as opposed to what Abdallahi would see as some type of
"Band-Aid" solution that would just doom Mauritania to a
continued cycle of coups). In waiting for Aziz' house of
cards to collapse there are obvious risks -- the risk that
Aziz will still manage to consolidate power and, perhaps the
more dangerous option, that the collapse will be sudden and
go in an unexpected and bloody direction. Abdallahi, for
one, thinks a steady hand of pressure internal and external
and Aziz' own weaknesses will bring Mauritania back to
democracy. If Aziz were to depart, one senses Abdallahi
would not particularly care whether he or someone else
resumes democratic leadership. End Comment.

HANKINS