A DAY WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000681

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: A DAY WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

1..(C) Summary: President Abdallahi sees the United States
as the strongest friend of Mauritanian democracy. He sees
the current crisis in stark freedom vs. force terms and is
planning for the long haul of increased international and
domestic pressure on the regime rather than a negotiated
settlement involving the military. Abdallahi believes there
is no fundamental political crisis if the military is
prevented from manipulating the political process -- he is
prepared to call for early elections if he finds the
political crisis is deeper than he understands it. The
President fired the generals "90% sure" they would stage a
coup which he saw as the best option compared to further
military manipulation or a coup at the time and manner of
their choosing. Abdallahi expects to have outside contact
for only a limited period before Aziz shuts him off again.


2. (C) The Visit: Charge met for nearly four hours on
November 17 with Mauritanian President Sidi Ould Cheikh
Abdallahi in the President's home village of Lemden where he
remains under military house arrest. Lemden is a three-hour
drive from Nouakchott -- the last 20 miles over a single
track dirt road. While not permitted to leave the village,
Abdallahi has been receiving a steady stream of visitors as
well as his family. Security is light with two uniformed
policemen and approximately 18 other military from the
provincial garrison who stay out of sight for most of the
day. Charge was not impeded in meeting with the President.


3. (C) Thank You President Bush: The President told Charge
he was pleased to receive him a day prior to the visit of
European Ambassadors because he considered the United States
Mauritania's closest friend since the coup having maintained
a resolute and principled position in support of democracy.
We wanted to express his personal thanks to President Bush
for his continuing support and asked Charge if it would be
possible to speak with the President in coming days to
personally convey his gratitude.


4. (C) In For The Long Haul: President Abdallahi sees the
current crisis in stark terms as a war between liberty and
force. He gave no indication of looking for an exit strategy
involving any type of negotiation with the military saying
that acceptance of the High State Council's much-touted
National Dialogue on Democracy leading to early elections
would only legitimize the coup leading to more military
meddling in the future not just in Mauritania but in the rest
of the region. The President said, "I will continue to
consider myself the President of the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania until I either complete my mandate or am told by
the Mauritanian people that they no longer want me." The
President said General Aziz has miscalculated both
international and domestic reaction to the coup and, in his
view, is increasingly isolated. Abdallahi saw domestic
rejection of the coup reflecting the long term evolution for
Mauritanian society that was gradually undermining the
ability of the so-called "notables" to control the people's
votes -- leaving a democratic process that reflects far more
independent choice than the past. "If the 'notables' were
still firmly in control, there would have been no opposition
and the military would have succeeded as they did in the
past." Abdallahi saw Aziz as having gained in the short-term
by the global drop in oil and food prices allowing" him to say
he is "making life better for the Mauritanian people" (just
as Abdallahi had struggled to deliver the benefits of
democracy to the people just as global prices skyrocketed)
but he did not see Aziz being able to sustain that populist
position. Continued and increased international pressure
coupled with sustained domestic resistance will, in the long
term, force Aziz and the military out of politics.


5. (C) A Review of the International Position: At the
President's request, Charge provided a blunt evaluation of
the international position relative to the coup. The United
States is somewhat isolated in stipulating that the
President's return to office is needed for the return to
constitutional order. The Addis Ababa Communique, while very
useful in pulling together a common position between the AU,

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EU, and Arab League condemning the coup and recognizing
President Abdallahi as the legitimate President of Mauritania
had not called for his return to office -- only for his full
participation befitting his status in the political dialogue.
Charge noted that most of the international community was
prepared to take a "pragmatic" approach that did not
necessarily include the President's return to office. The
Europeans, in particular, do not want to see "better be the
enemy of good" and want to work with what they have available
-- seeing the U.S. as somewhat naive or principled to the
point of being counterproductive. As opposed to others, the
U.S. has few practical interests in Mauritania (no business
presence, few citizens, no direct impact from transnational
crime) that makes it easier for us to take a principled stand
-- linking Mauritania more to global priorities of democracy
in the region as well as anti-extremism. Charge suggested
the President's detention and inability to communicate for
nearly 100 days had certainly weakened his stature
internationally and, more importantly, domestically. As a
result, the "NiNi" option of neither Abdallahi nor Aziz
seemed the predominant theme with Mauritanians and, privately
and occasionally publicly, with international partners.
Charge noted that the President had the opportunity now that
he can communicate with the outside world and, to an extent,
with the Mauritanian people to restore his credibility and
presence as President. If he fails to present a vision of
the future and to make clear the differences between him and
the other options, Charge offered he might not be able to
transition from being President in name only to regaining the
effective leadership of his country. The President asked for
the Charge's reading of several countries:

-- Spain: Clearly driven by practical concerns of illegal
immigration and drug trafficking and willing to try to soften
the international community's position particularly in the EU
and NATO. Ultimately needs to follow the EU position.
Abdallahi noted the involvement of some military in the drug
trade made Spain's policy decision ultimately self-defeating.
-- France: Strong U.S. - French coordination on Mauritania
with President Sarkozy personally leading a principled stance
despite numerous "pragmatic" strains throughout the French
bureaucracy. Abdallahi raised concerns about the French
Ambassador being interested in "cutting a deal" to get past
the impasse.
-- Germany: Charge noted that while Germany had no close
attachment to Mauritania, they would be representing the EU
for the Czech Presidency after January 1. Charge suggested
Abdallahi renew his contacts with the German President who
had previously visited Mauritania when the President was in
office.
-- Libya: Charge noted the regime had already sent two
delegations to Tripoli to win Libyan backing (even though
they had criticized Abdallahi with us for having paid too
many visits to Libya). Difficult to read Libyan intent but
widely understood they were tying recognition of the regime
to ending Mauritania's ties to Israel. Abdallahi said that
regardless of what Qadaffi might do privately, he did not see
the Libyans publicly recognizing the regime since that would
complicate Libya's broader objective of leadership within the
African Union.
-- Gulf States: Abdallahi noted his personal friendship with
the Emirs of Kuwait and Qatar but did not see them being
truly committed to supporting democracy if it meant isolating
an Arab state.


6. (C) Short Time Out: The President told Charge he expected
he would only have a short period of relatively free
communication. The High State Council's Secretary General
had already warned the FNDD leadership that General Aziz was
upset about President Abdallahi's public statements and that,
if he did not shut up, he would be moved again to some very
isolated internal location where he would be unable to
communicate. The President thought Aziz would likely move
him again after the African Union's November 21 meeting
unless the EU and AU took his transfer as a sign of
"progress." He said he was prepared to again be placed
incommunicado but would take the limited time available to
shore up contacts with international partners, set out his
positions to the public and media, and try to get some
long-term administrative systems in place. On the final

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point, he wanted to reiterate that we still sees his
Ambassador in Washington (Ambassador Dia) as his
representative (Charge assured him the U.S. still considers
him as such). The President then asked that any Mauritanian
Government accounts in the U.S. be frozen and, if possible,
that Ambassador Dia be able to access those accounts to
support his government's international activities. Charge
confirmed our understanding that there was an account with
several million dollars in the U.S. federal reserve system
that could be blocked but said he was unsure whether
arrangements could be made to make them available to his
designee.


7. (C) Provoking the Coup: The President reviewed some of
the events leading up to the coup saying that when he fired
the Generals the night of August 5 he was "90% sure they
would launch a coup." Abdallahi said he had misread Aziz
before and after the coup thinking he would be able to reach
an accommodation with him whereby Aziz would have free rein
on security matters while Abdallahi took the lead in the
political realm. Despite constant warnings from his
advisors, he said it was only in April that he fully
understood the degree to which Aziz was manipulating the
political system to create instability with the intent of
forcing early elections in which Aziz would be able to take
over. By August, he had reached the end of all possible
appeasement with the military and saw them planning a coup
(constitutional or otherwise) is the very near future.
Abdallahi fired the generals saying "if they were no longer
generals for even 24 hours the rest of the military would
have forgotten them" but recognizing the likelier result was
a coup -- but not one of the time and manner of their
choosing.


8. (C) No Political Crisis: The President saw the High
State Council's call for a National Dialogue on Democracy as
a charade to again allow them to manipulate the political
process. He said, "I am convinced that if the military was
no longer manipulating things behind the scenes there would
no longer be a 'political crisis' in Mauritania." He said
his own experience when he had worked directly with
parliamentary rivals was that he could find common ground --
although he often found the military undermining his efforts
afterward. In a review of the political events prior to the
coup, Abdallahi said he had resisted the second censure
motion because he saw it not as a censure motion against
Prime Minister Waghef (who was still putting together is
government) but against the President. He had been prepared
to dissolve parliament under those circumstances to force new
elections saying, "if I had one a majority the problem would
have been resolved but, if the voters came back with a
majority against me, I probably would have resigned rather
than try to deal with a cohabitation arrangement." Abdallahi
said "IF I ever return to office with the military no longer
engaged in politics, I don't believe there will be the
political strife of the past. If I misread the problem, I
would then most likely call for early elections."


9. (C) The Military: The President asked for the Charge's
evaluation of the military. Charge noted there were some
signs of discontent within the High State Council but nobody
seemed prepared yet to confront Aziz directly. Charge added
there had been reports of significant discontent in the rand
and file following the Tourine attack as soldiers has seen
their compatriots killed through a combination of poor
equipment, training, and guidance from the highest military
levels. Abdallahi asked specifically about Ghazwany noting
that before the coup he had found him the smarter and more
capable of the two generals and confiding that Ghazwany had
apologized for Aziz's excesses prior to the coup. Charge
noted that Ghazwany could be key in rallying support away
from Aziz but that he still seemed to attached to the senior
General -- even though Ghazwany seems to have lost some
access and influence in resent months. Charge did note the
need to support the military in their proper role and
suggested Abdallahi address the military directly to morn
their losses in Tourine and assure them he would see to it
that they are trained and equipped for their legitimate
missions if they respect the democratic role of a modern
military.

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HANKINS