THE POST-COUP AL QAEDA THREAT IN MAURITANIA

S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000666

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER MR
SUBJECT: THE POST-COUP AL QAEDA THREAT IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The military regime has highlighted an
increased terrorist threat as one argument the international
community should accept their coup -- raising some questions
whether the terrorist threat has substantially changed or
whether it is being played up by the regime for political
purposes. Mission believes a confluence of various factors
increase the likelihood of AQIM activities staged out of Mali
even as the risk of an internally-launched attack is reduced.
We find the Mauritanian military and security services
taking the external threat seriously and applying new levels
of their own resources to address the problem -- albeit in a
somewhat ad hoc fashion. Increased security presence in
Nouakchott proper does have a certain aspect of political
showmanship to highlight the need for security. We have not
seen the Mauritanian counter-terrorist efforts used as an
excuse for political repression. End Summary


2. (S) Post Coup Events Make Al Qaeda Stronger: The
September 15 AQIM attack in Tourine clearly demonstrates the
ongoing desire and capability of AQIM to launch attacks from
bases in northern Mali well into Mauritanian territory. The
unprecedented violence of beheading captured Mauritanians
highlights not just an increase in activity but in terror.
Mission assessment is that planning for the early September
incursion was started before the coup and was not in response
to General Aziz' takeover or a component of the jihad called
against the regime. Mauritanian counter-terrorism efforts
prior to the coup including substantially increased and overt
military cooperation with the U.S. and the arrest of over 60
AQIM members and supporters inside Mauritania likely
motivated the attack. Since the September 15 attack, the
Mauritanians have continued to arrest AQIM elements as well
as some probable AQIM-wannabes that should further provoke
AQIM. The terrorists' successful experience in the Austrian
hostage taking and the 1.5 to 2 million Euro ransom payment
will both encourage and enable AQIM to do more. Multiple
reports of an entente between AQIM and the Malians that AQIM
will not conduct strikes in Mali leads Post to believe at
least some of the ransom money will be destined for
Mauritania -- perhaps financing the VBIED threats rumored for
months. Mauritanian security counterparts report a
significant up-tick in AQIM's Mauritanian recruitment -- a
trend verified in at least one case by recruitment within the
family of a Mission contact. Some reports indicate over 100
Mauritanians have been recruited in recent months -- driven
by a supply/demand combination of AQIM's increased
"credibility" and AQIM's need to rebuild its disabled
internal networks.


3. (C) Military increasing counterterrorism resources: The
September 15 attack generated strong criticism of the
military high command for being derelict in their primary
duty of protecting the country from outside attack.
Post-coup faith in the military had fallen so low that rumors
persisted for weeks that the attack either was staged or,
worse still, was organized by the military themselves in
order to build their message that the military had to be in
place to maintain security. WIdely-circulated reports that
the Nouakchott high command had countermanded the decisions
of the unit and regional commanders to assume a defensive
position to, instead, drive through the night into an easy
ambush drew into question the professionalism of those who
launched the coup. Nearly two weeks following the attack,
the High Command sent elements from General Aziz' own
Presidential Security Battalion - BASEP - to reinforce the
garrison to Zouerate as a show of concern (those units,
however, redeployed back to Nouakchott after two weeks).
More substantially, the military deployed forces from their
paratrooper battalion (the BCP) and quickly equipped and
deployed the anti-terrorist GLATR unit the U.S. had been
training for over a year. The deployment of the GLATR was
particularly significant because they were given the vehicles
that had prevented them from being effective. Since we are
aware of no significant new arms imports since the coup, the
assumption is that the vehicles came out of stocks reserved
for the BASEP. Within the past few weeks, we have heard that
the military is planning to substantially increase the number
of troops specifically targeted against the terrorist threat.
The plan calls for four GLATR units spread around the
country. The first GLATR will be the unit we have been
training covering the northern region. A second GLATR will
be the re-named FUMA that was trained several years ago by
the U.S. covering the southeastern region around Nema. Two
other GLATRs are to be created out of the units previously
pulled together for peacekeeping operations. It is not clear
where these two units will be deployed. We understand the
commander of one of these units has refused orders to deploy
because his unit is not properly trained or equipped for the
mission. In all this, we do see a serious reallocation of
resources to meet the terrorist threat. Some of this effort
-- such as provisioning and deploying the GLATR - seems
sincere and credible. Other efforts -- such as the
short-lived deployment of the BASEP or the abracadabra
conversion of raw peacekeeping infantry into
counterterrorist specialist - seem ad hoc tactics to deflect
criticism.


4. (S - N/F) Intelligence operations maintaining high tempo:
The Mauritanian security services have always taken the
terrorist threat more seriously than the military or civilian
government. Only the December 2007 AQIM attacks had brought
the others around to see the threat -- particularly the
internal threat - as real. The violence of the Tourine
attacks have clearly reinforced the military's attention.
The Mauritanian security services continue to discover and
arrest persons affiliated with terrorism with over 30 arrests
since the coup. The majority of these arrests have been
linked to strong Al Qaeda connections. A few, such as the
recent arrests in Tidjikja, seem driven more by paranoia
having involved the arrest of, at worst, young AQIM wannabes.
Mission does not see the Mauritanian security services
creating threats to influence Western governments to support
the coup. The security chiefs themselves are increasingly
distracted by their political role within the High State
Council but continue to make final policy decisions within
their agencies.


5. (C) Some strutting in Nouakchott: The one area where
Mission does see the regime trying to hype the security
threat is in Nouakchott proper. While the military vehicles
that deployed as a show of force after the coup are long
gone, police presence throughout the city is greatly
increased. Police roadblocks backed by never-before-seen
armored police vehicles spring up every night at all major
intersections. To our knowledge, these checkpoints have had
no impact whatsoever in capturing suspected terrorists;
rather, they seem intended to give an air of security. In
fairness, the spate of carjackings and rapes seen prior to
the coup has gone away (although some extreme anti-coup
militants accuse the military of being behind the crime wave
to undermine Abdallahi).


6. (C) No political crack-down under the guise of
counter-terrorism: Despite the increased military and
security activity underway under the rubric of
counter-terrorism, Mission has not seen the regime use these
actions to repress opposition -- except to the extent the
heightened police presence also deters political protests.
The leadership of the Islamist parties, for instance, have
not been harassed on terrorism charges despite the connection
the regime draws between these parties and Abdallahi's "soft"
stand on terrorism.


7. (C) No Requests: Post has received no specific requests
for military assistance in response to the terrorist threat
since a September 15 request for aerial surveillance against
the Tourine attack (unfortunately, our aircraft had left
country on the 13th). The military continues to hope for a
return to our previous robust military cooperation, but they
seem to assume any specific request now will be denied.
Other aerial surveillance platforms are available on request
from other partners. The Spanish have allocated 20 hours
counterterrorism flying time for their migration -monitoring
Cessna Caravan based in Nouakchott. A French "Breguet"
maritime patrol aircraft based in Dakar is also available
when needed. Both have ISR capabilities although the Spanish
contracted plane is "low and slow" with minimal time on
station and the French aircraft is a large fuel-guzzler. The
Mauritanians have used their own Basler converted DC-3 for
reconnaissance but that plane has no surveillance
capabilities. The Mauritanians impounded a drug-carrying
twin-engine Cessna 441 with similar characteristics to the
Creeksand platform several years ago. That has the range and
speed to be effective as an ISR platform but would need a
costly and complicated retrofit.


HANKINS