MEETING WITH AHMED OULD DADDAH'S VICE-PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000636

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH AHMED OULD DADDAH'S VICE-PRESIDENT
AND POTENTIAL RIVAL

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary. On October 29, AID Rep met with opposition
parliamentarian and RFD Vice-President Dr. Hamidou Kane to
discuss Mauritania's current political situation. The
meeting was at Kane's request. Immediately after the August
6 coup, Kane expressed his ardent support for the junta's
"rectification" and had high hopes for further positive
political change. Three months later, he is more pessimistic
but sees the potential of presidential elections on/about
October 2009, followed by new legislative elections, as the
light at the end of the tunnel -- provided that military are
prohibited from being candidates. Between now and those
elections, Kane believes that the HSC will take strong steps
in the near future to win over its splintering opposition as
alliances re-forge. End Summary.


2. (C) Kane,s pessimism stems from differing objectives
and increased splintering within what he sees as
Mauritania,s current political players: 1) the High State
Council (HSC) junta administration; 2) the FNDD coalition;
and 3) the classic opposition parties such as (Rassemblement
des Forces Democratiques) RFD, Mouvement de la Democratie
Directe (MDD) and Alliance pour la Justice et la Democratie
(AJD). While all three players are beginning to experience
break-away elements, their respective views have followed
standard lines for the past few months:
-- The HSC wants military leadership and no international
sanctions;
-- The FNDD wants President Abdallahi,s return to power, and
international sanctions, but does not want military
leadership;
-- The classic opposition wants no military leadership, no
return of President Abdallahi and no international sanctions.


3. (C) According to Kane, the classic opposition, in
particular, is falling victim to internal divides. Their
position is weakening as "opportunists" clamor to support HSC
for personal economic benefit. For example AJD,s
spokesperson recently became advisor to junta leader Abdel
Aziz, and the party broke its alliance with behemoth RFD.
Even within RFD, there are diverging views and support to
party president Ould Daddah may be weakening. Kane stated
that he continued to support Ould Daddah, but did not deny
that he had political aspirations of his own, having just
returned from what he referred to as a political campaign
trip to Spain to meet with the sizeable Mauritanian community
there. Kane sees the FNDD and HSC also beginning to lose
their strong footing as the country,s economy and social
system continue to struggle in the post-coup environment.
Like the RFD, both have fallen victim to individual
opportunists seeking personal gain and losing sight of their
political values.


4. (C) The Parliament,s Transitional Roadmap : In September
2008, National Assembly members held a questionably legal
extraordinary session, without the approval for the National
Assembly President. During that session, non-boycotting
members voted to approve a transitional roadmap they
developed that called for elections within 12-14 months of
the August coup. The roadmap did not stipulate whether or not
military would be allowed to run for President. Although
Kane participated in the session, he claimed he did not vote
on the roadmap because it lacked clarity on the military
candidacy issue. He emphasized that the HSC has not yet made
a decision regarding this draft, and it will likely be
further discussed during the anticipated yet oft-delayed
national consultation days.


5. (C) What the HSC will do to win support: Kane
anticipates that HSC will take strong measures to "convince"
the populace of the military's right to power through: 1)
constitutional revision; 2) a diplomatic rejection of
Israel; and 3) further restriction of public freedoms. Kane
opines that HSC will undertake a massive constitutional
revision with the reasoning that the current 1991
constitution is illegitimate as it was developed under an
illegitimate government. He thinks that the public will be
involved in voting for a constitutional referendum, instead
of just a legislative vote. He did not venture to presume
what will be contained in the new constitution. On Israel,

NOUAKCHOTT 00000636 002 OF 002


Kane anticipates that the HSC will soon break its diplomatic
relations in an effort to further gain Moor support, and
simultaneously snub its nose at the United States and other
western countries calling for Abdallahi's return to power.
Kane anticipates that this will help gain "significant" Moor
support for HSC but will have little if any effect on the
Afro-Mauritanian population. Finally, Kane predicts that the
HSC,s restrictions on personal freedoms, including freedom
of association will increase along with arbitrary arrests.
Kane supports the idea of constitutional reform and breaking
ties with Israel, but he draws the line with increasing human
rights violations and post-election military leadership. He
recommended that the United States and other western donors
support the return to democracy in Mauritania by funding new
presidential and legislative elections and helping to ensure
that only civilians are allowed to run as candidates. He also
cited the Department of State's annual Human Rights Report as
being an important tool to raise awareness, both
internationally and within Mauritania, on human rights
violations. Interestingly, Kane stated that an assassination
attempt on Abdel Aziz is a possibility, while a second coup
is looking all the more unlikely.


6. (C) Comment. The RFD, and the classic opposition as a
whole, likes to think of itself as a being centrist, and the
most politically realistic of the three political actors --
the "NiNi" option to the failings of both the military and
President Abdallahi. For all his to-and-fro positions, Ahmed
Ould Daddah has maintained himself as a separate option to
the two extremes; however, he has likely weakened his
personal political future. Kane's outreach to the Mission
reflects a possible transition of power within the RFD
leadership. In the rapidly changing Mauritanian political
landscape, we can expect periodic splintering on all sides,
new alliances and emerging political actors could be formed
in the not distant future. A constitutional referendum which
would likely be designed to legitimize the military junta is
a frightening thought; however, a loose coalition of
anti-coup forces exists for now capable of blocking a
rubber-stamp charade. The RFD, for one, seems to be looking
out for a long and treacherous transition. End comment.
HANKINS