OTHER MAURITANIAN VOICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000590

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: OTHER MAURITANIAN VOICES

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

Meeting with President of the Senate
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1. (C) Charge met October 14 with President of the Senate Ba
Mamadou who would constitutionally be designated interim
president under the proposal put forward by President of the
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir whereby President
Abdallahi would return to office only to resign. Ba said he
sees strong consensus for a "NiNi" option that would see the
departure of both President Abdallahi and General Aziz. He
believes Abdallahi will resign freely if his advisors so
recommend but was quick to add that neither he nor anyone
else would make that commitment for him. Ba was already
thinking through the terms of a post-Coup reality with him is
a "transitional president." Taking a strictly constitutional
line he noted that the last Waghef Government would
constitutionally be the one to carry through the role of
governance through a transitional period (indicating
disagreement with those who would call for an
extra-constitutional establishment of a government of
national unity to work through the transition. Ba saw that
the 3 months specified in the constitution for a transition
government to organize new elections is too short and
indicated that, if he assumes the transitional presidency, he
would look for political/donor support for at least six
months.


2. (C) While already discussing post-coup scenarios, Ba was
not overly optimistic about the depart of General Aziz. He
sees falling confidence by Aziz supporters over the future of
the coup but see no movement from Aziz himself. Ba believes
still more pressure must be applied on Aziz directly and
indirectly through his military, political, and business
support base. He saw as vital U.S. action on bilateral
sanctions before the October 20 meeting with the European
Union.


3. (C) The President of the Senate discounted any signals
that the junta was reaching out to the FNDD as pure theater
and dismissed the upcoming National dialogue. He saw the
multiple new internal "mediation" efforts as largely led by
those who had sided with Aziz and are now trying to salvage a
political place for themselves. He did, however, see the
efforts by a coalition of Mauritanian human rights groups as
sincere and potentially constructive. Ba believes there will
be an anti-coup majority when the Senate reconvenes November
10 composed of the FNDD, Ould Daddah's RFD, and a group of
senators who have left the pro-coup coalition. He expected
the Senate will overturn everything enacted by the "illegal"
emergency session. While an anti-coup majority exists in the
Senate, the situation in the National Assembly is less clear.


4. (C) Ba, an Afro-Mauritanian Pullar, saw the risk that the
largely White Moor military will try to create an ethnic
conflict to divert attention from the coup. He believes the
military is already starting to provoke racial tensions
noting that some Afro-Mauritanian land titles are suddenly
being disputed in his home region of Boghe. He added that
most Afro-Mauritanian leaders will be cautious not to allow
themselves to be drawn into a provoked dispute as long as
they believe some resolution to the political crisis remains
possible.

Meeting with Ahmed Ould Daddah
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5. (C) The Charge also met October 14 with the now
pro-coup/then anti-coup formal leader of the opposition Ahmed
Ould Daddah. As always, Ould Daddah was thoughtful and
nuanced in his views -- a trait that is not understood by the
public which increasingly sees him as a flip-flopping
opportunist. Ould Daddah said, "I occasionally feel a bit
more optimistic about the situation," noting that two months
after the coup there is national consensus on the need to get
the military out Aside from a few "independent"
parliamentarians, Ould Daddah said the military no longer
has any political base. That said, Ould Daddah said he was
still not seeing much from Aziz indicating any willingness to
quit. He was hard pressed to identify any key leverage point
on the general since Aziz always keeps his own council and
has few associates with any real influence on him. He saw
little that could be done to get Aziz to voluntarily give up

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power. He saw the role of international pressure to be
useful in getting those around the general to eventually
abandon him -- a kind of "first penguin" strategy that would
quickly make the general inconsequential once the first
person who fears him takes the plunge.


6. (C) Ould Daddah told Charge he continues to reach out to
the FNDD and that he sees the need for serious dialogue
between all parties. He differs with the FNDD and Boulkheir
on the question of President Abdallahi's return to office
even if temporary -- seeing that as symbolically impossible
for the military to accept. For Ould Daddah, is Abdallahi is
prepared to resign he should do so without returning to
office. Ould Daddah said he is not opposed to Boulkheir's
idea of having the President of the Senate leading a
transitional government but he saw the idea as unlikely to
move forward citing (a) the view Ba is too close to Abdallahi
and (b) Ba's "corruption" issues. Ould Daddah saw the exit
through the establishment of a highly independent transition
government that might even leave a role for Aziz as a purely
titular President during the transition.


7. (C) Ould Daddah saw as the worst possible outcome of the
current crisis being the return of Col. Vall. Ould Daddah
condemned Vall for having blood on his hands over the late
80's attacks on Afro-Mauritanians, being deeply involved in
the drug trade, and being perhaps the most corrupt of
Mauritanians.


8. (C) Ould Daddah cautioned that any resolution to the
crisis not be at the cost of the institution of the military
which, he said, "Mauritania needs now more than any time in
its history." He saw that the military's departure from
politics needed to be matched by the political commitment to
provide the training, equipment, and support needed to meet
Mauritania's real security concerns.
HANKINS