NEIGHBORING VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000688

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV AG ML MO SG MR
SUBJECT: NEIGHBORING VIEWS

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: Following the November 10 Addis Ababa
Communique and the transfer of President Abdallahi to Lemden,
Charge checked with embassies of Mauritanias neighbors
Algeria, Mali, Morocco and Senegal to discuss their views on
the situation. As could be predicted, Algeria and Mali line
up more closely against the coup though, in both cases,
suggesting support for Messaoud Ould Boulkheir's plan that
would not see President Abdallahi completing his mandate.
Senegal and Morocco, while limited somewhat by the AU and
Arab League positions coming out of Addis Ababa, voice
greater support for the transition plan being forwarded by
the regime.


2. (C) Algeria: Ambassador Kaid Chakib Rachid termed his
government the strongest regional opponent to the coup and
noted he had called President Abdallahi November 16 adding
"I'm sure I'm the only Arab or African ambassador who
called." Rachid noted the regime's efforts to try to make
Algeria's condemnation of the coup part of the greater
Algerian - Moroccan dispute over Western Sahara. He noted,
"Algiers was the first to condemn the coup before we had any
idea what Rabat's position would be." He stressed that even
in the late 90's Algeria had been the leader within the
African Union (then still the OAU) in pushing for the
condemnation of coups in Africa saying "we condemned the coup
against Taya as strongly as the coup against Abdallahi."
Rachid also noted Aziz' personalization of the presence of
Algerians as envoys of the UN, AU and Arab League as an
Algerian plot. "We're not so clever or interested in
Mauritania to have put our people in place years in advance
just for this day," noting that Algeria has many "brilliant
diplomats" who represent not Algiers but the organizations
they serve. While saying. "we are as one," in demanding
President Abdallahi's return to office, Rachid thought the
President may be "fatally weakened by the coup" and not in a
viable position to complete his mandate. For Rachid, the
Ould Boulheir plan calling for anticipated Presidential
elections was likely the best long-term solution. Rachid
added, "we are impressed by Ould Boulkheir as the individual
who has best stuck to his principles through the whole affair
while still trying to work for a solution."


3. (C) Mali: Charge d'Affaires Claude Tounkara explained he
is also a prisoner of the coup. Bamako had received agrement
for a new ambassador just before the coup but cannot send him
now -- leaving Tounkara in place. The Malian government
remains firmly against the coup and is hearing about it from
the regime. Tounkara noted he had been convoked earlier in
the week by the "Foreign Minister" who had complained
bitterly about Mauritania's exclusion from the regional
security conference recently held in Bamako. At the same
time, Tounkara saw the current transportation dispute between
Mali and Mauritania (that has resulted in Nouakchott sealing
the border) as a sign of what life will be like if the
military stay in place. At its base, Tounkara said the
dispute resolves around interpretation of the ground
transportation agreement between Mauritania and Mali.
Several months ago, Malian businessmen started a very popular
"Bamako Bus" service between Nouakchott and Bamako. The
Malian buses are more comfortable and reliable than what
Mauritanian operators have to offer so the Mauritanian
operators got the government to agree to order the Malian
buses to off-load passengers at the border to transfer to
Mauritanian buses (although, ironically, the Malians were
told they could still deliver the passengers' luggage because
the Mauritanian buses don't have enough storage space). The
Malians insist the bilateral agreement allows for passengers
from anywhere inside Mauritania to anywhere in Mali (just not
for travel between points inside Mauritania). Tounkara said
the REAL reason for the dispute was that the popular bus
route (that serves as a transit point for Mauritanian traders
for points throughout west Africa) had cut into the passenger
load for Mauritanian Airways which is controlled by Aziz' top
financier Mohamed Hamayenne Bouamatou. The reliable bus
service costing less than a tenth of airfare and with less
baggage limits had dropped Mauritania Airways passenger loads
to only 20% of capacity. The Malians are convinced Bouamatou
provoked the transport dispute that has stopped all
crossborder travel for the last two weeks.

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Turning to the political situation, Tounkara, like his
Algerian colleague, highlighted the Ould Boulkheir plan as
the most viable solution for the country -- one that sees the
military leave but recognizes Abdallahi's political frailty.


4. (C) Morocco: Charge d'Affaires Abdel Aziz Shelouati,
speaking from talking points, was frank in saying that, while
Rabat does not support coups, its policy in Mauritania is
driven first and foremost by the need for security and
stability in Mauritania that requires a firm military hand
"for at least the next ten years." Shelouati cited the
Tourine attack as evidence regional stability will be
undermined if Mauritania were to risk the destabilizing
return to power by Abdallahi. Political instability would
not only invite Al Qaeda to act but also complicate the
already difficult situation in Western Sahara. Shelouati
dismissed Charge's argument that a strong and capable
military is necessary but that it must respect civilian
authority by saying, "What civilian authority? Abdallahi was
never more than a figurehead for the military and there is no
real political society in Mauritania -- only tribes and the
military." Shelouati said his Mauritanian contacts could not
understand U.S. indifference to the security threat in
Mauritania and why the U.S. dismissed the proposed National
Dialogue on Democracy as a viable solution to the problem.
Charge responded that we saw the greater long-term terrorist
threat coming from internal radicalization that several
decades of military rule had shown the army cannot address --
only democracy can and even then over a long time. Charge
noted that the National Dialogue organized under the auspices
of the High State Council and its designated government could
not be credible -- with the regime openly boasting how well
they had manipulated the transition last time, there was no
way on can accept having them repeat the same gameplan.


5. (C) Senegal: Ambassador Mahmoudou Cheikh Kane also
emphasized stability in his government's approach to the
coup. While remaining firm to the principles expressed in
the Addis Ababa Communique, Kane noted Senegal has over
100,000 citizens in Mauritania and has previously suffered
from refugee flows if Mauritania becomes unstable. Kane
offered his "personal opinion" that closer observation and
support to the National Dialogue proposed by the regime and
international oversight of any anticipated elections could
lead to a better and more solid result than the last
transition particularly with stronger guarantees of military
disengagement. Kane questioned whether President Abdallahi
was doing right not to embrace the Dialogue as a means for
getting his message out and contribute to his country's
future. Charge explained the U.S. view that the National
Dialogue as structured had no credibility.
HANKINS