AU-LED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DELEGATION SETS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000721

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: AU-LED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DELEGATION SETS
THE BAR LOW

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The mid-level AU and other organizations
delegation visiting Mauritania has set the bar low for the
regime -- asking for full liberation of President Abdallahi,
Abdallahi's participation in the discussions for an exit to
the crisis, and early Presidential elections to re-establish
constitutional order. The delegation is doubtful it will
find any breakthrough prior to the next international meeting
on Mauritania in Brussels on December 12. The AU head of
delegation is aware his delegation's position comes short of
the U.S. position but feels that is the best "consensus view"
the delegation can present. End Summary


2. (C) Charge participated December 6 in a briefing offered
by the African Union's representative to the European Union,
Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif, who is heading the AU, EU,
UN, OIC, Arab League, and Francophonie delegation to
Mauritania. The briefing was offered for the four resident
Security Council P5 members (U.S., France, China and Russia)
as well as South Africa as the sole African Security Council
non-permanent member represented in Mauritania. Annadif said
the delegation had met earlier in the day with General Aziz
and would meet December 7 with President Abdallahi in Lemden.
He had told General Aziz the international position was
united in condemnation of the coup and said the delegation
had three primary demands: (1) the immediate and
unconditional release of President Abdallahi, (2) President
Abdallahi's full participation in the political dialogue for
a resolution to the crisis, and (3) early presidential
elections leading to the re-establishment of constitutional
order. Aziz had offered his standard and imprecise
assurances that the National Dialogue for Democracy would
meet "soon" with every likelihood that it would recommend
early presidential elections. Aziz told the delegation
President Abdallahi would be liberated "before the end of the
year."


3. (C) Annadif told the Security Council representatives he
saw nothing new in Aziz' position and found no assurance in
the vague "liberation before the end of December."
Responding to a question from the Arab League representative
in the delegation, UNDP ResRep Ribeiro confirmed there was
neither anything new nor definite in what Aziz had said. The
Arab League participant, noting it was unlikely the
delegation would get anything on their second and third
points, argued weakly that the offer of a full liberation
should be seen as a positive sign. Ribeiro noted that the
local press had low expectations for the delegation's visit
and had already gone on line with a quote from an un-named
member of the delegation that the trip "will be a failure."
Annadif noted that the next step in the international process
would be a report by the delegation for a multi-organization
meeting to be held in Brussels on December 12.


4. (C) Charge took the floor to underline that the
presentation offered by Annadif is significantly weaker than
the position supported by the United States. Charge noted
that a position that already assumes anticipated presidential
elections also assumes that President Abdallahi must resign
as part of the negotiations -- a position that gives the
military exactly what it wants and thereby legitimizes the
coup. Charge added that, even if one were to accept the idea
of early elections, we remain extremely wary of any
discussion that accepts General Aziz' "National Dialogue" as
an acceptable template. Charge noted this strategy was a
repeat of that used in 2005 -- a process the General openly
boasts he successfully manipulated -- and cannot be seen as a
credible mechanism. Charge accepted that President
Abdallahi's "principled" position to date provided mediators
little to work with but advocated that the delegation try to
work on practical approaches with Abdallahi that did not
start the dialogue with his resignation. The South African
Ambassador also intervened voicing his government's concern
about simply repeating the process of 2005 -- adding, "we
need a solution that won't have us simply coming back to this

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point again." He also added that he saw the process of the
National Dialogue being organized by Aziz as unacceptable to
the FNDD and other major groups and, therefore,
unrepresentative of Mauritanian views. He also questioned
how Annadif's approach could work if President Abdallahi, who
everyone recognizes as the legitimate President, simply
refuses to resign (Annadif acknowledged but did not respond
to the South African's points). The Chinese told Annadif
that the U.S. and South Africa had already addressed his
concerns.


5. (C) Annadif acknowledged that the Addis Ababa declaration
of November 21 had scaled back the international community's
demands on the regime but had significant value because it
retains the key principles of denouncing the coup and
recognizing President Abdallahi's legitimacy. Finding "a
common denominator" had necessarily toned down the
declaration but allowed for a unified position. Annadif
noted that while the U.S. was not a direct party to the Addis
Ababa meeting, the U.S. Mission to the African Union had been
kept apprised of the discussions and had, in fact, offered
some language changes used in the final declaration. Annadif
noted that, while seeking to portray a common position, each
organization and individual country was free to take a
stronger individual position. He noted, for instance, that
the AU and Francophonie had already suspended Mauritanian
membership in their organizations.


6. (C) Comment: The decision to reduce the level of the head
of delegation to the African Union's EU representative
reflects the low expectations for the visit. The low "common
denominator" position posited by the delegation isolates the
U.S. as one of the very few to continue to call for President
Abdallahi's return. The FNDD and Abdallahi are looking to
us, unrealistically so, to toughen up the positions of our
international colleagues. Nothing definitive is expected out
of the December 12 meeting in Brussels, leaving any real
action from the EU and, possibly, from the AU, until the end
of the 120-day Article 96 consultation process in late
January. By that time Prague and Algiers will have the
respective presidencies of the EU and AU Peace and Security
Council. End Comment.
HANKINS