ABDALLAHI UNIMPRESSED WITH FRENCH SPECIAL ENVOY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000706

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: ABDALLAHI UNIMPRESSED WITH FRENCH SPECIAL ENVOY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: President Abdallahi's advisors claim the
special French delegation headed by Elysee Africa Director
Romain Serman offered no concrete proposals but suggested the
need for a concession by President Abdallahi. Abdallahi held
firm to his position of no negations while the military
remains in power -- at least until international sanctions
have reached their peak effectiveness. The Abdallahi camp
took exception to French overtures to Leader of the
Opposition Ahmed Ould Daddah. The regime blocked President
Abdallahi's efforts to present his own national day message
on November 28. The FNDD is worried about the prison
conditions for Prime Minister Waghef who is being threatened
by prison inmates. End Summary


2. (C) Charge met November 30 with Presidential Chief of
Staff Mohamed Kaber Ould Hammoudi and FNDD Co-Leader in
charge of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Ould Maouloud to discuss
the visit over the previous weekend of a bilateral French
delegation headed by Elysee Africa Director Romain Serman
Despite press reports that the delegation was presenting a
"French Plan" for a solution to the political crisis, Ould
Hammoudi said Romain never got into details of any proposal.
Instead, Romain said he was looking for the President's
appreciation of the situation. Ould Hammoudi noted, however,
that Serman's questions "suggested he wanted to see if the
President was willing to make a concession." Abdallahi told
the French that, while he was prepared to engage in a full
political debate once back in office, he was not prepared to
negotiate with the military -- "Whether 5% or 50%, any
concession to the military legitimized this and future
coups." Abdallahi said it was too early to discount the
effectiveness of sanctions since, aside from those from the
U.S., none had yet been imposed. He suggested that the
potential pressure of international sanctions had not yet
been reached.


3. (C) Ould Hammoudi said the President found weakness and
vacillation in the French position. Abdallahi told Serman he
accepted the French statement of August 7 (Comment - That (a)
condemned the coup, (b) called for Abdallahi's immediate
release, and (c) stated "We recall that President Abdallahi
was elected in March 2007 following free and transparent
elections. He is, therefore, the legitimate President of
Mauritania."). Abdallahi asked Serman whether the French
position had changed to which the Elysee representative said
"no."


4. (C) Charge cautioned Ould Hammoudi and Ould Maouloud not
to kill the messenger noting that the French remain
Abdallahi's strongest advocates within the European Union
against other Europeans who would seek a more "pragmatic"
approach to the coup. If they saw some vacillation in
Serman's message, it reflected the realities of the
conflicting voices among the Europeans and within the French
bureaucracy. Charge highlighted the importance of having
something concrete to present with the visit of the
AU/EU/UN/Arab League/OIC/Francophonie delegation slated for
early December. While not offering concessions, Abdallahi's
allies (specifically the French and AU) would need something
to show that the President has more that just principle in
his plan to get back into office. Charge suggested that a
tentative timeline showing when he saw international pressure
reaching its peak and what specific steps he would be willing
to take to resolve political problems if/when he returned to
power.


5. (C) The Abdallahi advisors noted their dissatisfaction
with the fact that Serman had visited Opposition Leader Ould
Daddah in addition to Abdallahi and Aziz. They discounted
Charge's suggestions that as the officially designated
"Leader of the Opposition" Serman would have seen a need to
meet Ould Daddah. "Once he accepted the coup as a
'rectification,' he lost his role as opposition. He says he
is against the military but only in the privacy of his living
room -- there is nothing in his actions to show his
opposition." Ould Maouloud, who had just come from a press
conference, was also distressed that western diplomats had
attended the November 28 Mauritanian National Day ceremony at

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the Presidency. Charge noted that the diplomats, including
the U.S. Acting DCM, had gone as a gesture of respect for the
Mauritanian people but had not participated in the
after-ceremony reception so as not to honor General Aziz.
Ould Maouloud noted the regime had effectively used the
coverage of Aziz shaking hands with diplomats (Comment --
perhaps aware of diplomats' plans to leave immediately after
the flag ceremony, Presidential protocol changed the order of
the ceremony to have Aziz shake hands first. Some local
press noted the absence of the U.S. -- not recognizing A/DCM
as the American representative).


6. (C) Ould Hammoudi and Ould Maouloud noted that the
President had planned to film a national day message in
Lemden on the 28th. Security forces, however, forced the
President's staff to dismantle reception tents put up for the
occasion, kept local residents indoors so they could not
participate in any national day celebration, and temporarily
confiscated cameras from press in Lemden to ensure that no
video of the message had been captured. The advisors noted
the obvious contradiction to the regime's public statements
that the President could meet anyone he wished.


7. (C) Ould Maouloud asked whether the U.S. could do
anything to improve the conditions of confinement for Prime
Minister Waghef. Ould Maouloud said Waghef is being held in
the general prison population and is being daily threatened
and harassed by the prisoners. He provided Charge with a
copy of a confidential memorandum from the Regime's Minister
of Justice Ahmedou Tidjane Bal to the Attorney General
offering "suggestions" concerning the prosecution of the
"political adversaries" of the "current Mauritanian
Government" concerning the dissolution of Air Mauritanie.
The memo suggests that the Attorney General build the case
but use the airline's unions and investors to file a
complaint so the regime could plead it is only following
civil procedure.
HANKINS