PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FORMALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000598

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FORMALLY
PROPOSES EXIT STRATEGY

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (SBU) Action Request: See paragraph 7.


2. (SBU) The President of the National Assembly, Messaoud
Ould Boulkheir, has sent all diplomatic and international
organization missions a diplomatic note outlining an exit
strategy he hopes "can serve as a basis for responsible
discussion acceptable to all concerned parties to develop
solutions that consolidate rule of law, stability, unity and
civil peace while preserving our precious democratic
accomplishments and hopes for greater prosperity." Ould
Boulkheir makes clear, "It goes without saying that the
utility of this proposal is subject to its acceptance by the
President of the Republic Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi
to whom I was unable to submit this plan due to the
conditions of his current detention." The proposal comes on
the eve of ACP Article 96 negotiations between the junta and
the European Commission scheduled to start October 20 in
Paris and is clearly timed to influence those talks.


3. (SBU) The elements of Ould Boulkheir's plan (full Dip
Note in French sent to AF/W) seeks to create a negotiated
process acceptable to the different parties and, in
particular, acceptable to, "(a) the party that benefits from
the force of legitimacy that is represented by President
Abdallahi, (b) the party that imposes itself as a fact that
is represented by General Aziz." The plan, which differs
from that earlier proposal calling for the resignation of
President Abdallahi in favor of the President of the Senate,
calls for two phases:

(a) Initial meetings between President Abdallahi and General
Aziz,

(b) Creation of a negotiating committee in the form of
Council for an Exit to the Crisis (Conseil de Sortie de Crise
(CSC)) composed of:

-- President Abdallahi
-- The President of the Senate
-- The President of the National Assembly
-- The Leader of the Opposition
-- The President of the Economic and Social Council
-- The President of the Constitutional Council
-- The President of the High Islamic Council
-- General Aziz
-- The President of the Human Rights Commission
-- The President of the Bar Association
-- A representative of the FNDD
-- A representative of parliamentarians in favor of the coup
-- A representative of the UN
-- A representative of the AU
-- A representative of the Arab League
-- A representative of the European Union
-- A representative of the United States


4. (SBU) Ould Boulkheir defines the role of the CSC as
finding a solution to the crisis built around six points:

(a) The return to legality and the restoration of President
Abdallahi to his legitimate functions.

(b) The creation of an impartial consensus government with
significant autonomy to organize residential elections with
neutrality and transparency with the "assistance and
supervision" of the international community. This government
would also re-engage state activities and restart economic
and diplomatic activities.

(c) Determination of the time needed to organize elections.

(d) Organization of presidential elections open to all who
are authorized by the constitution.

(e) Upon the completion of new elections, the new president
will dissolve the National Assembly and organize new
parliamentary elections.

(f) Military officers involved in the coup will have
guarantees protecting them from reprisal or settling of

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accounts. They will be isolated from all sensitive positions
in the army. Those who wish to play a political role must
resign from the military.

The CSC will automatically dissolve as soon as this plan is
adopted and formalized. The President will reassume his
functions with an engagement to respect and implement this
plan.


5. (SBU) Ould Boulkheir closes his plan noting that its
application will depend on continued pressure to convince
"all of the parties" that there is no other viable solution.


6. (C) Comment: Ould Boulkheir has played perhaps the most
constructive role since the crisis. Highly aware of his
constitutional role as President of the National Assembly, he
has consistently opposed the coup while remaining open to
dialogue. He is allied with the FNDD but maintains some
policy distance. His plan comes from the perspective of one
firmly opposed to the coup with just enough concessions to
make it theoretically doable. This plan would be a retreat
for the military but does allow for Aziz to be involved in
the political discussions about transition mechanisms and
leaves the door open for Aziz to run for president himself if
he resigns. By making no mention of the High State Council
or the Laghdaf Government (both of which he would see as
having no legal basis),by referrin to Aziz only as
"General," and by inserting the idea that all military coup
leaders would be removed from sensitive positions even if
they stay in the military makes this a strongly anti-coup
proposal. We have not yet had the chance to discuss the
proposal with FNDD leaders, but expect they would see this
calling for concessions on their part -- notably the
acceptance of only a temporary return of President Abdallahi
and the lack of restriction on future candidates. The FNDD
has previously been strong in its view that the military
should play no role whatsoever in discussions of transition
arrangements. If adopted, European partners are likely to
resent seeing the U.S. as the only bilateral member of the
CSC. End Comment


7. (SBU) Action Request: Please advise if and how Mission
should respond to the President of the National Assembly's
diplomatic note.
HANKINS