EUROPEANS HOPE AU TRIP WILL PRESSURE ABDALLAHI TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000702

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: EUROPEANS HOPE AU TRIP WILL PRESSURE ABDALLAHI TO
BE A REALIST

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: Strong divisions remain between U.S. and
European views of the way forward following the November 21
Addis Ababa meeting. The Europeans believe the high level
AU/UN/EU/Arab League/OIC/Francophonie visit of December 5-7
needs to seek negotiation and encourage realism by President
Abdallahi. They see the power of the international community
to influence the return of constitutional order having a
limited life-span and further focus on the return of
President Abdallahi as a pre-condition a counterproductive
strategy. End Summary


2. (C) Divisions still persist: In the first meeting on
November 26 of the Western embassies with the UN, EC, IMF and
World Bank since last week's visits to President Abdallahi
and the European Union and African Union decisions of
November 20 and 21, clear differences on next steps remain
between the European block (with UNDP support) and the U.S.
(with vocal World Bank support). The EC Representative, who
is usually strongly aligned with the U.S. was not present --
his deputy remained largely silent. The French, German and
Spanish Ambassador's shared the sense following their
November 18 visit to Lemden that the President's staunch role
of non-dialogue with the regime makes the President the
primary obstacle to the return to "acceptable" democratic
progress in Mauritania. All three raised their concern that
President Abdallahi had asked them to "impose sanctions
against the Mauritanian people so they will turn against the
regime" suggesting Abdallahi's sole focus on "legitimacy" ran
to the point of seeing his own people suffer. They noted the
FNDD came out the day after their meeting with the President
saying the FNDD does not support general sanctions -- only
targeted ones -- which, for the Europeans, brought into
question how much Abdallahi was coordinating with/listening
to his advisors.


3. (C) Sidi's Return - "Agree with the concept but don't
believe we can get there": French Ambassador Vandepoorter
told Charge that France remains in agreement with the U.S.
position that the return of President Abdallahi to power as
an ideal but added, "my own analysis is that we can't get
there." Spanish Ambassador Polanco followed saying he saw
the emphasis of every international mediator on Abdallahi's
return had effectively wasted four months of potential
progress -- "When the first question each envoy asks Aziz is,
'When will President Abdallahi come back?,' they have closed
off any possibility of seeing what else can be accomplished."
Polanco cautioned that if progress is not taken towards a
resolution based on the possible, versus the ideal, President
Abdallahi will become "an ever more isolated old gentlemen we
go visit once a quarter in Lemden" and the hardest line of
the military regime will be strengthened, not weakened.
Polanco saw the possible sanctions under the Coutonou
Agreement the most effective leverage on the regime but
cautioned that, once used, they have no further value.
German Ambassador Schanze -- always the feistiest of the
Europeans - said, "Within the regime there are some military
guys who only know of camels and sand dunes -- they are the
hard line that gain from the lack of progress. But there are
others who know the world outside Mauritania -- they want to
get back to something acceptable but can't the dialogue
begins and ends with Abdallahi's return."


4. (C) Visit needs to focus on progress: The Europeans and
UNDP ResRep all supported the view that the schedule visit of
senior-level representatives of the African Union, United
Nations, European Union, Arab League, Organization of the
Islamic Conference, and the Francophonie had to be a sincere
effort at finding a mutually acceptable resolution. A visit
that confronted Aziz with ultimatums and the continued threat
of sanctions would be, for them, "not worth doing." Saying
"whether fair or not" they saw the only way out of the
impasse having to start with a commitment by President
Abdallahi to resign in exchange for an equal commitment from
Aziz.


5. (C) We don't want to be back here in 2011: Charge noted
there was a fundamental difference between the expressed

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European position and that of the U.S. Noting the
regrettable implication of "blaming the victim," Charge
stressed that an approach that plays along with the regime's
concept of a "National Dialogue on Democracy" to be followed
up by anticipated elections does not address the fundamental
issues. With the military now openly boasting of how well
they manipulated the last democratic transition, Charge
added, "there is no sense finding a short-term solution
allowing the military to again manipulate democratic
elections -- we don't want to be back here in three years
trying to resolve another coup." World Bank Rep Rantrua also
challenged the Europeans for urging concessions from
Abdallahi with nothing from Aziz saying their approach
"legitimizes the coup." When he asked how they proposed to
restore democracy if they give up on the President, the best
he got from the Spaniard was, "We can't dictate the plan, but
we can always tell them if what they propose is
insufficient." Rantrua finally chastised the Europeans for
undermining the harder-line position of the African Union --
"We Europeans are always critical for the Africans on not
being serious about good governance. When they finally take
a tough stand, all we do is cut them off at the head."
HANKINS