MEETING WITH COL. VALL - "BETTER OFF WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000717

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH COL. VALL - "BETTER OFF WITH
SANCTIONS THAN WHERE AZIZ WILL TAKE US"

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 480

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary -- While still looking for a quick transition
to new elections, Vall is taking a tougher line on Aziz
seeing the current efforts to attack political enemies
leading inevitably to a counter-coup with all its inherent
risks for civil war. Vall believes serious targeted
sanctions might be successful in isolating the 3-4 real
instigators of the coup from the rest of the military. The
mutually exclusive positions taken by Aziz and Abdallahi
offer little chance of an acceptable resolution to the crisis
unless and until one side gives. Vall does not exclude
running again for President but say he won't participate "in
just any elections." End Summary


2. (C) The meeting: With foreign delegations increasingly
making a call on former head-of-state Ely Mohamed Vall,
Charge met with Vall at his residence December 3. This was
the first Mission meeting with Vall since the Ambassador's
meeting in early September (REFTEL). With an eye on Vall's
widely-reported corruption, Charge could not help but notice
that Vall's large new residence is the finest he had yet seen
in Nouakchott.


3. (C) "A Special Coup d'Etat": While using the phrase
"coup d'etat" and referring to President Abdallahi as the
"legitimate President," Vall spoke of the lead up to the coup
as a special circumstance. Vall started by noting that
during the transition he had seen both Abdallahi and Ould
Daddah as having the necessary intelligence and commitment to
democracy to carry through the democratic transition. While
preferring Ould Daddah, he had found Abdallahi acceptable but
was later disappointed by "the leadership issue." Abdallahi,
according to Vall, failed to act "presidential" in a society
that demands such from their senior leader. Abdallahi
"delegated away his office -- giving to much freedom to Aziz
and placing to muck operational authority in his Prime
Ministers." The excess delegation resulted in Abdallahi
being held responsible for every problem but actually
managing none of them. Abdallahi "is not a politician" and
failed to take care of his parliamentary constituency. All
this leading Vall to say Abdallahi "effectively refused to do
his job." In discussing the relationship between Aziz and
Abdallahi, Vall disputed the idea that Abdallahi had an
arrangement where, in support for Aziz and Ghazwany's support
in the election, he could have political freedom and leave
Aziz freedom on security matters. "That might have be in his
head, but Aziz never saw it that way." Rather, "Aziz thought
he had someone who would do as he was told and who initially
did so -- in naming the new military leadership along Aziz'
directions. When Abdallahi tried to show some independence,
Aziz let loose his parliamentarians on him."


4. (C) A risk of civil war: Vall said that the attempted
coup of 2003, "the first time that we saw the risk of
Mauritanian forces firing on each other," had convinced him
of the need to get the military out of politics and
ultimately loyal to civilian authority. If not, he saw the
competition for political power within the military would
ultimately lead to internal warfare in the military. Vall
said that the August 6 coup had raised the risk of civil war
again but not in the way Aziz terms it. Vall said, "the coup
was all about those two (Aziz and Ghazwany) with the later
addition of the Surete (Hady) and, to a lesser extent, the
National Guard (Negri)." The coup itself was not a "coup" in
the normal sense but a "rebellion" by these few officers who
effectively said, "if you try to touch me, there will be
trouble." Vall understood that most of the rest of the
military leadership did not support Aziz' power play but, for
fear of open military vs. military conflict, came short of
resisting him. Vall warned that, "if things stay the way
they are, civil war will eventually come." Vall so no
willingness from Aziz to pull back and fully expected
international sanctions to continue. Vall said "we are
absolutely dependent on donor financing to sustain ourselves"
and saw the inevitable impact of Aziz staying in place being

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economic ruin. "He will turn off all the development
financing, scare off investors, strip whatever he can out of
state industries, and then lead us into collapse." Vall saw
the recent spate of arrests and investigations (including
Aziz' thinly veiled threat to try Vall for corruption) as
evidence to all that Aziz is trying to consolidate his own
personal base and bring down any potential opponents. At
some point in this downward spiral, Vall saw that the other
military leaders will see no option but to turn on Aziz and
company.


5. (C) Hard to find a middle ground: Vall said he saw
little room for maneuver in the positions of the two sides --
"the legitimate president who has no power, and the
illegitimate putchist who has all the power." With Abdallahi
saying he won't negotiate until the military leave and the
military saying they will accept anything short of Abdallahi
coming back, Vall saw in impasse. Vall said he advocated
"simultaneity" whereby President Abdallahi would return to
office to re-establish democratic order, but then yield
office to a government of national unity with the sole
mandate of organizing new elections "within two months."
Charge noted that most observers saw that the only persons
ready for such quick elections are "you, Ould Daddah, and
Aziz," Vall deflected somewhat saying, "I'm not interested in
running in just any elections." Leaving open that he would
be interested in the job, he said he was only interested if
the electoral plan was fully accepted by the international
community. He was not interested in winning elections that
would not be deemed free and fair -- suggesting that the plan
being touted by Aziz would result in such flawed elections.
Vall allowed that there could be some step short of
resignation that could allow Abdallahi back but force him to
risk his mandate -- adding "Abdallahi wouldn't win 10%
today." When asked about international sanctions, Vall said,
"I tell my friends we are better off with sanctions than
where Aziz will take us." He said that "serious" sanctions
against the core 3-4 coup leaders could have an effect of
isolating them from the rest of the military. From his
comments, Vall seemed to believe the sanctions being
discussed now were not "serious" suggestion more along the
lines of international legal action instead of visa and
assets bans.
HANKINS