DIPLOMATIC DISCORD ON NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000627

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU MR
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC DISCORD ON NEXT STEPS

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: The first "UNDP Group" meeting following
the failure of the October 20 Paris talks highlighted
substantial difference between Western missions on the way
forward -- centered primarily on the definition of what a
"return to constitutional order" means in practical terms.
European ambassadors generally find the U.S. "principled"
position utopian and, in the long term, counter-productive.
The U.S. (with the support of the EC rep) counter that overt
efforts to compromise with the military undermine our
democratic message and will ultimately lead to a long-term
solution that moves Mauritania and the region backward.
Everyone agrees that the lack of a unified position within
the international community undermines efforts to reach an
acceptable resolution to the crisis. End Summary


2. (SBU) The UNDP Group: Charge met October 26 with the
"UNDP Group" -- the Western Group that has met regularly
since the coup that includes the U.S., French, Spanish and
German Missions, the European Commission and UNDP
Representatives, and the IMF and World Bank representatives.
This was the first meeting in over two weeks and the first in
some time where all three European ambassadors were present.
Meetings are held at UNDP, hence, the group's name.


3. (C) Paris Meeting Readout: The French Ambassador and
European Commission Representative opened the meeting with a
readout of the October 20 EU-Mauritanian Article 96
Consultation they had both attended in Paris. Both expressed
their dismay that the regime had come to the meeting with
absolutely nothing new terming the presentations made by
"Prime Minister" Laghdaf and "Foreign Minister" Ould
Mohamedou as "Stalinist" in their rigidity. The Mauritanians
avoided all engagement on the direct questions posed: When
will the President and Prime Minister be released? What will
be their role in reaching a negotiated solution to the
crisis? Is there a basis for a politically acceptable
resolution? Does the High State Council intend to govern
during a political transition? Will the military present
themselves as presidential candidates? The Mauritanian
response was to restate their well-rehearsed vilification of
President Abdallahi and then say all other questions will be
resolved in a future national political dialogue. Despite
adjourning to give the Mauritanian's a chance to polish their
position, the meeting closed by 2:30. The layout of the
negotiating session had the French (as EU Presidency) and
European Commission on one side of the table opposite
Mauritania and the ACP on the other side (with the African
Union and the Francophonie seated to the side as observers).
The EC took significant objection to the intervention by the
ACP delegation that spoke of the "special circumstances" of
the coup. The EC reminded the ACP spokesman that his
organization had condemned the coup. Following the collapse
of the talks, "Prime Minister" Laghdaf tried to make the best
of the situation lauding the meeting as a "successful
beginning to dialogue" in some ways drawing upon the ACP
position as evidence of "better international understanding"
of Mauritania's circumstances. EC Development Commissioner
Louis Michel was adamant in his retort, "There is no success
and no dialogue. These talks are a failure."


4. (C) Next EU Steps: As the Paris meeting was closing, the
Europeans had tried to open the door for next steps by
suggesting a senior-level visit to meet with President
Abdallahi. The Mauritanians gutted that proposal by saying
it would have to be a joint EU/ACP delegations, that it would
have to meet with "ex-President" Abdallahi and ALL political
forces, and that Abdallahi would not be released prior to the
visit. The discussion in the UNDP Group started to diverge
when EC Representative Stammer spoke of the 30 days set by
the EC for the Mauritanians to return to the table with
something serious. Stammer stressed that the 30 days were
not set as an "ultimatum" but added that if the Mauritanians
came back with nothing new a move towards sanctions was
inevitable. Spanish Ambassador Polanco was quick to say "not
so fast" saying it would be a political decision of the
member states to decide whether to invite the Mauritanians
back in 30 days if nothing new seemed apparent and to decide
ultimately whether sanctions were appropriate. French
Ambassador Vandepoorter added that a meeting in 30 days would

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not likely require the prior restoration of democracy but
"positive signs." He cited the release of President
Abdallahi as, of course, the most important step the regime
could take, but added "credible efforts" at a national
dialogue as something else that could be considered.


5. (C) What does 'Constitutional Order" mean? The UNDP
group noted the divergence in international opinion on what
would be an acceptable resolution to the crisis. The Spanish
Ambassador noted, "My French colleague and I differ in
whether President Abdallahi's return is necessary to
re-establish constitutional order. The European Union
certainly has never stipulated that. The U.S. has set that
condition as have elements in the African Union." The French
Ambassador chimed in saying France had never stipulated "in
writing" that Abdallahi had to return. UNDP ResRep Ribeiro
stressed that "only" the AU's Ping had called for Abdallahi
to return. She also responded negatively when the Charge
suggested that the Security Council (through its PRST) had
given the lead to the AU -- saying that the Secretary General
of course preferred to support regional solutions to regional
problems but had not firmly committed the AU to that track.
Charge made clear that the U.S. position that the return to
constitutional order means the re-establishment of
constitutional institutions which, by definition, includes
restitution of the legitimate presidency. Charge noted that
the differences in nuance had existed since the beginning of
the crisis with the U.S. always stipulating the return of the
President as a requirement and the Europeans and others
leaving that question open. The fact that the issue
increasingly needs to be defined reflects some progress. At
the beginning nobody felt it necessary to clarify the
positions because the odds of a reversal were seen as slim so
the differences were largely theoretical -- the current
debate reflects the recognition of a greater chance of
successfully reversing the coup. German Ambassador Schanze,
the most pessimistic in the group, pushed back saying the
return of Abdallahi "even for one minute" is the one and only
thing that General Aziz could not accept. Insistence on that
point, which he added "nobody wants," only closed off the
opportunity for real dialogue and risked pushing the regime
to an ever more extreme position. The Spanish Ambassador
added that international rigidity was useful for General Aziz
since it allows him to play the sovereignty card -- playing
the masses by shifting responsibility for everything that may
go wrong in the future from himself to the interfering
international community. We run the risk of helping Aziz
become a new Taya -- staying on for the next 20 years,
according to the Spaniard.


6. (C) Blaming the Victim: The Europeans, led by the
Spanish, laid into the FNDD leadership -- most particularly
Mohamed Ould Maouloud. "He says "no" to the regime, he says
"no" to civil society, and he says "no" even to his own ally
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir" suggesting that there is an
effective "Aziz - Maouloud" alliance where both benefit form
gridlock. The Spaniard dismissed Ould Maouloud as an
"insignificant intellectual who could only poll 3% in the
presidential elections (it was 4%)" who is benefiting from
Abdallahi's detention to make himself more significant than
he merited. Charge was quick to point out that Maouloud had
always taken the position that he could not say "yes" to
anything until the President was free and that even Ould
Boulkheir had conditioned his exit strategy on first having
the chance to get Abdallahi's blessing. Charge cautioned
that we could not force a solution on the FNDD (even though
we knew many of the elements of a political deal being
discussed had a certain resonance within the FNDD) until they
had a chance to meet with Abdallahi.


7. (C) Comment: This discussion, as well as discussions at
a UNDP Group dinner Charge hosted October 24, reflects the
wide convergence of views held by locally assigned diplomats.
The German was quick to say he had the liberty to speak
freely since Berlin was not seized of the problem whereas he
saw his French colleague required to toe the line set by
their capitals. The Europeans are all smart, seasoned
diplomats who tend to discount the quality of democracy prior
to the coup and look more to security than progress towards a
better democracy as the main priority. They see the
principled U.S. position as naive and one that makes better

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the enemy of good. The UNDP representative is primarily
concerned with programming, not politics, and likes to play
the "good cop" role with Aziz saying "as someone who wants to
help your people, I have to say you have to do something to
get out of this mess." The French Ambassador tends to side
with his European brethren that "we won't get anything from
Aziz unless he gets something on his most important issue,"
but adds that his President's views are clear and that is the
line he needs to follow. He said his personal view is that
the international position needs to be in agreement on the
following: (a) President Abdallahi and Prime Minister Waghef
need to be released, (b) they need to be given the real
opportunity to be fully engaged in the political debate for a
resolution to the crisis, (c) the military must withdraw from
politics, and (d) new elections need to be credible. The
European Commission Representative is perhaps the hardest
against the coup saying "I don't believe a word the military
says." For him, as with Charge, the international community
needs a strong and consistent position that offers the
military no chance to legitimize their coup. The UNDP Group
agreed that public expressions of disagreements within the
international community concerning the need for President
Abdallahi to return tends to embolden Aziz to think his "wait
'em out" strategy will work.
HANKINS