REMINISCING WITH ABDALLAHI'S MINISTERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000616

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: REMINISCING WITH ABDALLAHI'S MINISTERS

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Charge met with two Abdallahi Ministers,
Minister of Agriculture and Livestock through all three
Addallahi governments Correa Issagha and Minister of Economy
and Finance during the first two governments Abderrahmane
Ould Hama Vezzaz, for their political assessment. Both were
concerned but generally optimistic about a return to
constitutionality. Both saw errors in pre-coup
administration that had helped set the conditions for the
coup and had ideas about how to do better next time. End
Summary

Correa Issagha
--------------


2. (C) Charge called on Issagha October 20 to follow up on
reports that Issagha had been arrested the previous day for
impersonating a minister. Charge was also interested in the
insights of one of the few ministers who had survived all
three Abdallahi governments. Issagha confirmed that he had
been ordered to meet with the Attorney General on the 19th.
He said police came to his door without a summons early in
the morning saying he had to go see the Attorney General.
Issagha told them he would go of his own volition on the
21st. Otherwise he would have to be shown a duly executed
summons or be taken in by force. After several quick
contacts with their headquarters, the police were instructed
to bring Issagha is against his will (although Issagha
described this as a respectful and non-abusive process). The
Attorney General told Issagha he was being summoned because
he continued to sign documents and present himself as a
Mauritanian Minister and had caused the country embarrassment
during the early October ACP Summit in Accra where he had
insisted on being seated as the "official" Mauritanian
delegation causing difficulties for the regime's own
delegation. Issagha responded first by challenging the
Attorney General to show him documentary evidence he had
signed anything as Minister after August 6, but then declared
"I am the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock of President
Abdallahi and, as is my right as a citizen, I refuse to
acknowledge any other president." The Attorney General let
him go with a, "Well, now you've been warned," statement.
Issagha said the police had confiscated his diplomatic
passport upon his return and that a promised regular passport
had yet to be issued. The FNDD leadership had suggested
Issagha stay in Senegal after the Ghana meeting as their
sub-Saharan envoy but Issagha responded "I don't want to be a
refugee."


3. (C) Turning to politics, Issagha (a mixed
Afro-Mauritanian Pulaar/Black Moor) advocated support for
Popular Alliance for Progress (APP) president and President
of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir's exit
strategy. He reviewed the three governments he had served in
starting in with the technocratic first government under Zein
Zeidane which he saw as high minded and smart but ultimately
hobbled by traditional political forces that felt left out
(like the parliamentarians who had created ADIL as the
President's party and then demanded a slice of the pie). The
first Waghef government tried to make allowances for regional
and ethnic representation but Issagha saw that as opening a
Pandora's box of every group wanting more and a division of
government unity as ministers increasingly worked for their
group's interests over national interests. Issagha said the
political wrangling never gave him a chance to truly evaluate
Prime Minister Waghef as a manager since Waghef never got out
of the starting gate. Issagha dismissed the second Waghef
government as being so compromised by the military to be
considered a government. Issagha, who was always seen as an
opposition member in the Abdallahi governments, said
Abdallahi had been fatally indecisive on many issues but that
he had shown integrity and firmness on the two most important
points -- the return of Mauritanian refugees and the reversal
of slavery. He saw Aziz as incensed by Abdallahi's attention
to "black issues" and said Aziz saw the Afro-Mauritanians as
having too much influence in the Abdallahi governments (even
though they remained under-representated as a percentage of
population).


4. (C) Charge asked what Issagha would like to see
differently if and when democracy in re-established. Issagha

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said greater focus on multi-nationalism (i.e. a shared
Afro-Mauritanian, White Moor, and Black Moor identity) but he
was quick the say this should not be quota driven. Issagha
argued that too much of Mauritanian society is based on
racial and tribal connections and that simply giving a bigger
cut to Afro-Mauritanians and Black Moors would only reinforce
that negative tendency. Issagha recognized traditional
tribal and clannish leaders as important for political
consensus but thought a model had to be found that respected
their influence without letting them run the show. "Let the
best qualified person get the job," is Issagha's mantra. He
dismissed the argument that affirmative action was needed to
give Mauritanian blacks equal competitiveness saying, "there
are lots of skilled Mauritanian blacks but they aren't in
Mauritania. They would come back if they thought they could
actually put their skills to work." Issagha chided Leader of
the Opposition Ahmed Ould Daddah as the epitome of clannish
politics saying, "He says Abdallahi won only because the
military gave Abdallahi money. Ould Daddah lost because
Mauritanians didn't want to see him come in to settle the
clan accounts against those who overthrew his father."

Abderrahmane Ould Hama Vezzaz
--------------


5. (C) Vezzaz was easily the minister most respected by the
international community in Abdallahi's first two governments.
Working 18-hour days non-stop, Vezzaz rebuilt Mauritania
credibility with the IMF and the World Bank, was the driving
force behind Mauritania's extremely successful donors
conference in December 2007, and was the point person for
every major donor program including our own MCC initiative.
Those close to Vezzaz indicate he was under threat by the
military and was scared. Others suggest his ego (he's good
and he knows it) put him in conflict with Prime Minister
Waghef. Either way, it is understood he chose not to be in
the second Waghef government and was not fired. Vezzaz told
Charge his health had deteriorated after his work in
government. After the coup, he "got away from it all" in a
quixotic month-long desert camping trek. Since his return,
he has been working within the FNDD as an ADIL representative
but has shun the limelight. As opposed to most FNDD leaders,
Vezzaz strongly claims a personal tie to President Abdallahi
that is reflected in his thoughts on an exit strategy.


6. (C) Despite his personal friendship with Abdallahi,
Vezzaz said, "the coup was pre-ordained the day the President
signed the paper making Aziz a general and rearranging the
military leadership according to Aziz's instructions." While
Vezzaz agreed with Charge that initially there was a
symbiotic relationship between Aziz and Abdallahi and that
Aziz could not mount a coup since he did not have support of
the rest of the Mauritanian military hierarchy, he said that
after a year and a half of carefully putting his people in
place Aziz no longer needed Abdallahi. Vezzaz did not
challenge the contention that Aziz had helped finance
Abdallahi's campaign and chided Abdallahi for thinking he
could play with the devil.


7. (C) Vezzaz described Mauritanian politics as a land of
"super delegates" -- the clan, religious, political, village
and business leaders who constitute the "notables" who can
generally deliver votes. He saw the post-August 6 reaction
as predictable given Mauritania's history. "Our tradition is
that military coups succeed. The notables assumed this one
would succeed whether they liked it or not. Since the Taya
coup resulted in 20 years of military rule, any notable who
wanted a position or privilege in the future made the logical
decision to fall in line with the coup." Vezzaz said this
coup proved different -- the unprecedented internal
opposition coupled with anti-coup international solidarity
was making the notables think the success of the coup is no
longer a given. Vezzaz saw the 20-member shift in the Senate
away from the junta as not so much opportunism as a
realization among that group of notables that there was a
chance (he was less generous with the pro-coup deputies in
the National Assembly suggesting they didn't have the
personal stature of "notable" -- they had won "independent"
campaigns financed by the military and had no future
possibilities unless the military retains its political
clout).


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8. (C) Vezzaz saw the greatest weakness of the Abdallahi
governments was poor communication -- an inability to reach
out to either the notables or, by passing them, directly to
the people. Some of the new ministers, Vezzaz said, assumed
the arrogance of power from day one. While he saw Prime
Minister Zeidane as smart, he said "it was over for him" when
he acted too much like an economist and too little as a
politician when food and energy cost increases first began to
bite in October 2007 -- recalling with Charge a Nero-esque
speech Zeidane gave in November as cities throughout
Mauritania were rioting that spoke of Mauritania's with-in
projections inflation rates and higher than anticipated
currency reserves. The speech was out of touch with common
Mauritanians. Vezzaz said a future democratic government
(one he hopes to participate in) will do a better job
explaining what it is doing and why and will have a better
dialogue with all the key stakeholders.


9. (C) Turning to the current situation, Vezzaz took pains
to thank the U.S. for its principled position since the
beginning of the coup. He said the stance had surprised
Mauritanians who assumed the U.S. had other interests in
Mauritania than democracy (whether access to natural
resources or security) and that even those who support the
military respect that the U.S. has stood firm. He said the
FNDD had been very nervous last week when the French Minister
of Cooperation had spoken of the situation in Mauritania as
"a coup d'etat, but one with very unusual circumstances."
Vezzaz said the FNDD was very concerned about the French
adding, "I know "the French" means many things -- there is
the Elysee but there are also the bureaucracy, the military
and intelligence services, and commercial interests." Vezzaz
said the FNDD knows President Sarkozy is an anti-coup
stalwart, but is unsure how long little Mauritania will keep
his attention before more "subtle French tendencies" take
over. Vezzaz saw the U.S. declaration of visa sanctions on
the 17th as a signal from Washington for Europe to be firm --
he saw the Paris fiasco for the regime as being possible only
because of the timely U.S. action. While seeing the
political tide turning against the junta, Vezzaz said any
softening of international resistance would be fatal. Only
two months after the coup, Vezzaz said the junta already saw
Spain as an ally. A weakening of the French or U.S. position
will encourage them to wait it out for six months or more
until international resolve withers away. Speaking of U.S.
visa sanctions, Vezzaz said he understood the policy affected
persons only if they actually make a visa application (i.e.
without a pre-approved "black list") but argued publishing a
list would have a far greater effect. (Comment: Mauritanian
web-sites published on October 21 what was purported to be
the U.S. black list -- likely an FNDD attempt to put the fear
of god into coup supporters on our behalf. End Comment).


10. (C) Vezzaz was critical of discussions of the return of
President Abdallahi coupled with a short transition to new
elections. While he believed the President's prestige had
been sufficiently damaged that he could no longer complete
his five-year mandate, Vezzaz argued that anything short of
an 18-month transition would ensure the worst of outcomes --
the democratic election of an inherently undemocratic
individual. Vezzaz said he doubted Abdallahi would want to
run again believing that a weakened public figure cannot win.
In that case he saw only Aziz, Vall and Ould Daddah as
candidates who could put together a short-notice campaign.
Ould Daddah, in Vezzaz's view, has flip flopped too much and
has lost his following. Even if Ould Daddah is given the
benefit of the doubt for having democratic convictions (which
Vezzaz does not believe),Vezzaz does no believe Ould Daddah
can win. That would leave one of two military leaders as the
only likely winners. Recalling his earlier "super delegate"
theme, Vezzaz argues that any three to six month transition
period would be read by the "notables" as a guaranteed
military victory in which case the notables will make the
"logical decision" of supporting the military (again). A
year-and-a-half or longer transition with the military well
and good out of politics would give a transition government
under Abdallahi the chance to prove that an unencumbered
democratic government can deliver the goods (Comment: Vezzaz
acknowledged that all the work he had done getting donor
money on stream before the coup was effectively lost and that
he or someone else would have to start all over again. End
Comment).

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11. (C) Charge closed the one-on-one dinner with Vezzaz on a
sensitive question -- how is the anti-coup movement financing
itself. Charge noted there were multiple rumors that there
had been significant transfers from government to private
accounts on the day of the coup which some assumed was the
funding source for the FNDD's international travel, operating
costs, high quality publications, and websites. Vezzaz
refuted the charge strongly challenging Charge to find one
such transfer. He added that even if those close to the
President had wanted to move the money somewhere the military
couldn't grab it, there had been no advanced notice to plan
for that. Furthermore, with Governor of the Central Bank
Kane siding with the coup and with multiple
military-supporters planted in his own ministry, Vezzaz said
they would have been blocked from overcoming the very
financial safeguards he himself had put in place. Vezzaz
said that the FNDD's position is precarious. Each party is
contributing something and they are getting some support from
unnamed international human rights NGOs. Noting the support
the junta is getting from key businessmen like Mauritanian
mogul Bouamatou, Vezzaz added that some businessmen see the
pro-coup business supporters as trying to take over and are,
discretely, providing modest financing, Vezzaz noted the
international travel of the Abdallahi emissaries is being
kept modest. He noted that one minister, Ould Kelb, who had
received a U.S. visa to go to New York for UNGA didn't go in
the end because the FNDD couldn't get the money together in
time for a ticket.
HANKINS