Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NOUAKCHOTT640
2008-11-04 16:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
"WE NEVER TALK ANYMORE" MAURITANIA JUNTA WANTS TO
how-toVZCZCXRO2868 PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO DE RUEHNK #0640/01 3091637 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041637Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7792 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0228 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0277 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0606 RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0347 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0722
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000640
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: "WE NEVER TALK ANYMORE" MAURITANIA JUNTA WANTS TO
BE SEEN TO BE TALKING
REF: USUN 986
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000640
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: "WE NEVER TALK ANYMORE" MAURITANIA JUNTA WANTS TO
BE SEEN TO BE TALKING
REF: USUN 986
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) The USUN Demarche: The recent Mauritanian demarche
on US PermRep Ambassador Khalilzad reflects the junta's
frustration that the U.S., while maintaining an active
dialogue on security matters, has not engaged in direct
political talks with the regime as have some of our European
partners. On some of the specifics of Mauritanian PermRep
Ould Hadrami's comments, post would beg to differ:
-- Contact Policy: Ould Hadrami is correct that the Mission
has not sought out meetings with the military junta's "Prime
Minister" or his new cabinet; however, we would do so if
necessary to promote the return to constitutionality or as
needed for vital operational or security issues. We would
also respond if convoked by any minister but, so far, nobody
has asked to see us.
-- Past Meetings: Ambassador Boulware has met three times
with General Aziz since the coup and has spoken to him once
on the phone -- in all cases directly related to the return
to constitutionality.
-- Meeting with President Abdallahi: The Ambassador has
repeatedly requested to meet with President Abdallahi but the
request was never granted.
2. (C) The need to be seen talking: We have noted the
regimes use of meetings with foreign officials as "evidence
of dialogue" regardless of the substance of what was said.
"Prime Minister" Laghdaf's return from the October 20 Paris
meeting was hailed in the government-controlled press as a
significant step to better explaining Mauritanian reality to
the Europeans even as the Europeans called the meeting a
complete failure. The regime's "Foreign Minister" returned
from a meeting is Dar-es-Salaam with AU Chairperson Kikwete
with a similar regime message of success even though Kikwete
roundly condemned the coup. Meetings between visiting
foreign delegations are always played up in the official
media as a sign of return to diplomatic normalcy. The few
meetings with U.S. officials have not played well for the
regime because we brief non-government press afterward. The
regime has multiple avenues of communication with the Mission
should they really want to have a serious political dialogue
-- we just haven't seen the desire yet.
3. (C) But no dialogue: While the regime may say it wants
"dialogue" with the U.S., we have seen no signs of any
movement from their "you must accept the coup as a fact"
attitude they have held since the coup. European diplomats
noted that the junta's presentation at the October 20 Paris
meeting was as hard-line as any they had heard since the
coup. The lack of any effort to directly address any of the
serious questions posed by the EU frustrated Europeans who
might support a "pragmatic" resolution since they were given
nothing to work with. The second visit by the African
Union's Lamamra found General Aziz backsliding from previous
commitments -- which likely contributed to the AU PSC's
decision to issue its October 6 "ultimatum."
4. (C) A discussion they can control: After several delays,
the regime continues to speak about a National Dialoge that
will lead to a consensual political path forward; however,
that dialogue is to be managed by the military regime (as it
did in 2005). The FNDD has rejected any participation in any
negotiations without the prior release and full participation
of President Abdallahi. The regime continues with a
"Abdallahi who?" refrain suggesting the president is so
marginalized that he is no longer politically significant.
With an anticipated anti-coup majority in the Senate when it
meets this month, the regime's contention that "the
Mauritanian people support us" will be harder to maintain.
5. (C) They just don't get it: The regime's leadership
(particularly Aziz) still seems confused about the strong
negative reaction to the August 2008 coup when, from his
point of view, he is simply following the same script that
worked so well in 2005. We have seen some fissures among the
NOUAKCHOTT 00000640 002 OF 002
military leadership (but nobody yet ready to openly defy
Aziz) and press commentary that "Prime Minister" Laghdaf and
many other ministers rue their decisions to ally themselves
with the military.
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: "WE NEVER TALK ANYMORE" MAURITANIA JUNTA WANTS TO
BE SEEN TO BE TALKING
REF: USUN 986
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) The USUN Demarche: The recent Mauritanian demarche
on US PermRep Ambassador Khalilzad reflects the junta's
frustration that the U.S., while maintaining an active
dialogue on security matters, has not engaged in direct
political talks with the regime as have some of our European
partners. On some of the specifics of Mauritanian PermRep
Ould Hadrami's comments, post would beg to differ:
-- Contact Policy: Ould Hadrami is correct that the Mission
has not sought out meetings with the military junta's "Prime
Minister" or his new cabinet; however, we would do so if
necessary to promote the return to constitutionality or as
needed for vital operational or security issues. We would
also respond if convoked by any minister but, so far, nobody
has asked to see us.
-- Past Meetings: Ambassador Boulware has met three times
with General Aziz since the coup and has spoken to him once
on the phone -- in all cases directly related to the return
to constitutionality.
-- Meeting with President Abdallahi: The Ambassador has
repeatedly requested to meet with President Abdallahi but the
request was never granted.
2. (C) The need to be seen talking: We have noted the
regimes use of meetings with foreign officials as "evidence
of dialogue" regardless of the substance of what was said.
"Prime Minister" Laghdaf's return from the October 20 Paris
meeting was hailed in the government-controlled press as a
significant step to better explaining Mauritanian reality to
the Europeans even as the Europeans called the meeting a
complete failure. The regime's "Foreign Minister" returned
from a meeting is Dar-es-Salaam with AU Chairperson Kikwete
with a similar regime message of success even though Kikwete
roundly condemned the coup. Meetings between visiting
foreign delegations are always played up in the official
media as a sign of return to diplomatic normalcy. The few
meetings with U.S. officials have not played well for the
regime because we brief non-government press afterward. The
regime has multiple avenues of communication with the Mission
should they really want to have a serious political dialogue
-- we just haven't seen the desire yet.
3. (C) But no dialogue: While the regime may say it wants
"dialogue" with the U.S., we have seen no signs of any
movement from their "you must accept the coup as a fact"
attitude they have held since the coup. European diplomats
noted that the junta's presentation at the October 20 Paris
meeting was as hard-line as any they had heard since the
coup. The lack of any effort to directly address any of the
serious questions posed by the EU frustrated Europeans who
might support a "pragmatic" resolution since they were given
nothing to work with. The second visit by the African
Union's Lamamra found General Aziz backsliding from previous
commitments -- which likely contributed to the AU PSC's
decision to issue its October 6 "ultimatum."
4. (C) A discussion they can control: After several delays,
the regime continues to speak about a National Dialoge that
will lead to a consensual political path forward; however,
that dialogue is to be managed by the military regime (as it
did in 2005). The FNDD has rejected any participation in any
negotiations without the prior release and full participation
of President Abdallahi. The regime continues with a
"Abdallahi who?" refrain suggesting the president is so
marginalized that he is no longer politically significant.
With an anticipated anti-coup majority in the Senate when it
meets this month, the regime's contention that "the
Mauritanian people support us" will be harder to maintain.
5. (C) They just don't get it: The regime's leadership
(particularly Aziz) still seems confused about the strong
negative reaction to the August 2008 coup when, from his
point of view, he is simply following the same script that
worked so well in 2005. We have seen some fissures among the
NOUAKCHOTT 00000640 002 OF 002
military leadership (but nobody yet ready to openly defy
Aziz) and press commentary that "Prime Minister" Laghdaf and
many other ministers rue their decisions to ally themselves
with the military.
HANKINS