MEETING WITH FORMER ECON MINISTER VEZZAZ --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000654

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KMCA MR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FORMER ECON MINISTER VEZZAZ --
WELCOMES MCC VALIDATION OF PERFORMANCE, FNDD CONCERNS ABOUT
QATAR

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 639

B. NOUAKCHOTT 637

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) MCC Scorecard A Validation Of Abdallahi Policies:
Charge met November 5 with former Minister of Economy and
Finance (and current FNDD economic director) Abderrahmane
Ould Hama Vezzaz who had been the Mission's principal
ministerial counterpart in the development of Mauritania's
MCC Threshold Proposal. Charge shared the
soon-to-be-released MCC 2009 Scorecard that shows significant
improvement in Mauritanian scores under then-Minister Vezzaz'
tenure. The MCC Scorecard indicated substantial jumps in
Mauritania's relative scores for Immunization Rates (from
14th percentile to 27th),Girls' Education Completion rates
(22nd to 41st percentile),Control of Corruption (68th to
78th percentile -- reversing a steady slide in this
indicator),and Business startup (48th to 81st percentile).
As Vezzaz was well aware, the MCC scorecard has a lag time
built in such that the 2009 report indicates the results of
the first year of the Abdallahi Government rather than the
performance of the current junta. Vezzaz was pleased to hear
that the Embassy plans to issue a press release in
conjunction with the public release of the MCC Scorecards to
emphasize that the Abdallahi Government policies were showing
positive results. Vezzaz said the FNDD will also use the MCC
results to counter regime charges of policy mis-management as
the FNDD begins to deploy speakers to the interior next week.


2. (C) Concerns about Doha: Vezzaz told Charge the FNDD is
extremely concerned about the Qatari mediation effort (REFTEL
B). Vezzaz had participated in the Qatari-based Arab
Democracy Foundation's meeting with the FNDD. Because the
Emir had been extremely supportive of President Abdallahi in
the past and because of their substantial future investment
interests, Vezzaz said "we couldn't tell them "no" to their
initiative." Vezzaz worried however that, while more liberal
than most, the Emir is not fundamentally democratic, and is
more likely to look for "a deal" than the restoration of
democracy. He added, "We are in no hurry just to reach 'a
deal.' We want a resolution that will once and for all
protect Mauritania from future coups. We cannot accept an
arrangement that rewards the coup-makers in any way --
otherwise, it is just a matter of time before they strike
again." Vezzaz asked that the U.S. keep in close contact
with the Qatari to be sure they don't stray too far from
international consensus. Vezzaz was aware President Sarkozy
will be meeting soon with the Emir and had faith he would
pass the right message to the Emir (although he worried the
Sarkozy entourage might give off softer signals). Vezzaz
thought it would be useful for Qatar to send an observer to
the November 10 Addis Ababa meeting to ensure they were
linked to international consensus. Vezzaz also noted his
concern that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had last week
said he opposes "Western threats and sanctions against
Mauritania" on the eve of the Addis meeting (Comment: Mission
has seen no press reference to what President Mubarak might
have said).


3. (C) U.S. Africa Policy: Vezzaz made a point of thanking
the Bush Administration for its consistent and principled
position throughout Mauritania's democratic transition and,
most especially, in the three months since the coup. He also
welcomed the election of Senator Obama saying the
President-Elect's "African" ties would make him even more
effective in demanding democracy and good governance in
Africa. Vezzaz opined that African leaders have always been
able to "play the race card" with American governments to be
held to a lesser standard -- they will no longer be able to
use that gambit.


4. (C) SNIM Director Rebuffs the Regime: Charge asked
Vezzaz if he knew what was behind the sudden resignation of
national mining company (SNIM) Director General Mohamed Ould
Sidi Mohamed Deyahi. Vezzaz said his understanding from SNIM
insiders (he emphasized he did not know if his information
was 100% correct) was that Deyahi had resigned rather than
give into a regime demand to transfer "10s of millions of

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dollars" to support the coup. As reported REFETL A, Vezzaz
confirmed that SNIM has managed over the years to maintain
budget independence from various Mauritania regimes allowing
them to maintain and build a solid commercial base. Vezzaz
understood Dehayi had given the military some $600,000 to
appease them, but had told Aziz he could not defend the
larger amount. Vezzaz worried that whoever replaces Deyahi
will hand over the money just as SNIM needs cash for port,
rail, and mine expansion. He saw the risk Aziz will "do a
Mobutu" in gutting the most important economic element of the
Mauritanian economy.
HANKINS