ANTI-COUP PARLIAMENTARY STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000673

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: ANTI-COUP PARLIAMENTARY STRATEGY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The President's of the two houses of
parliament are taking different tactics in defying the regime
based on the political balance of power in their chambers.
Both are under pressure from the regime and both greatly
appreciate U.S. solidarity against the coup. End Summary

Senate
--------------


2. (C) Charge met November 13 with President of the Senate
Ba M'Bare in his Senate office. M'Bare seemed initially more
reserved and nervous that in Charge's previous meeting with
him and he said outright he was unsure how the new
parliamentary session that started November 10 will play out.
M'Bare said he and President of the National Assembly had
coordinated their approach to the session with M'Bare
deciding to preside over the Senate even as Ould Boulkheir
has decided to boycott and declare the session illegal.
M'Bare said the difference in approach was all numbers -- he
has a loose anti-coup majority while Ould Boulkheir has a
strong pro-coup majority. In discussing the composition of
his anti-coup majority, the numbers were worrying. The
largest group is composed of the "third way" senators who are
positioning themselves in the "NiNi" camp advocating the
departure of Aziz and the military as well as a prior or
simultaneous resignation of President Abdallahi. M'Bare saw
this group as having 17 firm members and 3 wavering members.
The second largest group is Ahmed Ould Daddah's remaining
loyalist group of six senators while the third is the FNDD's
five senators. Depending on the three wavering "third way"
senators, the anti-coup camp is only 50% of the 56 person
senate or a small majority.


3. (C) M'Bare said it is still his intent to use the session
to pressure the regime. He will invite ministers from Prime
Minister Waghef's government instead of Laghdaf "ministers"
and will otherwise cause a freeze. He plans to eliminate the
special investigation committee on Senate finances pushed
through during the Emergency Session and create, instead, a
standing committee on Senate operations.


4. (C) Charge clarified with M'Bare his own political
future. M'Bare noted he has a two-year mandate as President
of the Senate that will end in May. He had heard rumors that
the regime was holding off on any political transition that
could shift presidential power to the President of the Senate
until he could be replaced by someone they saw as more
malleable and, more importantly, by a White Moor. M'Bare
said he had not yet decided whether to run for the office
again but he thought the anti-coup majority would keep a
coup-supporter from coming in. M'Bare added that the regime
was doing everything it could to push him out before May.
Just that morning, the new President of the Central Bank,
General Aziz' cousin Sidaty Ould Benhmeida, had issued
instructions that M'Bare no longer had signing authority over
the Senate operating funds accounts -- a move M'Bare called
unconstitutional and yet further evidence of Aziz' attempts
to manipulate parliament.


5. (C) Turning to the broader political scene, M'Bare said
he was pleased with the November 10 Addis Ababa Communique
particularly because it had hardened a somewhat wishy-washy
Arab League position. M'Bare specifically praised the U.S.
for having the most consistent and unwavering position
against the coup. Charge noted that the unified
international position would continue to add pressure on the
regime and commended M'Bare for taking a courageous position
of internal defiance.

National Assembly
--------------


6. (C) Charge met later in the day with President of the
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir at Ould Boulkheir's
home. Ould Boulkheir had moed the meeting up in order to be
able to travel o Aleg and a ttempt to meet President
Abdallahi who had been transferred from Nouakchott earlier
that morning (see Septel).


NOUAKCHOTT 00000673 002 OF 002



7. (C) Ould Boulkheir objected to the idea that he and the
Senate President had coordinated their positions on the
opening of the parliament suggesting M'Bare was being foolish
to rely on a supposed anti-coup majority made up primarily by
opportunist senators in the "third way" and those who are
allied with Ahmed Ould Daddah. Ould Boulkheir was
particularly negative about Ould Daddah saying "he can't be
in the middle saying he wants a return to democracy while at
the same time saying Abdallahi can't come back." He noted he
was in variance with others in the FNDD in that he believed
there was a need for a transition government and anticipated
elections but, like the others, he saw the return of
President Abdallahi as an absolute requirement to
re-establish democratic institutions before any new political
arrangements are put into place.


8. (C) Ould Boulkheir initially told Charge that he was
boycotting the session because it was illegal and that
holding the session was tantamount to cooperating with and
giving legitimacy to the regime. When Charge noted Ould
Boulkeir had told Charge last month he would preside over the
current parliamentary session and use it either to create
gridlock or force the regime to allow it to be the venue for
a true national dialogue, he relented that the balance of
power was against him in the National Assembly. Ould
Boulkheir noted there was no Senate-like "third way" in the
National Assembly where Aziz still has almost 60 out of 95
deputies on his side -- Aziz' so-called "Parliamentary
Brigade." Ould Boulkheir noted that if he had decided to
preside over the National Assembly, the pro-coup majority
would have been able to control the agenda despite his
protestations. By boycotting, he is able to undermine the
legitimacy of anything the Assembly might adopt.


9. (C) Like M'Bare, Ould Boulkheir welcomed the outcome of
the Addis Ababa meeting. For the FNDD it fell short of the
call for the reinstatement of President Abdallahi in his
office but it clearly defined an international position that
Abdallahi remains the President of Mauritania -- firming up
wavering Arab League rhetoric. Ould Boulkheir particularly
noted the strong U.S. position. He recognized that the
regime was trying to personalize U.S. resistance as a
personal vendetta by the Ambassador, but Ould Boulkheir
recognized U.S. opposition to the regime reflected the whole
of the U.S. government. He expected that policy would stay
the same, if not become stronger still, under the incoming
administration. He thanked Charge for the recent press
release concerning Mauritania's MCC scores which he said had
helped the FNDD defend President Abdallahi's tenure from
regime propaganda. He understood the release had
particularly miffed General Aziz.
HANKINS